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Some Personal Impressions 



SOME PERSONAL 
IMPRESSIONS 



BY 

TAKE JONESCU 

FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF ROUMANIA 

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M. 




NEW YORK 

FREDERICK A. STOKES COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 



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CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction vii 

I Monsieur Poincare 3 

II Prince Liciinowsky 11 

III Count Berciitold 25 

IV The Marquis Pallavicini ... 33 
V Count Goluciiowsky 43 

VI August 2, 1914 51 

VII Kiderlen-Waeciiter 61 

VIII Count Aehrentiial 79 

IX Count Czernin 91 

X Count Mensdorff 105 

XI England's Antipathy to War . . 113 

XII The Responsibility for the War . 119 

XIII King Charles of Roumania . . . 125 

XIV Herr Riedl 141 

XV Count Szeczen 151 

XVI Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace . 157 

XVII Baron Banffy 1C3 

XVIII Roumanian Policy 171 

XIX Tragedy 177 

XX Count Tisza 183 

XXI Talaat Pasha 189 

V 



vi CONTENTS 

PAOK 

XXII PfilNCE von Hi. low £03 

XXIII Tatichkff 215 

XXIV France and the Teuton .... ££S 
XXV A Cousin oi Tissa £S1 

XXVI New Italy 887 

XXVI I My Four Last Germans . . . . 24S 

XXVI11 Eleutherios Veniselos .... 269 

XXIX The k user 281 



INTRODUCTION 

BY VISCOUNT BRYCE 

Tins book should need no introduction, for all 
who have tried to follow the course of events 
in the Danubian States and Balkan States 
during the last few years cannot but know the 
name and fame of Mr. Take Jonescu, one of 
the most active and gifted, as well as one of 
the most highly cultivated statesmen in East- 
ern Europe. However, at the request of its 
author, whose acquaintance I had the good 
fortune to make when traveling in Roumania 
fourteen years ago, I willingly write a few 
sentences of Preface to this English transla- 
tion. The French original (for Mr. Jonescu 
writes French with singular facility, clearness, 
and grace) has already found many readers, 
and this version deserves to win for it a still 
larger circle here and in America. 

Those of us who in France and the English- 
speaking countries have grown familiar with 
the names of the more prominent actors in the 



viii INTRODUCTION 

great and gloomy drama of the last ten or 
twelve years, must have often wished to know 
something of the personalities that lay behind 
the names. What were their talents, their 
characters, their manners? What were the 
ideas and motives which prompted either their 
avowed purposes or their secret aims? In 
some eases these motives may long remain ob- 
scure, but in others the recorded words and 
acts are sufficient to enable those who were in 
close touch with them to form a just estimate 
and present to us true portraits, provided al- 
ways that such observers bring discernment 
ami impartiality to the task. The book is 
modestly entitled "Some Personal Impres- 
sions"; and the descriptions it contains are for 
the most part vigorous sketches rather than 
portraits. Some, however, may be called vig- 
nettes, more or less finished drawings, each 
consisting of few lines, but those lines sharply 
and firmly drawn. Intermingled with this 
score of personal sketches there are also a few 
brief essays or articles which set before us 
particular scenes, little fragments of history 
in which the author bore a part, all relating to 
the persons who either figured in the war. or 
were concerned with the intrigues from which 
it sprang. Among these we find several Cer- 



INTRODUCTION ix 

man statesmen — Kiderlin-Waechter, Prince 
Biilow, and Prince Lichnowsky, a large num- 
ber of Austrians, among whom Counts Berch- 
told, Achrcnthal, Goluchowsky, Czernin and 
Mensdorff, are the best known ; the late King 
Charles of Roumania, the German Emperor, 
Eleutherios Venizelos, and lastly the most 
ruthless and unscrupulous ruffian (with the 
possible exception of Trotsky) whom the war 
has brought to light, the Turkish Talaat 
Pasha. 

These, with some minor personages, make 
an interesting gallery, for though most of 
them are dealt with very briefly — sometimes 
merely by telling an anecdote or reporting a 
single conversation — still in every case a dis- 
tinct impression is conveyed. We feel that 
the man described is no longer a name but a 
creature of flesh and blood, with something by 
which we can recognize him and remember 
him for future use. National characteristics 
are lightly but brightly touched. Among the 
Germans, Kiderlin-Waechter stands out as in 
Mr. Jonescu's judgment the ablest, and Biilow 
the cleverest. If the Austrian statesmen are, 
or were, what he paints them (and there seems 
no reason to doubt the general justice of his 
observations), the hideous failure of their di- 



x INTRODUCTION 

plomacy becomes comprehensible. A dynasty 
guided by such servants was fated to perish in 
the storm its folly had raised. Aehrenthal and 
Tisza were at least men of force and ability, 
but an ability which did not exclude bad prin- 
ciples and rash unwisdom. The rest were 
mostly ciphers; while of Count Berchtold, the 
description given by Mr. Jonescu successfully 
conveys to the reader that there was nothing 
to describe, at least on the intellectual side. 
One may pity the people which was guided by 
such statesmen, for they were not its choice, 
but one cannot pity the dynasty which did 
choose them. It well deserved to perish, after 
three centuries of pernicious power. 

Besides the illuminative glimpses of curious 
scenes, and the vivacious sketches of notable 
personages, which these pages contain, the 
reader will find in them some contributions to 
history of permanent interest. We are helped 
to apprehend the views, and comprehend what 
is now called the "mentality" with which the 
ruling caste in Germany entered the war. It 
has been often said of late that the men in 
whose hands great decisions lay were not great 
enough for the fateful issues they had to decide. 
Quan tul a sapientia regitur mundus seems even 



INTRODUCTION xi 

truer now than it did in the days of Oxen- 
stierna. Among all the "Impressions" this 
book records, that is the one which stands out 
conspicuous. 



Monsieur Poincare 



MONSIEUR POINCARE 

On New Year's Eve, 1913, I arrived in Paris. 
I was on my way to London, where the 
Balkan Conference was then sitting. Negotia- 
tions between the Turks and the Balkan 
States had come to a deadlock, and I hoped 
to profit by this to the extent of coming to 
some pacific settlement of our territorial dif- 
ferences with Bulgaria. It was my intention 
to offer the support of Roumania to Bulgaria, 
which at that date meant the Balkan league, 
and if necessary to promise military assistance 
in order to force the Turk to give up Adrian- 
ople. 

The Powers had no notion what to do. It 
was felt that there was little chance of mere 
collective notes having any success, and as for 
a naval demonstration, which alone could have 
saved the face of Kiamil's government, the 
Powers were too jealous and distrustful of 
each other to act together in this way. On 
the other hand it was certain that the armed 

3 



4 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

resistance of Turkey was shattered and that to 
force her hand would really be doing her a 
kindness. It' only it had been done then. 
Turkey would have escaped Enver and her 

present misfortunes. 

It is useless to repeat what I have so often 
said, that the idea of a war with Bulgaria, and 
possibly with all the Balkan States — our tradi- 
tional friends — was utterly repugnant to me. 
It was even possible that such a war might 
bring about the expected European con- 
flagration, in which we should find ourselves 
on the side of Austria-Hungary, a prospect 
that was altogether odious to me, for in it I 
saw the grave of our future and of our 
national ideal. 

I hoped the Bulgars would appreciate the 
situation and would hasten to accept my sug- 
gestions. If only they had done so, peace with 
Turkey would have been signed in the first 
week of January. 1913, the second Balkan 
war would probably not have taken place, and 
the European war would have been averted 
for an indefinite number of years. 

Although my hopes oi' arriving at an under- 
standing with Bulgaria were high. I took the 
possibility of failure into consideration and 



MONSIEUR POINCARE 5 

realized that I might want the friendly sup- 
port of the Great Powers. This was why, 
before leaving Bucharest, I intimated to Mon- 
sieur Poincare, then Prime Minister of 
France, that I was about to visit him. 

ii 

M. Poincare received me on the 1st of 
January, 1913, at half-past eight in the morn- 
ing, an hour that in Paris is certainly an 
absurd time for an appointment; but I had to 
go to London in the afternoon, and on ac- 
count of its being New Year's Day, Monsieur 
Poincare was due at the ISlysee at ten o'clock 
for the official ceremonies. 

I asked Monsieur Poincare for the support 
of France in our difficulties with Bulgaria. 
He made the warmest declarations of friend- 
ship for Roumania; promised me his own per- 
sonal cooperation, but said, "My action is 
naturally limited by the fact that relations 
with our ally are most cordial while, owing to 
your military convention with Austria and 
Germany, you will be in the enemy's camp if 
war breaks out. You know well," and he 
could not have spoken with greater sincerity, 
"that we do not want war, and are doing 



6 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

everything to avoid it. But if our adversaries 
force us to go to war the fact that your 300,- 

000 rifles are on their side cannot be a matter 
of indifference to us." 

As the Treaty between Roumania and the 
Triple Alliance was supposed to be kept secret 

1 had to pretend that I knew nothing about 
the obligation he was alluding to. 

The French Prime Minister, who knew the 
situation precisely, then asked me if I could 
assure him that in the event of war — a war 
that France would never provoke — he could 
hope that France and her allies would not 
find the Roumanian army against them. 

Personally I had not believed for many 
years that the Roumanians and Magyars 
would ever fight side by side, but on the 1st 
of January, 1913, it was impossible for me 
to make any valid promise in Roumania's 
name. 

I could only tell Monsieur Poincare that I 
could not give him an answer, but that if I 
were in his place I should grant Roumania 
as much help as was compatible with my al- 
liances and my obligations, and leave it to the 
future to prove whether I had acted wisely 
or not. 



MONSIEUR POINCARE 7 

III 

The events of 1913 confirmed my beliefs. 
With great clearness I saw that the idea of 
shedding Roumanian blood to glorify Magyar- 
ism was such an absurdity that no one on 
earth could give effect to it. 

On the 9th of September, 1913, I paid 
Monsieur Poincare another visit. He was 
then President of the Republic. He con- 
gratulated me on the success of Roumania, 
and I took occasion to say: "On New 
Year's Day you asked me a question which 
I could not then answer; I will give you your 
answer to-day. If war does break out — and 
I devoutly hope humanity may be spared 
such a calamity — you will not find the Rou- 
manian army in your enemies' camp." 

"Have you cancelled the treaty of al- 
liance?" he asked. 

"I know nothing about any treaty. All I 
know is that the Roumanian army will not 
be in your enemies' camp. I am quite certain 
about it, and if I did not know that we are 
both believers in peace and are doing all we 
can to preserve it, I should say that events 
will prove me right. Let us hope that they 
may never have occasion to do so." 



8 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

"But are you sure to remain long in 
power?" he asked. 

"Far from it, I shall be out of office in two 
months, but that doesn't matter. What I am 
telling you is true irrespective of what min- 
isters comprise the government. After what 
has happened this summer no one will be able 
to make Roumanians fight against their will 
or against the dictates of national honor and 
interest;" 



Prince Lie know sky 



II 

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 

Twenty years ago Prince Lichnowsky was 
Secretary to the German Legation in Bucha- 
rest. 

I knew him in those days as an intelligent 
young man, gay, witty and a real grand 
seigneur. Though a German diplomat he 
was Polish by origin and had all the adapta- 
bility, vivacity and brilliance of his race. We 
got on admirably. 

I did not see him again until early in 
January, 1913, when I went to London to try 
and come to an understanding with Monsieur 
Danef over Bulgar-Roumanian difficulties. 

Prince Lichnowsky had come back into the 
Diplomatic Service after a very long absence. 
He had only done so at the reiterated request 
of the Kaiser, who believed him to be the only 
man capable of succeeding Baron Marschall 
in London, Baron Marschall at that time hav- 
ing the reputation of being the ablest diplo- 
mat in the German service. I may as well say 

11 



12 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

here that in spite of his ability Marschall had 
not been much of a success in England. He 
had lived too long in Constantinople to make 
a good Ambassador at St. James's. 

Prince Lichnowsky took his task seriously. 
He spared himself no trouble to win people's 
confidence, and in a short time had accom- 
plished marvels in this direction. He was 
extremely frank, and his clear picturesque 
way of talking impressed people. It was he 
who, in speaking to me of the two little bits 
of Bulgar territory that jutted out into our 
Dobrudja, which Danef was at the time of- 
fering me as a complete satisfaction for our 
claims, contemptuously described them as 
"the two dugs of the bitch." 

I will not now describe my interviews with 
Lichnowsky in 1913. I must admit, however, 
he was more than friendly and kind, and did 
me real services. He went so far even with- 
out waiting for the sanction of his Govern- 
ment as to make a proposal favorable to us 
at the Balkan Conference then sitting in Lon- 
don. I shall have something to say of all this 
another time. 

I must, however, mention two points relat- 
ing to that moment. One day Lichnowsky 
assured me that the relations between Eng- 



PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 13 

land and Germany were excellent. The next 
day Sir E. Grey said to me, "If Prince Lich- 
nowsky makes the proposal you speak of I 
shall receive it most favorably, as I do every- 
thing that comes from the German Ambassa- 
dor. We are on excellent terms." 

This was really remarkable when one thinks 
of the then recent Agadir crisis. I came to 
the conclusion that there was no danger of 
European war, and on the 7th of January, 
1913, I wrote to King Charles that I was 
positive the great war would not break out 
yet awhile. 

At that same time Lichnowsky said to me, 
"We will do what we can for you, but our 
means are limited. You should really apply 
to Vienna, as Austria can do a good deal at 
Sofia if she wishes to. I am sure there is 
something brewing between Austria and Bul- 
garia. I don't know exactly what it is, but 
something is going on." 

In the spring of 1914 I was again in Lon- 
don for six days. Prince Lichnowsky gave a 
luncheon in my honor. All the Embassy staff 
were there, including the notorious Kiihlman, 
then Councilor of the Embassy, now Min- 
ister at the Hague, who at that time was un- 
fortunately corresponding with the Kaiser over 



14 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

the head of Lichnowsky and was giving false 
information to Berlin as to the state of affairs 
in England. 

1 asked Lichnowsky how matters stood be- 
tween England and Germany, and if he was 
as pleased with things as he had been in 
January, 1918. He replied that he had suc- 
ceeded in his efforts, and that Germany and 
Great Britain were on the best of terms. 

"I told the Kaiser," he said, "that nothing 
could be easier for ns than to keep up good 
relations with England— because England 
genuinely cares for peace. But in order to 
do this we should never attack or annoy 
France, because in that ease England would 
hack her to the last man and the last shilling, 
and as it is not to our interest to irritate 
France, you see that our relations with Eng- 
land will remain of the best." 

My impressions accorded with those of the 
German Ambassador. 1 felt that England 
would not tolerate an attack on France, hut 
putting that aside it was certain that in Lon- 
don the desire was to be on good terms with 
Germany, In that one saw the guarantee of 
peace. 

On July the 12th, 1914, I again arrived in 
London. I saw Lichnowsky and discussed the 



PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 15 

Albanian question with him, which had by 
then become disquieting, and also the silence 
of Austria as to what line she was going to 
take over the Serajevo drama. Lichnowsky 
felt that Austria had something up her sleeve. 
His Austrian colleague Count Mensdorff was 
uncommunicative. Lichnowsky had been in 
Berlin since the Serajevo assassination, and he 
was not pleased with what he had seen in the 
Wilhelmstrasse. "They are giving Austria a 
free hand," he said, "without thinking where 
it may lead us. I warned them, but I am not 
happy about it, and am beginning to regret 
that I did not stay in Berlin." Lichnowsky 
did not conceal the fact that Tchirsky, the 
German Ambassador at Vienna, was encour- 
aging the bellicose tendency of Austria. 

Lichnowsky's apprehensions were well 
grounded. The German Chancellor, Beth- 
man-Hollweg, had never been well up in ques- 
tions of foreign politics — far from it. As for 
Von Jagow, I knew that at the time he was in 
Rome he had told one of his colleagues that in 
the Balkan incidents he saw the proof of the 
approaching disintegration of Austria-Hun- 
gary, and that it was a disturbing problem. 
With a fixed idea like that in his head it would 
be easy to make mistakes. 



1(> SOME PERSONAL OPPRESSIONS 

On Wednesday, July the 22d, I dined with 
Baroness Deichman, sister of Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna. The 
house was one of the social centers of London 
and lent itself most favorably to an Anglo- 
German understanding. I knew thai I was to 
meet Lichnowsky, who had expressed a wish 
to talk to me thai very day, 

After dinner 1 went with Lichnowsky into 
a sitting-room in which there hung - a fine 
portrait o( Sir Maurice de Bunsen, painted, 
it' I am not mistaken, by the great English 
artist, Herkomer, 

Lichnowsky was in Court dress; he was to 
see the King that evening. I do not know 
what the occasion was. \\c told mo ho had 
not yel succeeded in finding out the text ot' 
the demands Austria was making of Serbia, 
hut that ho had Learned enough to know that 

they would ho very, very harsh. Ho know that 
amongst other things Austria had asked for 
the suppression o( a nationalist society in 
Serbia, and that alone seemed to him to bo 
going pretty far. He earnestly begged mo to 
suggest to tho Roumanian Government that 
they should use any influence they had at 
Belgrade to gel the Austrian note, no matter 
was, accepted by Serbia, "1 promise 



PRINCE LI( IINOVVSKV IT 

you," he said, "thai in the carrying of it out, 
the Serbs can whittle it down or evade the 
conditions, and we can sec i<> it that nothing 
is said. I take that <>u myself. We must get 

round fchlS crisis somehow. For instance, the 
order to SUppreSS a patriotic Society need 

not really mean anything. In a few months 
they eoidd resurrect it under another name." 
I promised him to do whal I could. That 
very night I telegraphed what the German 
Ambassador had communicated to me to Mon- 
sieur Bratiano, the then President of the 
Roumanian Council, 

ii 

On Friday, July the 24th, the Austrian 
Ultimatum was published, [n reading the 
Times- I said to my wile, "This means Eu- 
ropean war; we must get hack to Roumania." 

I went to sec Liehnowsky in the morning. 

lie was at the Foreign Office. I went to 

his house later and found him very much 
upset. Obviously the /Austrian note had ex- 
ceeded his expectations. He was, however, 

firmly convinced that there was no danger of 

war. He was sure that some way of preserv- 
ing peace would be found. lie (old me with 
an ironic* smile that he had heen instructed to 



18 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

advocate to the English Cabinet the "localiza- 
tion" of the question at issue between Serbia 
and Austria. He did not express his opinion 
of this folly, but it was evident that he thought 
it ridiculous. He was so certain of peace that 
he asked me if I were going direct to Aix-les- 
Bains from Brighton or whether I should re- 
turn to London for one night. When I an- 
swered that it would depend on the political 
situation he said good-by, being certain that 
I should go straight on to Aix from Brighton. 
He was so assured in bearing that I tele- 
graphed to Paris and Aix to announce my 
arrival. 

At Brighton in the afternoon of Saturday 
and again on Sunday I received communica- 
tions from London that showed me that Lich- 
nowsky was deceiving himself and that Tchir- 
sky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, was 
pushing Austria on to take up an overbear- 
ing attitude. I telegraphed to my friend 
Mishu, Roumanian Minister in London, ask- 
ing him to book places for me in the Ostend 
Express for Tuesday morning, the 28th of 
July, and I informed my brother at Aix-les- 
Bains that I had given up my journey thither. 

I returned to London on Monday morning 
the 27th of July. From the station where my 



PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 19 

friend Mishu met me I went straight to Prince 
Lichnowsky and told him of my agitation and 
of my decision to go back to lloumania. He 
told me I was wrong, that there was no possi- 
bility of war, not a hundred to one chance of 
it ; that in my place he would stay on in Lon- 
don because it would be so tiresome to go from 
London to Aix-les-Bains via Bucharest. In- 
sisting on the danger of war, I said, "It is 
all the more serious — because we must not 
delude ourselves as to the attitude of Eng- 
land. In spite of the pacifism of its Gov- 
ernment, England will certainly come in." 

Lichnowsky, forgetting what he had said to 
me in the spring, said, "Of that I am not so 
sure as you are." "You are wrong," I said. 
"I know the English. No one in the world 
will be able to prevent them mixing them- 
selves up in a war provoked with so much 
injustice. If you believe the contrary you 
are profoundly mistaken." 

He went on repeating that it might be 
possible, but that he was not so sure of Eng- 
land's coming in as I was. That is the one 
weakness that I found in Lichnowsky 's judg- 
ment at that time. Of course like a great 
many other people he had been blinded by the 
Irish question. 



20 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

I followed Lichnowsky's advice. I gave up 
my tickets for Tuesday the 28th, but being 
more distrustful than the German Ambassa- 
dor I took places on the express for the fol- 
lowing day, Wednesday the 29th. It turned 
out to be the last through train. 

On the morning of Tuesday the 28th, when 
I saw Lichnowsky, he was a changed man. He 
had begun to lose confidence. He only saw a 
seven to three chance of peace, and although 
he assured me of his hope that humanity would 
be spared such a nameless folly, he said, "Go 
back to Roumania. There are none too many 
good brains about; don't deprive your coun- 
try of yours. I hope you will soon come back, 
but I understand your going." v 

I saw him for the last time in the afternoon 
of Tuesday the 28th. He was pale — a man 
undone. He told me the peace of the world 
hung by a thread. I have seldom seen any- 
one so overcome. 

I had a profound conviction that this man 
was sincere, that he had genuinely worked 
for peace, that he had served his country with 
all his strength, and that for all the calamities 
unchained by the black executioner of Buda- 
pesth and the criminals of Berlin he deserves 
no blame. 






PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 21 

I hope Prince Lichnowsky, for whose con- 
fidence and friendship I am grateful, will 
forgive me for witnessing to history in such 
detail. The day will come when the German 
people — once more sober — will remember that 
their true servants are those who did their 
best to save their country from the torrent of 
universal hate unloosed against it by this war 
— a war naked of all excuse. 



Count Berchtold 



Ill 

COUNT BERCHTOLD 

I HATE only had two political conversations 
with Count Berchtold during my life, but they 
were enough to enable me to take the measure 
of the man. After each of them I wondered 
to myself how it was possible that such a per- 
son could be Minister of Foreign Affairs to a 
Great Power. The phenomenon was ex- 
plained to me by a Viennese journalist. "In 
our country it is necessary for a Count to suc- 
ceed a Count." I state this for what it is 
worth, but I have never succeeded in finding 
a better reason. 

Count Berchtold is a fine-looking man, if 
one admires that type of person. Gentle- 
manly, extremely gentlemanly, with good 
manners — and that is all there is to him. I 
should have nothing to add if I wanted to 
paint his portrait. 

I was motoring in Northern Italy when 
Count Berchtold went to Sinaia in Septem- 
ber, 1912, to pay a visit to King Charles. A 

25 



SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

o Sinaia caught me at Ven 
In it i med me that it was eon- 

ild stop at Vienna 
ad se< Count Berchtold, 
1 and< in that Bang Charles 

thought a change in the Austrian Govern- 
ment imminent and that he wished me to he in 
personal touch with the new director of Aus- 
v. 1 acquainted Count Berchtold 

th my wish to visit him. and he eame in 
from the country to Vienna in order to re- 
e me. 

We chatted for an hour, lie tried to ex- 
plain to me his notorious Circular on the 
deeentrali/ation of the Ottoman Empire-— the 

i ular that precipitated the outbreak of the 
Balkan War. 1 could make nothing of it. 
Re complained that his intentions had been 
misunderstood everywhere, lie laid himself 
out to reveal them to me. but again 1 did not 
understand him any the better. Was the 
business too intricate, or was I too limited- 
I don't really know. 

Speaking to him of the tieklish condition 
of Balkan affairs, 1 said, '"If you can keep 
the peaee for another couple of months the 
situation will be saved. "Mountain wars are 
not undertaken after November." "Whv 



COUNT BERCHTOLD 27 

should the peace be kept for two months 
only? 1 am sure that peace is in no way 
threatened in the Balkans. You can be cer- 
tain of that," he replied confidently. Did 
he want to mystify me or did he not know 
the real situation? 

In the course of conversation I spoke of the 
folly of competitive naval armaments and 
asked why Austria too should be travelling 
down the same road. "Why," I asked, "do 
you want a big fleet? You have no Colonies; 
you never will have any Colonies, and your 
oversea trade will never be of much impor- 
tance. What good is a fleet to you? If you 
are seeking security against Italy you are 
committing a fundamental error. You will 
never be able to fight Italy on the sea, not 
only because she will always be your superior, 
but also because, in the event of such a con- 
flict, she would be the ally of France and Eng- 
land, and your Dreadnoughts would never 
even put to sea. If, on the other hand, you 
expect to be on Italy's side she will not need 
your fleet. She would prefer to increase her 
own. Besides," I added, "I don't understand 
what Germany is up to either"; and there- 
upon I repeated to him what I had said to 



88 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Kiderlen-Waeehter in Berlin some ten months 
previously. 

In reply Count Berchtold explained to 
me what 1 had already suspected — that the 
increase of the Austrian Navy had been 
demanded by Germany, and that the day 
was coming when the Austro-German fleets 
would have a real superiority over the Eng- 
lish fleet. He recogniied that England 
could always build more ships than the two 
Teutonic Empires, but he was sure that she 
would soon bo short of erews. "With their 
system of voluntary enlistment the supply o( 
recruits will soon fail, whereas we with our 
compulsory service can always get as many 
men as we want. Then we could attack and 
destroy England." 

I listened with amazement to this "Minister 
of a Great Tower, lie did not seem to 
realize that the day England found she could 
not get enough volunteers for her Navy, that 
day she would introduce compulsory service, 
but that she never could allow herself to be 
outclassed by Germany at sea. 

II 

The second time I saw Count Berchtold 
was on the 11th or 12th of September, 1013. 



COUNT BERCHTOLD 29 

I am not quite sure of the clay. I rather 
think, however, it was the 11th. He hegan 
by making most ample apologies both on 
his own account and on that of Count Tisza 
for an incident that had recently occurred at 
Deva, when the small Roumanian flags on my 
wife's motor had been torn off by Hungarian 
police. We then spoke of the great political 
crisis we had just been through. He told me 
he had been much criticized and had been ac- 
cused of not having protected the rights and 
position of Austria-Hungary. I replied — in 
accordance with my genuine conviction — that 
even if it were really true that the designs on 
Salonika attributed to Austria were but a 
calumny, Austria had lost nothing through 
the Balkan crisis, that even her caprices had 
been satisfied, and that therefore she had 
absolutely no cause for grievance. I added 
that he could, if he would, establish good 
relations with Serbia, more especially as for 
at least fifteen or twenty years to come the 
Serbians would be more than busy with their 
newly acquired territory. I assured him that 
this was the genuine belief of Monsieur 
Pasitch, and that if Austria would but show 
herself a little less hostile everything would 
once more go smoothly. 



130 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

We talked, too, of Albania, which he looked 
upon as his own creation, and seemed sur- 
prised that I know the Albanians and Al- 
banian affairs as well as I did. I must own 
that on this subject he was very well in- 
formed, but all the same he seemed to me com- 
pletely deluded. For example, he told me 
that at that moment law and order in Albania 
Mas better assured than in any other country 
in Europe! 

This second conversation did not make me 
change my opinion of Count Berchtold. I am 
quite persuaded that since the death of Fran- 
cis Ferdinand it was Tisza and not Berchtold 
who directed Austrian policy. lie has been 
the plaything of the really strong man. Far 
from this being an excuse for him, it means 
that he is doubly guilty, for no one has the 
right to accept a position that is above his 
capacity. 

1 am sure we shall never hear of Count 
Berchtold in Fmropean politics again. That 
episode is ended. 



The Marquis Pallavicini 



IV 
THE MARQUIS PALLAVICINI 

A pure Magyar answers to this Italian name. 
In his youth the Marquis Pallavicini must 
have been an Imperialist, like so many other 
Hungarian aristocrats; but at the time I knew 
him he was already a Magyar in the full ac- 
ceptance of the word. This is all the more 
remarkable as it seems the Marquis speaks 
pretty indifferent Magyar. He has made up 
for this by bringing up his sons, the children 
of a charming English woman, to be such 
chauvinists that they would never even learn 
their mother's tongue. 

Like all good Hungarians, the Marquis 
Pallavicini has always been an ultra- Ser- 
bophobe. It gave him great pleasure to 
describe to me how, when he was Minister at 
Belgrade, whenever the poor Serbian Gov- 
ernment resisted any demand of Austria, he 
would discover that all the Serbian pigs were 
stricken with sudden illness, and how directly 
the Serbian Government gave in, the pigs 

33 



84 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

were instantly and miraculously cured, SO that 
their export might be resumed. 

No mere words can do justice to the 
physiognomy of the Marquis Pallavicini, when 
he was explaining these incidents in Anstro- 
Serbian relations or rattier in the martyrdom 

of Serbia. A smile which was almost a grin 
pervaded his face, his short-sighted eyes closed 
till they became invisible, and his pining voice 
took on a Mephistophelian tone. The very 
wagging o\ y his head, his short awkward 
gestures, all seemed to diffuse a smell oi' 
sulphur! 

The Marquis Pallavicini is the antithesis of 
the traditional Austrian diplomat. Usually 
such people are good to look at, they have a 
presence which impresses the unwary, and 
one must see a good ileal oi' them to under- 
stand their remarkable emptiness. To put it 
shortly, they look more intelligent than they 
really are. 

In the case of Pallavicini it is just the 
opposite. His face is not his fortune. He 
looks rather a simpleton, and yet one would 
be wrong to trust in his ease to appearances. 
Pallavicini may not be a great mind, but at 
any rate he is a very observing, very well- 
informed, and a very subtle person. In a 



THE MARQUIS PALLAVICINI 35 

word, the Austro-IIungarian Ambassador to 
Constantinople is a much abler man than he 
looks, and one would make a blunder if in 
dealing with him one judged by appearances. 

n 

I have had relations with the Marquis 
Pallavicini for years. We have talked to- 
gether for hours. Of all these conversations 
three only present themselves to my mind 
when I recall the past. 

The first concerned the domestic politics of 
Hungary. It was a few weeks prior to the 
well-remembered general election when the 
Tisza Government was beaten by the coalition. 
We were both lunching with Count Larisch 
at Bucharest. Pallavicini believed that Tisza 
would be successful. I made a bet with him 
that the coalition would triumph and win 
easily, and he never understood how it was 
that I guessed correctly. Pallavicini was com- 
pletely unable to understand the compelling 
force of parliamentary freedom for which the 
coalition fought, and that is why he was at 
that time an Imperialist. 

Our second talk took place at Constanti- 
nople on my return from Athens in Novem- 
ber, 1913. The occasion was a reception at 



06 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

the Roumanian Legation. Pallavicini wanted 
a tite-d-tite with me which I could not refuse 
him. In this interview, which followed one 
that I had had with Monsieur de Criers, the 
Russian representative, the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador to Turkey strongly advised me to 
try and improve our relations with Bulgaria. 
I replied that I asked nothing better, but that 
as the Bulgarians were discontented and we 
were satisfied, an understanding between us 
was unthinkable, unless it were motived by 
an attack on some third party; and I con- 
cluded by saying, "An understanding with 
Bulgaria is all very well, but at whose expense 
is it to be?" "At that of Serbia, of course," 
he replied. This Mas early in November, 
1913! 

At the third and last conversation I had 
with the Marquis Pallavicini — which will with- 
out doubt forever be the last — I spoke so much 
that I feel awkward about referring to it. 

It was the spring of 1914. Ever since our 
military promenade into Bulgaria the Austro- 
Hungarian press had been irrepressible. At 
Budapesth two things had been noted, both 
equally disagreeable to the Magyar oligarchy. 
One was that the Roumanian expedition 
across the Danube indicated the first step in 



THE MARQUIS PALLAVICIM 37 

our emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian 
yoke; the other that nothing had done more 
for the greater Roumania idea than the new 
prestige which free Roumania had just ac- 
quired. Our soldiers' phrase in the summer 
of 1913 was, "We pass through Bulgaria in 
order to get to Transylvania." This phrase 
expressed a profound truth which even Buda- 
pesth could not hut realize. The Austrian 
press opened a most comic campaign on the 
question of Austro-Roumanian relations. 
Were they the same? And if they were 
chilled, how far would the congealing process 
go? And what ought to be done to make 
relations once more idyllic? An enormous 
amount of ink was wasted in Vienna and 
Budapesth. At Bucharest they were regarded 
as unwholesome, people had had enough of 
these false declarations of love, which after 
all were none too decent, as they presupposed 
an unnatural attachment on our part. 

The Austrians decided to send Pallavicini 
to Bucharest. He had once lived five years 
amongst us, and had the reputation of being 
a convinced anti-Roumanian. They said we 
could not deceive a man like him as they 
alleged we had done in the case of so many 
others. 



38 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Pallavicini arrived at Bucharest in the 
spring of 1914, He stayed there three days; 
visited King- Charles and our politicians, and 
went away annoyed. Naturally he came to 
see me. He stayed more than an hour, and 
frankly told me that he wanted to know 
whether our alliance with Austria still held 
good, hecause if not the Austrian* would 
have to apply elsewhere — to Bulgaria, in short. 
He told me he had not taken this step yet, 
which was a lie, hut that he would he obliged 
to do it if he could not count on us. I an- 
swered him with diplomatic politeness, which 
meant nothing. When he returned to the 
charge I said nothing was more intolerable 
than to be asked every moment, "Do you love 
me?" and that that was what the Austrian 
press was doing all the time. I did not con- 
ceal from him that this error in taste had 
ended bv really annoying us. 

"You have seen the King," I said, "and 
you know what his power is. You must at 
any rate be pleased with the King." He said 
"No," that the King had declared to him that 
Roumania would range herself against those 
who provoked war, and that that was not good 
enough for him. 

And when I put it to him that I no longer 



THE MARQUIS PALLAVICINI 39 

understood the hang of things, as for thirty 
years it had been dinned into us that it was 
Russia who wished to provoke war and Aus- 
tria-Hungary that desired nothing but peace, 
he dished up to me the old theme of preven- 
tive war. He explained to me that it was im- 
possible for Austria-Hungary to remain in 
the position in which Balkan events had placed 
her, that Serbia was a menace to her, and that 
sooner or later war must break out. Austria 
might soon be led to provoke it herself. 

It was all very well for me to marshal my 
arguments against the folly of preventive war 
and to try and prove the absurdity of talk- 
ing of the Serbian danger to the Dual Empire; 
nothing was of any avail. The Marquis in- 
sisted at length that it was necessary for 
Austria to bring about a European war. I 
have already said that he repeated the word 
"war" five times during our interview. I made 
a pencil mark each time he said it. 

This conversation with the Marquis Palla- 
vicini was one of the gleams that lit up my 
mind on the European situation. Through- 
out the Balkan crisis I had many proofs that 
Austria-Hungary was trying to provoke war 
at any cost, but since the treaty of Bucharest 
I had hoped that the storm was overpast. The 



40 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Marquis made me realize, however, that I was 
mistaken. 

Magyar policy was so well served by the 
assassin Prineip that if I had the same men- 
tality as the politicians of Budapesth I should 
say that they had suggested to him his useless 
crime. 

It would be an exaggeration to suggest that 
the Marquis Fallavicini was one of the au- 
thors of the world war, but he was one of the 
most active and adroit of the auxiliaries. On 
this account he may find a place in history. 



Count Goluchowsky 



COUNT GOLUCHOWSKY 

I have very agreeable memories of my inter- 
course with Count Goluchowsky. He is a 
great gentleman and his manners are perfect. 
Moreover, during his long stay in Roumania 
he did his best to minimize the painful side 
of the inevitable clash between Roumanian 
and Magyar interests. I only had one dis- 
cussion with him that was really disagreeable, 
and then he forgot himself so far as to tell me 
straight out that the capitulations were still 
in force in Roumania. The discussion became 
so desperately animated that I thought per- 
sonal communication would be impossible in 
the future. Count Goluchowsky quite under- 
stood the mistake he had made, just as on 
another occasion he understood a still greater 
blunder he made in the case of the late 
Alexander Lahovary. The papers dealing 
with this incident should be in the possession 
of Madame Lahovary. 

Everyone was grateful to Count Goluchow- 

43 



H SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

sky for the really pacific orientation he had 
given to Austrian policy during his long 
tenure of offiee. He pushed his pacifism to 

the point of inventing a kind of entente of 
European Powers to resist the American 
danger, a clumsy scheme that made people 
laugh at his expense, but which at any rate 
showed that he wished to preserve peace 
amongst the nations of Europe. 

It is true that the Emperor Francis Joseph, 
who was then full of vigor, had made the ap- 
pointment of Count Goluchowsky to the Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs conditional on his 
not making trouble for him, and allowing him 
to finish his long reign in peace. 

The only weakness Count Goluchowsky 
gave way to at the Ballplatz Mas his exagger- 
ated hatred of Serbia. He utterly despised 
the Serbs. His aristocratic prejudices had 
something to say to this; the Serbs were after 
all to him a nation of uncouth peasants. Many 
times did King Charles point out to Count 
Goluchowsky that he was making a great mis- 
take in refusing consideration to the Serbs, 
and many times did the Count say that it 
would only require two monitors at Belgrade 
to bring "the worthy Serbs'' to reason. 

In spite of this it would be extremely un- 



COUNT GOLUCHOWSKY 45 

just not to recognize that Count Goluchowsky, 
who had never posed as a star of the first 
magnitude, filled his post of Foreign Minister 
with distinction. He was not as provocative 
as Count Aehrenthal, who, though a man of 
clearly superior capacity, was also liable to 
make big mistakes. 

Count Goluchowsky inspired me with the 
sort of esteem that one has for a man who 
has played an important role well and who 
can bear disgrace with dignity. 

II 

I had not seen Count Goluchowsky for 
many years when I ran into him in the dining- 
room of the Hotel Bristol at Vienna at eight 
o'clock on Thursday, the 30th of July, 1914. 
I was on my way from London to Bucharest, 
and was agonized by the thought of the great 
disaster which might at any moment over- 
whelm humanity. 

Count Goluchowsky was sitting with a 
young Austrian whom I had met before. He 
wore a miniature of the Order of the Golden 
Fleece in the button-hole of his short dinner 
jacket. This was a characteristic detail. If 
one happens to be one of the twenty or thirty 
persons who have been honored with this deco- 



16 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

ration, it would seem to me a dreadful error 
in taste to wear it in miniature on a dinner 
jacket, and it surprised me that a man who 
represented the last word in breeding- eould 
do such a tiling. 

1 went up to the Count, and we naturally 
talked of the great evil that was menacing the 
world, lie answered with a smile that was 
almost jovial that the worthy Serbs would 
now be brought to their senses and that this 
affair concerned Austria and nobody else. 
When I told him that it was no longer a Serb- 
ian question and that if Austria did not aet 
reasonably Russia and France would be forced 
to intervene, and that that would mean a Euro- 
pean war. he replied with the same smile, the 
same gay light-heartedness and his g-ayety 
was o{ a kind 1 had seldom seen in him — "So 
much the worse for the worthy Russians and 
the worthy French." 1 went on to say that 
that was not all: that I had just come from 
London, and eould assure him that, although 
the English Government was the most pacific 
in history, the logic of events would prove 
stronger than the will o( Governments, and 
that if Austria persisted in its overbearing 
attitude. England would tight to her last man 
and her last shilling. 



COUNT GOLUCHOWSKY 47 

The smile on Count Goluchowsky's face 
expanded, and he said, "So much the worse 
for the worthy English." 

At that moment my last meeting with Sir 
Edward Grey on July 21, 1914, passed like 
a vision before my eyes. On that occasion he 
had spoken to me with austere gravity, saying 
that the situation gave cause for deep anxiety, 
but that in spite of it he hoped for peace; 
because for his part he could not imagine that 
the man existed who could shoulder the re- 
sponsibility of provoking a calamity which 
would spell the bankruptcy of civilization, and 
of which no one in the world could foresee the 
consequences. There came another vision — 
that of Monsieur Poincare, who, on the 1st 
of January, 1913, spoke to me with most 
poignant emotion of the terrible eventuality 
of a European war, a war in which he refused 
to believe and against which he was working 
with all his strength. 

In memory I re-read Kiderlen-Waechter's 
last letter to me, written in November, 1912, 
a few months before his death, the letter of a 
man who, most unfortunately for Germany 
and for the world, was no longer with us, a 
letter which stated that he was convinced that 
peace would be maintained because at the last 



4S SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

moment the whole world would hesitate to em- 
bark on a venture which this time was a ques- 
tion of lite or death for all. 

With the eyes oi' my soul I saw Grey, Poin- 
eare, Kiderlen; with my physical eyes I saw 
the broad smile and the indescribable levity of 
Count Goluchowsky, And I became more 
than ever confirmed in my belief that Vienna, 
now a mere suburb of Budapesth, was the 
criminal, the great criminal, in that it was 
ready to plunge humanity at any moment into 
the unspeakable horror of war. 



August 2, IQ14 



VI 

AUGUST *, 1914 

J arrived hack at Sinaia from London at 
J 1 :.'i0 a.m. on Sunday, the 2d of August. 
Germany had declared war on Russia the 
previous evening, so the horrible slaughter was 
about to begin. On the Saturday evening in 
Bucharest J had already heard (in a way that 
J shall divulge one day) that a Privy Council 
was to he held at Sinaia on Monday, the 3rd 
of August, that this Privy Council had heen 
postponed for forty-eight hours in order that 
J might he present at it, and that King 
Charles was insisting that Rournania should 
go into the war on the side of Austria and 
Germany. 

I am keeping hack for a future occasion my 
account of the conversations I had on the eve- 
ning of Saturday, the 1st of August, at 
Bucharest, on Sunday, the 2nd of August, at 
the Sinaia station on my arrival, and still 
more important, those of Sunday afternoon. 
As I was leaving the station an invitation 



5ft SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

reached me to go and lunch at the Royal 
Palace* at one o'clock. There was barely lime 
to go to my villa and dress my poor villa thai 
no longer exists. 

I realized that in order to convert me to 
his ideas the King was about to make an 
onslaught on me. Less than a month ago in 
that Same Palace the King had confided to 
nn« the great secret to wit, that the Emperor 
William had decided to bring about a Eu- 
ropean war, which would nol take place, how- 
ever, for three or four years. On that oc- 
casion the King had gone so Tar as to explain 
to me that this breathing Space of three years 
would Suffice to complete both our constitu- 
tional reforms and our military preparations. 

As 1 had made up my mind to face him 
with an absolute nan possum us attitude at the 
Privy Council the following day, I was 
anxious to avoid argument, which must al- 
ways be a painful business with an elderly 
monarch, and 1 made up my mind that dur- 
ing luncheon 1 would give the talk a turn 
that would leave him no ray of hope. 

Hardly had 1 sat down next to Queen 
Elizabeth at the luncheon table than I found 
I was in a house divided against itself. It was 
obvious that the King was more than worried, 



AUGUST 2, 1914 53 

that the Queen was more bellicose than the 
King* and that the Crown Princess, now 
the reigning Queen Marie, was dead against 
the policy of her uncle and aunt, and did not 
conceal it from them. It even seemed to me 
that tears had recently been shed in that 
Royal Palace. 

It was the Queen who first began to speak 
on the burning question of war. I told her 
that I was sure that war had been inevitable 
since the day Austria had addressed her in- 
famous ultimatum to Serbia, arid that I knew 
the ultimatum was the work of the Magyars, 
of Tisza, Forgaseh, Berehtold, who had the 
support and collaboration of Tchirsky, the 
German Ambassador at Vienna. I added as 
a self-evident truth that a German victory 
meant a Hungarian victory, and therefore was 
not compatible with maintaining the inde- 
pendence of the Kingdom of Roumania. The 
King, who sat opposite, and was listening with 
fixed attention, understood me, and that is 
why, as I shall explain presently, he spared 
me from the onslaught I wished to avoid. 

Intelligent as she was, and though really a 
woman above the average, the Queen was not 
sufficiently versed in politics to understand a 
word of this. She was all for explaining that 



54 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

a Magyar victory would mean nothing for a 
very long time to come, etc, . . . When 1 i<>l<l 
her again o[' my extreme anxiety in view of 
Mil- fact that Germany had such a formidable 
force at her disposal and that if she were suc- 
cessful it would be the end of Roumania, she 
passed on to another subject. 

She asked me what I thought would he the 

probable consequences of such a war. I an- 
swered with all eyes upon me — that no 
human being would he presumptuous enough 
to say he knew or could even guess what all 
the consequences of such a war might be. "I 

know, however," 1 added, "what four of them 
will he, and these four I will explain to you 
in a few words. The first consequence will 
he a revival of international hatreds on such 
a scale as Europe has not seen for centuries. 
This is as sure as that the night follows the 
day. 

"The second consequence will he a. sudden 
veering o[' opinion towards the ideas of the 

Extreme Left, what we call socialist ideas. 

"Of course in the long run nothing that is 
inherently absurd can triumph, hut there is 
hound in all countries to he a trend to the Ex- 
treme Left, once the unloosing of this appall- 
ing catastrophe has made the governing classes 



AUGUST 2, 1914 55 

appear more incapable in the eyes of the 
masses than they have hitherto believed them 
to be. 

"In the third place, Madam, there will be 
what I can only describe as a cataract of 
crowns. Your Majesty has so often told me 
you are a Republican that you will hardly be 
surprised at this prophecy. Only those mon- 
archies which are in truth hereditary presi- 
dencies of republics, like the British Royal 
House, have any chance of escaping this 
dreadful flood, the flood that must inevitably 
rise out of a war engineered by absolute mon- 
arch s." 

I also explained to the Queen that as yet 
another result of the war, the revolutionary 
movement, which for several decades had 
ceased to he political and had become economic, 
would inevitably become political once more. 

"And lastly," I added, "this war will pre- 
cipitate by at least half a century the estab- 
lishment of America in the moral hegemony 
of the white race, an achievement inevitable 
in any case, but which the war will hasten." 

My fourth statement provoked animated 
discussion. I said I saw nothing in this event 
to object to, as the most interesting experience 
humanity had as yet seriously embarked on 



56 SOME PEHSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

was this new effort in civilization on the part 
oi' the United States; since it would moan a 
civilization without prejudices, without castes, 
without monarehial or aristocratic institutions, 
and without historic quarrels. 

A few days later I published four articles 
developing these ideas with the titles "The 
Hatreds/' "The Movement to the Left," "The 
Cataract of Crowns," and "The Coming of 
America." 

When I think oi' this date, the 2nd oi' 
August, 191 fej already so remote, 1 wonder 
how it is that these conclusions, which at the 
time appeared to me self-evident, were not so 
to the world in general, and 1 reflect once 
again how tenacious on most of us is the grip 
oi' the ideas o( the past. 

After luncheon we took coffee in the great 
hall, and I noticed that the King was hesitat- 
ing between his wish to talk to me and his fear 
oi' hearing too soon the refusal for which my 
animated and provocative conversation at 
luncheon hail prepared him. 

Before the King spoke to me the Crown 
Princess, now the reigning Queen, came up 
to me with Queen Elizabeth and asked me 
whether or no England would remain neutral 
in the war. Tt should not be forgotten that 



AUGUST 8, 1914 57 

this was Sunday, and that it was on the pre- 
vious Wednesday J had left London. As the 
Princess spoke to me in English J replied in 
English, saying that her question surprised 

me, as she must know as well as I did that 
England, as in Napoleon's day, would go into 
the war with her last man and her last shill- 
ing. In a nervous voice she then said, "Yon 
hear what he says, aunt," and turning to me, 
"That is what I tell them all the time, and 
they refuse to understand it. They under- 
stand nothing in tfiis house." She then went 
away with the Queen. 

A few minutes later the King addressed 
me: "Yon know yon must bring two of your 
friends to the Privy Council to-morrow. 
Whom have yon selected?" 

"I have asked several to come to Sinaia, 
Sir," I replied, "and I will make my choice 
to-morrow morning." 

"Oh, well," said the King, "the selection 
doesn't really matter, for your party at any 
rate is disciplined." As I still did not appear 
to understand, the King added, "You have al- 
ways said that if ever we went to war we 
should have to hegin by publishing all our 
treaties of alliance." "Yes, Sir," I replied, 
"and if because of a treaty honestly inter- 



58 SOME PERSONAL [MPRESSIONS 

preted we were genuinely forced to go to war, 
they must be published, because before every- 
thing a nation musl honor its signature." 

This time the King understood and re- 
signed himself to the inevitable, lie knew 
thai as Germany had provoked war we weir 
hound neither by the letter nor the spirit of 
the treaties. 

The next day at the Crown Council he 
tried to put another interpretation oi\ the text 
of the treaties, hut on this Sunday, the '2nd 
oi' August, he attempted nothing of the kind. 

Many of my recollections of the four ter- 
rible years are as sharp and clear as at the 
moment the events happened. There are few 
thai have remained in my memory so dis- 
tinctly as this luncheon of the '2nd of August, 
1911, in the Royal Palace at Sinaia. 



K iderlen-IV aechter 



VII 

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 

For more than ten years I was very intimate 
with the late Kiderlen-Waechter. That is to 
say, I had opportunities of seeing him exactly 
as he was and to know both his good and his 
bad qualities. Above all Kiderlen was a great 
intellectual force. There was no doubt about 
it. One could not be often in his company 
without realizing that one had to do with the 
kind of mind which is an ornament to the 
human race. Kiderlen was nearly all mind. 
Not that he was lacking in heart, for during 
his life he gave undoubted proofs of deep and 
unchanging attachment towards certain peo- 
ple. He loved quietude and adored animals. 
But taking him all in all, one can without 
doing him an injustice say that Kiderlen was 
neither a sentimentalist nor an idealist, but 
that he was in the last resort a sound working 
mind, though naturally a mind which was rep- 
resentative of his country and his time. 
He had been under the influence of Bis- 

61 



G2 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

marck as well as under that of Holstein, who, 
like Richelieu's Fere Joseph, played a part 
behind the scenes out of all proportion to his 
nominal position. From those early associates 
Kiderlen derived a certain vein of brutality, 
the mention of which cannot be omitted. 
Moreover, he lent himself readily to advertise- 
ment, because he believed it to be the indis- 
pensable adjunct of all political action. It 
was he and he alone who framed the famous 
ultimatum to Russia during the Bosnian crisis, 
although he was at the time only Minister at 
Bucharest on leave at Berlin. "I knew the 
Russians were not ready for war, that they 
could not go to war in any case, and I wanted 
to make what capital 1 could out of this 
knowledge. I wished to show them that Ger- 
many, which had been in Russian leading 
strings since 1815, was now free of them. 
Never would Schoen and Co. have ventured 
to do what I did on my own responsibility." 
It was in this way that he explained to me his 
overemphasis of Germany's action in this 
case, an emphasis that contributed appreciably 
to the unrest of Europe. 

Kiderlen never wanted to go to the Foreign 
Office. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
our Government," he said, "is the worst of all 



KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 63 

posts. If a tiling succeeds the Chancellor 
takes the credit, if it fails the blame lies oil 
the Secretary of State." What lie would 
have really liked was the Embassy at Con- 
stantinople. By a whim of the Emperor it 
was snatched from under his nose and given 
to Wangenheim, whom the Kaiser often met 
at Corfu. 

Yew people know of the way in which Ki- 
derlen was appointed to the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs. The story is worth telling. 
When Bethmann-IIollwcg, by the pure ca- 
price of the Kaiser, was appointed Chancellor 
of the Empire he knew nothing at all about 
foreign politics. Naturally he looked out for 
someone who did, and hoping to find the right 
man in Kiderlen he asked him for a report on 
the political world situation. Kiderlen at the 
time was Minister at Bucharest, but doing 
duty at Berlin. I never saw the report he 
produced at that time, though I knew of its 
existence. Since then I have been told that 
it was copied by Ilerr von Busche, who was 
at the time German Minister in Roumania. 
Bethmann-ITollweg read the report, and 
promptly told the Emperor that he would 
only consent to remain Chancellor if Kiderlen 
was appointed Foreign Minister. 



64 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

The Emperor had to give in. I say "give 
in," because it was some years since Kiderlen 
had been in the Kaiser's good graces. Once 
he had been greatly appreciated in that quar- 
ter on account of his clear thinking and 
vivacity. No one knew better than he how 
to tell spicy stories, and the Emperor, who is 
very fond of them, never got tired of listen- 
ing to them. But one day the Kaiser chaffed 
Kiderlen on some private matter. Kiderlen 
showed himself offended, and his reply was 
such that he at once fell from royal favor. 

One must remember that Kiderlen was ex- 
ceedingly free in manner with the Kaiser. He 
was no courtier and never flattered anyone, 
and to him appreciation and friendship of his 
Sovereign seemed to be essentially the same 
as the friendship of other people. Kiderlen 
was perfectly direct with the Kaiser, so direct 
that he flatly refused to submit to certain con- 
ditions that the Kaiser wished to impose on 
him at the time of his appointment to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "I shall go to 
the Foreign Office to do as I think right in 
that post or I shall not go there at all," was 
his proud reply, and he had his way. 

In the course of a conversation in 1911, 



KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 65 

which I will speak of again later on, he said 
to me, "If I am alive and in office there will 
be no war between us and England. If ever 
he decides differently he will have to find an- 
other man. I allow no one to domineer over 
my conscience." 

This sense of dignity was one of the finest 
traits in Kiderlen's nature. The former presi- 
dent of the Roumanian Council, Monsieur 
Maioresco, knows something about it, for dur- 
ing the summer of 1912 he thought he under- 
stood that Kiderlen had expressed a wish to 
be asked to stay with the King at Sinaia, 
and he made the mistake of asking the Ger- 
man Minister whether Kiderlen's position 
with the Emperor was sufficiently good to 
warrant such an invitation. 

Kiderlen heard about it, was furiously 
angry, and wrote a crushing letter saying he 
should like it known that he never had asked 
and never would ask for an invitation from 
anyone, no matter whom. 

And yet he had a great admiration for King 
Charles, and kept him informed of everything 
from Berlin. In the Spring of 1912, he told 
him for his private information only the great 
news of the Balkan alliance. He added that 
he had learned it from a most exceptional 



(it; SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

source, which would dry up forever it' the 
King was in the least indiscreet with the 

news. 1 was never able to discover who this 
mysterious informant was. 

Another o( Kiderlen's characteristics was 
his wit. For example, one day the Roumanian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, General La- 
hovary, said to him at a diplomatic reception, 
"I do not understand what you are after in 
Morocco. France alone has rights in Mo- 
rocco." Kiderlen replied, "I don't know- 
either. You see my Government only keeps 
me informed of questions that are supposed 
to affect Roumania. They did not look upon 
Morocco in this light; but since you have 
pointed out to me that they are wrong, 1 will 
ask Berlin for a special explanation for your 
Excellency.*' 

I don't pretend here to draw Kiderlen's 
portrait. 1 shall try to do so one day. These 
few words of introduction are. however, in- 
dispensable to the story which follows of the 
statements made to me by Kiderlen at the 
time of the Morocco erisis. 

II 

When Kiderlen was made "Minister of For- 
eign Affairs he had to leave Kouniania. A 



KroERLEN-WAECHTER 07 

few days before his departure we were out 
walking, as was our habit, and he began to 
sketch out his program in so far as it con- 
cerned German relations with France. 

"I have told them," he said, "that every 
effort at an alliance with France is doomed 
to failure. It is simply impossible for us to 
win her friendship. I know better than any- 
one that France wants peace and that she will 
never attack us. I am perfectly sure about 
this, but I also know that if we were attacked 
by any other Power no Government would be 
strong enough to prevent France attacking us 
at the same time. Therefore all we can do is 
to maintain good peaceable relations with 
France and not try for anything more am- 
bitious. For this reason I advised them" (and 
by them he meant the Kaiser) "to give up all 
designs on Morocco, and I explained to them 
that so long as the Morocco question was open 
England would side with France all over the 
world and on all questions at issue between us. 
Now that would not suit us one little bit. 
England, of course, cannot abandon France 
on the Morocco question. She knows well 
enough that in exchange for something she 
did not possess in Morocco she received from 
the French their positive rights in Egypt. 



68 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

England owes a debt of honor to France. It' 
we want to get rid o( all the disadvantages 
which Anglo-French diplomatic cooperation 

connotes for us we must give the French a 
free hand in Morocco and so help England to 
pay her debt to France. And we shall he 
Sacrificing nothing, for we cannot set ourselves 
down in Morocco in face of English opposi- 
tion. Then why maintain this useless ten- 
sion: It' we can get something for ourselves 
on this occasion so much the better, but we 
must not make that a condition o( the settle- 
ment." 

'"And do you believe that this policy will bo 
adopted;" I asked, 

"Of course, as they have appointed me to 
the Foreign Office, for you know perfectly 
well that 1 am not the kind o{ man who carries 
out any policy but my own." 

'"Then." 1 said, "we need not worry our- 
selves over the Morocco question. Peace will 
not be threatened in that quarter." 

"Certainly not. and besides you know how 
truly 1 long for peace. We have nothing to 
gain from victory, and in the case of defeat 
we have only too much to lose. Time is in 
our favor. Every decade we become stronger 
than our enemies. You have no conception o( 



KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 60 

the prodigious strides made in our national 
economy. And what good would a war be? 
Admitting that we are victorious; if we take 
new territory we only increase our difficulties. 
Then there is another thing you may not have 
considered. Every big victory is the work of 
the people, and the people have to be paid for 
it. We had to pay for the victory of 1870 
with that pestilential thing, universal suffrage. 
After another victory we should have the 
parliamentary system — and you know what I 
think about that for us Germans. It would 
be an irreparable evil. No German would ever 
submit to party discipline. Every German, 
every German deputy wants to form his own 
party, or at least his own group. We have no 
need of war. If we don't bring it on, nobody 
will. The Republican regime in France is es- 
sentially pacific. The English don't want war, 
and will never provoke it in spite of what the 
newspapers say. As for Russia, she knows 
that she cannot make war on us with any 
chance of success. Of course there will always 
be delicate questions, and of course there will 
be anxious moments, but war will not come. 
You may make your mind easy about Mo- 
rocco." 

Kiderlen went on in this strain. He ex- 



70 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

plained his whole policy to me, and I believed 
his declarations to be sincere, for he had never 
given me any reason to doubt him; but after 
this talk I was naturally astonished when the 
Agadir incident occurred. 

At the time of the incident I was in Lon- 
don, and on the evening Lloyd George made 
his famous speech at the Mansion House I 
had some people dining with me at the Carl- 
ton. After dinner a friend who had heard the 
speech came in and repeated the gist of it, 
and when he told me that the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, who was well known to be 
most peacefully inclined, had read the pas- 
sage relating to Foreign Affairs from a slip 
of paper, I realized how grave the situation 
was, and shivered at the idea of European 
war. 

Calm soon reigned again, for Germany 
wisely withdrew. I breathed freely, but from 
that moment German policy became for me an 
enigma. 

in 

In the autumn of 1911 I went to Brussels 
for a family gathering. On my way home I 
stopped at Berlin to pay my friend Kiderlen a 
long-promised visit. I stayed three days and 



KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 71 

met him continually, but the conversation on 
the first day was the most interesting. Kider- 
len had invited me to lunch with him alone. 
He was late in arriving, because he had been 
detained at the Reichstag, where he had been 
heckled over what was called his Moroccan 
defeat. There was one man in particular, the 
socialist deputy Ledehour, who was a perfect 
nightmare to Kiderlen. 

Before he arrived I looked round his study, 
which was littered with papers and maps. 
There were a few photographs, of course — 
mostly of kings. As for photographs of ordi- 
nary human beings I only saw three, that of 
an Austrian whose name I forget, that of 
Monsieur Cambon, with an autograph and 
dedication, and my own. Cambon and I were 
often said by Kiderlen to be alike, and he used 
to say that we were the only foreigners he 
talked frankly to, because we had never told 
him anything but the truth. 

Kiderlen was very tired, and we sat down to 
luncheon at once. The wonderful Sevres 
given him by the President of the French Re- 
public in memory of the agreement of 1909, 
was on the table. "That is the price of trea- 
son," he said jokingly. 

During luncheon and afterwards until four 



78 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

o'clock we had leisure to discuss every ques- 
tion that interested us. Of course I did not 
conceal my astonishment over his Moroccan 
policy, which had nearly brought on a war 
with England, a war which he had always 
characterized as absurd. He explained that 
he never meant actually to go to war, but that 
his only object was that of settling the Mo- 
rocco question once and for all. 

lie alleged that France was not carrying 
out the agreement reached in 1909. and that 
he had to deal her a blow to make her see that 
things were serious. He maintained that the 
blow had done its work, because they had sub- 
sequently arrived at an understanding, and 
that in future relations with France would be 
normal and relations with England might be- 
come friendly. He did not admit to me what 
I well knew to be his real object — namely, 
to test the solidity of the Anglo-French un- 
derstanding and if possible to smash it. He 
complained that he was growing more and 
more unpopular owing to his wish to avoid 
war, and he assured me in the most categorical 
manner that the Emperor was at one with him 
in keeping the peace, and this in spite of the 
frankly bellicose attitude of the whole im- 
perial family, including those who had never 



KIDERLEN-WAECHTER 73 

before mixed themselves up in polities. He 
told me at some length of a conversation he 
had had with the Crown Prince in that same 
room in the chair I was then occupying, a con- 
versation which was entirely to Kiderlen's 
credit. He told me that the Crown Prince was 
worse than a ninny, and that he had said to 
him that it was not in the society of little officer 
boys that politics could be learned, and that 
he ought not to meddle with matters which he 
did not understand. 

Referring once more to Anglo-German re- 
lations, he again told me of his wish to reach 
an understanding with England. He did not 
conceal from me what I already knew so well 
that, like Bismarck, he detested England prin- 
cipally on account of her parliamentary insti- 
tutions, but he told me that he believed what 
Bismarck had once written to Holstein was 
true, that England was one of the great con- 
servative factors of the world, and it was not 
in anyone's interest to destroy it. In this let- 
ter Bismarck added that the day England be- 
came revolutionary the whole world would 
become revolutionary too. 

"But if you are so anxious to come to an 
understanding with England," I said, "why 
don't you do the one thing to ensure it? Why 



74 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

do you refuse to compromise on the question 
of naval armament! What is your object in 
pushing to its limit the competitive policyl 1 

understood your attitude when it was still a 
question o{ your becoming the second great 

sea-power of the world. That you already 
are. and what more do you want ! Do you 
aspire to he not only the greatest military 
power in the world, but also the greatest naval 
power- That would mean universal domina- 
tion, and it is not realizable. Others have tried 
it. Spain and France, for example, but they 
wont under. You are too intelligent not to 
understand that until she has been utterly 
crushed it is impossible for England to let 
herself be outbuilt on the sea. You may build 
:i\e dreadnoughts, she will build thirteen. 
Where are you going to stop! You are head- 
ing straight for a war with England, and that, 
you know, will be no joke. Admitting for a 
moment that you gain the victory. How long 
will that last! You would raise against your- 
self a world coalition. So hated would you 
be that the very rabbits would enroll them- 
selves against you. Don't follow dreams — ami 
what you are after now is a dream.' 1 

Kiderlen replied rather bitterly. "I wanted 
to have an understanding over the limitation 



KIDERLEN WAECHTER 75 

of armaments, but I couldn't manage it. I 
have said everything you have s ; > i < I to me, 
though perhaps I have not put- it so well. I 
have said ii t<> Tirpitz, who was sitting in this 
armchair of mine. I was sitting in yours." 

"And?" 

"I did not succeed iu convincing him," he 
answered. 

"Rui the Emperor?" I asked. 

"He sided with Tirpitz." 

And then he went on to asseverate that in 
spite of this he would do all he possibly could 
to conic lo tin agreement with England. He 
suggested even that I should tell my friends 
in London to send him as Ambassador some- 
one who had a great position in Kngland, SO 
that the work would not have to he done twice 
over, in London and Berlin. We then went 
on to talk about the agreement he had just 
concluded with France. He assured me that 
if by accident the French Parliament rejected 
the agreement it would mean war. The agree- 
ment represented the maximum concession 
that the people of Germany would stand. 

That very day I took pains to write my 
impressions to a friend in Paris. My friend 
showed my letter to M. Caillaux, then Prime 



76 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Minister, who read it to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Senate. 

This was the last occasion on which I had 
any prolonged talk with Kiderlen. From this 
time on we simply wrote to each other. 

On the evening of the 30th of December, 
1912, I was due to meet him at Stuttgart, 
where he had been spending the Christmas 
holidays, and where he remained. At the rail- 
way station at Salzbourg I heard of his most 
unexpected death, and the next day at Stutt- 
gart they told me that my name was one of 
the last words he had spoken. 

Perhaps it was only an illusion of friend- 
ship, but I cannot help believing that in Kid- 
erlen we lost one of the mainstays of peace. 
Not that my friend was a sentimentalist, far 
from it; but he was a man of genuinely well- 
set mind, and his real intellect kept him to the 
last of the opinion that a war of Germany 
against the world was altogether a bad busi- 
ness. 



Count Aehrenthal 



VIII 
COUNT AEHRENTHAL 

Count Aehrenthal was the most bril- 
liant Austrian Foreign Minister since the days 
of Beust. His capacity is the measure of liis 

blunders. Without exaggerating, one may 
say that he was to a greal extent the author 
of the war. As a matter of fact. Prom L866 
down to this day the Hapsburgs have main- 
tained a prudent political reserve, and though 
Count Andrassy gave himself airs at the time 
of the Berlin Congress everyone knew that it 
was nothing hut showing off. Achrenlhal 
alone took the idea seriously that Austria- 
Hungary was still a great power and destined 
to aet an important part in the worlds af- 
fairs. On several occasions he tried to play 
first fiddle in the European orchestra, to the 
great disgust of Berlin, whieh could not bear 
that Austria should even pretend to emanci- 
pate herself from its yoke. 

The key to Count Aehrenthal's active and 
dangerous policy must he sought in a personal 

7!) 



SO SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

matter. He was extraordinarily intelligent 
for an Austrian, and his quickness of under- 
standing, his faculty for adaptation, his charm- 
ing vivacity can only be explained by the drop 
of Jewish blood that ran in his veins. 

Count Aehrenthal knew his own value, es- 
pecially when he compared himself with other 
Austrian diplomats. lie was very ambitious 
and believed he was destined for great things, 
and he intended to use the power o( the mon- 
archy for his own aggrandizement and per- 
sonal fame. 

He was a Bohemian and detested Slavs. I 
remember a day when he received news of 
anti-German excesses in Prague, "Czechs." 
he said, "have such hard heads that they have 
to be broken in order to make them under- 
stand anything." 

He had been in Russia for a long time, and 
knew all the weaknesses o( that colossus. In 
his thirst for success he exaggerated them and 
underestimated the infinite resources of her 
clumsy organism. 

I saw a great deal of Count Aehrenthal dur- 
ing his long stay in Koumania, and have many 
letters from him. One day he tried to do me 
an irreparable injury in making use of some 
information he had dragged out o( me at mv 



COUNT AEHRENTHAL 81 

own luncheon table. I naturally resented this 
very much, and though, luckily for me, I was 
able to counter his maneuver in time, our re- 
lations after this became purely official. 

On the eve of his final departure from Rou- 
mania, he let me know that he wished to do 
more than leave a p.p.c. card on me, and that 
he would like to see me. In this last interview 
he told me that we should probably both serve 
our countries for some time to come, that we 
should therefore have to meet each other, and 
that it would be better to forget the past. I 
told him that as he had not succeeded in in- 
juring me and as he believed he was serving 
his country in trying to do so, I was quite 
willing to resume our old footing. 

Later on when he was transferred from the 
Embassy at Petrograd to the Foreign Office I 
used to go and see him. I am now going to 
tell of two of those interviews. 

The first took place on a September day in 
1909 or 1910. I don't know which, I only 
know that it was after Tangier and before 
Agadir. 

He asked me what impressions I brought 
back from my three months' tour in France 
and England. 

"I brought back two impressions," I said. 



82 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

"The first is that the alliance between Eng- 
land and France cannot be broken — at any 
rate in this generation. It is tinner even than 
your alliance with Germany." 

"But," he objected, "there is no treaty of 
alliance." 

"Of course there is no treaty, but there is 
something better. Don't forget that those two 
nations are free nations governing themselves. 
Well, they are firmly convinced that their in- 
terests are the same, and they have decided to 
act together. No government could break 
such an agreement which springs from the 
mind of the two peoples." 

"But such an alliance is ridiculous!" he ex- 
claimed. "France stands to gain nothing from 
England, whereas from Germany she could 
have anything she wanted." 

"France realizes." I answered, "that in ally- 
ing herself with Germany she would be ally- 
ing herself against England. If England 
were overcome France would be nothing but 
the vassal of Germany. That is a position yon 
have accepted for yourselves. France has too 
glorious a history behind her to accept a simi- 
lar position without being crushed first." 

"What!" said he briskly. "Austria is Ger- 
manv's vassal?" 



COUNT AEHRENTHAL 83 

"Yes, just as Roumania is the vassal of 
Austria." I said this to coat the hitter pill. 

"Aud what was your second impression?" 

"I will tell you in a few words. France is 
no longer afraid. She desires peace passion- 
ately; she will never provoke war; but she is 
no longer afraid. Henceforth if you bully 
her realize that it means war. The time for 
bluffing is gone by. If you want war that is 
another thing, but intimidation and bluff will 
no longer work." 

"But it is mad," he said. "The French 
army, far from being stronger than it was a 
few years ago, is much weaker." 

"Fear," I said, "is a physical question. One 
may be weak and yet not be afraid. For one 
reason and another, because perhaps she has 
been too much bullied in the past, France, who 
was afraid at the Tangier crisis, is now no 
longer afraid; of that I am profoundly con- 
vinced." 

"It is very odd," said Aehrenthal in ending 
the conversation; "our ambassadors have not 
formed the same conclusions as you have." 

"I can only give you my own," I replied, 
and we passed on to talk of other things. 



84 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

II 

The last time I saw Count Aehrenthal was 
during the autumn of 1911, a few months be- 
fore his death. 

His illness had marked him heavily. He 
had been spending a few weeks in the beauti- 
ful surroundings of Mendel — henceforward I 
hope to be Mendola — but he was not much 
better for it. There was something very pe- 
culiar about his condition, something I had 
never seen before. He had kept his clearness 
of mind intact, but he found great difficulty 
in expressing himself — he stammered. He 
only did this for the first few words of a sen- 
tence. Once he had got a phrase out the rest 
went easily. And this took place each time 
that he began to speak. I must leave the ex- 
planation of this symptom to the doctors. 

Count Aehrenthal was embittered, very 
much embittered, by his struggles with the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his protege, 
Conrad von Hoetzendorf, whom he had just 
triumphed over. He did not explain things 
straight out to me, but he let me understand. 

"There are people who think I was wrong 
in preventing war with Italy.'' he said. "They 
say that Italy would never in any case fight 



COUNT AEHRENTHAL 85 

on our side and that it would have been better 
to square accounts now. But I think I was 
right. Even if Italy never fights on our side 
we should be quite wrong to attack an ally 
when she was engaged elsewhere." 

Naturally I agreed with him. 

And then forthwith we returned to the sub- 
ject that we had so often discussed at Bucha- 
rest. 

I had always maintained that monarchies 
were doomed and that only those monarchies 
which were literally and really constitutional 
had any chance of surviving; the rest seemed 
to me to be nearer their end than anyone be- 
lieved. Aehrenthal, absolutist and reaction- 
ary as he always was, fought this opinion of 
mine bitterly. Imagine my surprise at find- 
ing Count Aehrenthal almost converted to re- 
publicanism. 

He told me that on reflection he had 
changed his mind, and was no longer preju- 
diced against the republican system. He also 
explained that it was chiefly on account of 
foreign policy that he had once believed so 
firmly in the monarchical system. 

"But now," he said, "France gives the lie to 
all my theories. The foreign policy of the 
French Republic is skillfully conducted and 



86 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

undoubtedly successful. Although France] 
thanks to her political institutions, uses up 

move men than any other country, she has a 
constant supply o( first-rate men at her helm. 
Look at her diplomacy, The whole German 

and Austrian Diplomatic Corps together are 
not worth the brothers Cambon and Barrere, 

to mention only these three." 

"What," I said laughingly, "and it is you, 

Count Aehrenthal— here in the Ballplata, fac- 
ing the portraits of Metternieh and Kaimitz 
—who tell me that!" 

"Yes, I do. Life teaches us many things,* 1 
he replied. 

1 understood more clearly than ever how 
greatly Aehrenthal must have suffered re- 
cently from the interference ot' Francis Ferdi- 
nand in his policy, lie who had been so sure 
of his mastery over the world of archdukes 
had himself experienced the bitterness, the in- 
dignity of despotic government And before 
his death he had a revulsion ot' feeling that 
gave him a vision of certain truths, a vision 
that men who pass their lives as slaves never 
attain to. Once again I recognized the signs 
o{' Jewish blood: without it no Austrian Count 
and Foreign Minister of his Apostolic Maj- 
esty could have spoken in such a fashion. 



COUNT AEHRENTHAL 87 

None the less, Aehrenthal bears his share 
of the responsibility for the war. lie wished 
to live in history, he seriously wished to ex- 
pand Austria-Hungary. But all the same in 
pressing this policy he had his tongue in his 
cheek. The Magyar party adopted his policy 
as its own, and the result is that Austria-Hun- 
gary has perished. 

It is the strongest men who are liable to 
commit the worst mistakes. 



Count Czernin 



IX 

COUNT CZERNIN 

The last time I talked politics with Count 
Czernin, a conversation to which I shall have 
occasion to refer again, the Austrian minister 
began by saying that he had a great favor to 
ask me. 

It was a few days after the fall of Lemberg 
in 1914. "We shall soon be at war witli each 
other," he said. "But after the war we shall 
have peace. Promise me that when once the 
war is over and I have the pleasure of meet- 
ing you again, we shall be the same friends 
as ever." He punctuated his request with 
compliments which it is not for me to repeat. 

As he was in my house I had to make a 
civil answer. I hunted about for something to 
say, and then with a certain measure of em- 
barrassment I said something of this kind: "I 
don't know whether we are going to be at war 
or not. But if we were it would only be be- 
cause our respective nations believed that it 
was their interest or their duty to fight one 

91 



9* SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

another. We are both of as eivili;ed men. 
There is no earthly reason why after the war 
we should not in our individual capacity be 
nds again." 

At that time I did not believe Count C.vv- 
nin was capable of doing what he did later on. 
when he cancelled my Austrian decoration 
and. denying his own words, . vately lied 

to me. 

If 1 had known him better my answer would 
e been quite different, but Count Caernin 
is really a most accomplished type of A::>- 
trian. 

Wo all knew, md wo all say. that there is 
no sueh thing as an Austrian nation. It is 
true in the real sense of the word. An Aus- 
trian people in the sense of a collection of men 
i collective conscience does not exist 
and could not exist. But Austrians do exist 
Fhey are members of a clique recruited from 

ong the nations of the earth., serving the 
SapsburgS from father to son. living on the 
Imperial favor and forming a sort of civilian 
general start' to that family — which is the only 
link existing amongst the nations composing 
the Empire, 1 Amongst themselves these peo- 
ple talk German, but intellectually they 



COUNT CZERNIN 93 

not Germans. Though by origin they may be 
Czechs Polish, I Lilian, Croatian, German, yet 
they are not Czechs or Poles or Italians or 
Croats or Germans. Until quite recently they 
could even be of Magyar origin without, how- 
ever, being really Magyars. All those people, 
all the members of this little clique, are Aus- 
trians. They are, in fact, the only Austrians 
in the world. Their essential characteristic is 
the absence oi' real intelligence, yet they are 
not quite as innocent as they look, for they 
have bureaucrat ie traditions and a guile that 
stands them in lieu of intelligence. 

When one first sees them one is charmed by 
their beautiful manners and what I can only 
describe as their encyclopedic polish. This 
prevents one realizing their hopeless nonen- 
tity. Then one is liable to err in the other 
direction. From astonishment at their igno- 
rance and want of brain one comes to believe 
them to be harmless. It is only after a time 
that one learns the real truth. Then one per- 
ceives that at bottom these people are rogues, 
and that one should not reckon too much on 
their intellectual nonentity. 

Count Czernin is a most typical Austrian, 
and intercourse with him is most agreeable, 
as his manners, at any rate in appearance, are 



94 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

perfectly charming. He lias a rudimentary 
intelligence, but it is amply supplemented by 
guile, He has. too, a fund of humor which 
sometimes miirht almost be regarded as wit, 

'Thus one day he said to Radef, a former Bul- 
garian comitadji, "Neither you nor I will ever 
make good diplomats, because 1 never lie and 
you never speak the truth." And again, to his 
colleague Busche, who was always boasting 
about the superiority of Germany to poor 
Austria, he said. '"But at least there is one 
point on which you will have to admit that 
Austria is superior to Germany,*' And when 
Busche, who was intelligent but rather un- 
couth, persisted that this was impossible. C.er- 
nin said slyly. "We have a better ally than 
Germany has!" 

Count Caernin was in retirement in 1013 
when Vienna thought tit to replace Count 
Piirstenherg, the then minister to Houmania, 
because he had failed to prevent Roumanians 
making war on Bulgaria, the Peace o( Bu- 
charest as the consequence. 

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand picked 
OUt Caernin for the post, lie had always in- 
tended one day to make him Minister oi For- 
eign Affairs, In the meantime he sent him to 
Bucharest with the definite mission o( patch- 



COUNT CZEBNIN 95 

ing up Austro-Roumanian relations at the 
price of serious concessions in Transylvania 
which he meant the Maygars to make to the 
Roumanians. I met Count Czernin for the 
first time immediately after his arrival at the 
opening of an industrial museum. 

In spite of the crowd all around us Count 
Czernin took me into a corner and explained 
that he had only come to Bucharest with a 
view to consolidating our relations by con- 
cessions which the Magyars were to make to 
us. lie assured me that these concessions 
would he made whether Budapesth liked it or 
not. In the long run it was certain that Buda- 
pesth would sec reason, because not only was it 
a matter of justice, but it was absolutely nec- 
essary. And in conclusion he said, "Unless 
the Magyars make large concessions the Aus- 
tro-Roumanian alliance cannot go on." 

In speaking like this he showed true cour- 
age, and I have no doubt that he was himself 
deluded as to the possibility of serious conces- 
sions. It was distinctly honorable on the part 
of an Austro-IIungarian Minister to admit 
that he regarded them as absolutely necessary. 
At the same time for him to tell me so bluntly 
in the middle of a crowd at our first meeting 
seemed to me a very singular proceeding, but 



96 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

it only strengthened my opinion of Austrian 
diplomats. 

Later on it became evident even to Count 
Czernin that the tale of Magyar concessions 
to Roumania was nothing but an Arabian 
Nights' romance, and each time I saw him he 
referred to it less explicitly. It was easy to 
see that he felt awkward and knew that he had 
gone too far, and that he was looking out for 
an honorable way of retreat. 

At the beginning of the world war our rela- 
tions were most correct, but our political con- 
versations were confined to the ordinary gos- 
sip of society. 

When I returned from England in the early 
days of the war on the eve of the Privy Coun- 
cil of August 3rd at Sinaia I often met Count 
Czernin, who like me had his headquarters at 
Sinaia. He was trying like so many others to 
defend Austria against the accusation of hav- 
ing unchained the war. I protested vigor- 
ously, and he thereupon asked me to explain 
to him unreservedly what made me affirm the 
contrary. At that time Waldhausen, the Ger- 
man Minister, Czernin and I had a talk at the 
Palace Hotel at Sinaia which lasted nearly 
three hours. Having obtained permission to 
speak freely, and taking no notice of their na- 



COUNT CZERNIN 97 

tionality, I made out a regular indictment of 
Germany, and of Austria in particular. I 
produced so many proofs, quoted so many 
facts of which the public was still ignorant, 
and used such crude language that of necessity 
my relations with Count Czernin were af- 
fected. He naturally pretended that I was 
mistaken, but congratulated me on my frank- 
ness and courage, at the same time stating 
that he should look upon me as one of the 
most implacable enemies of his country. 

If I repeated this conversation it would con- 
sist chiefly in a monologue, and it would only 
mean reiterating all I have said and written on 
the origin of the war, and just a few other 
things that I have not yet made public. It 
would have little or nothing to do with Count 
Czernin. 

From that day we ceased to call on each 
other, but this did not prevent our talking if 
we happened to meet. It was not till some 
weeks later, when I had proof of his having 
taken part in the hateful work of political 
corruption, that we ceased to bow to each 
other. 

One day on the boulevard at Sinaia he 
stopped and asked me if it were true that 
Talaat and Zaimis were coming to Roumania 



OS SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

in order to try and come to an arrangement 
over the Turco-Greek difficulty about the Is- 
lands. 

When 1 answered that it was true, he asked 
me with a malicious smile if I believed Talaat 
was really coming for that purpose. 

I straightway said '"No." and added that 
Talaat had stayed at Sofia on his way and 
that it was obvious that he was coming to 
Roumania to try and arrange a Turco-Bul- 
crar-Roumanian alliance against Russia. 

"Well." said C/ernin. "and if they make a 
proposition of the kind what are you going to 
say ?" 

"1 am not the Government," 1 said, "hut if 
1 were and a proposition o( this kind were put 
forward. I should tell them quite straight out 
that if 1 wanted to go hand in hand with Aus- 
tria I should diseuss the matter with her and 
not with her household servants." 

C/ernin thought my language rather pic- 
turesque ami dropped the subject, 

A few days after Lemberg had fallen Count 
C/ernin telephoned to know whether 1 could 
see him. lie said he wanted to bring me back 
some books I had lent him. I naturally said 
"Yes," all the more willingly as it was several 
weeks since he had been to see me. I was curi- 



COUNT CZERNIN 99 

<>iis to know why he was coming; the books 
were too transparent an excuse. I received 
him in my study; it was our last conversation, 
and it is so strange as to be worth recording. 
Count Czernin began by referring to a mat- 
ter I have already mentioned, the question of 
our private friendship after the war. .Just as 

I was saying that neither war nor peace de- 
pended on me, he said, "You are going to 
make war on us. That is self-evident. It is 
your interest and your duty to do so. If I 
were a Roumanian I would attack Austria, 
and I cannot see why you should not do what 
I should do in your place. Of course it is not 
very pretty to go for an ally, but history is 
made up of such rascalities, Austrian history 
as much as that of any other state, and I don't 
see why Roumania should be the only excep- 
tion;" and then, as I told him he was making 
me feel perfectly at home, he went on: "All the 
same I must ask one thing of you. Just wait 
for a fortnight. In a fortnight the whole mili- 
tary situation will have changed in our favor, 
and whatever your present interest may be in 
making war on us you will then see that it 
would he a mistake." I smiled, and Czernin 
went on, "No, not a fortnight, let us say three 
weeks; that is all I ask of you. If the situa- 



\00 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

tion has not changed in three weeks, attack 
us. 1 should do so in your place. I insist, 
however, on the three weeks, for, mark you, 
this will be a war of extermination. If we 

are victorious we shall suppress Roumania. 
If we are beaten Austria-Hungary will cease 
to exist." 

I again said that the Avar did not depend on 
me. and that judging from what 1 saw he 
might count, not on three weeks, but a far 
longer time, even if war were eventually to 
break out between us. I added that it seemed 
an exaggeration to talk oi J extermination, and 
went on to say, "Our circumstances are in no 
way parallel. For example, if Roumania were 
suppressed I should lose everything, and 
should be but a pariah wandering through the 
work!, while you, who are by way of being a 
good German, stand to lose nothing when 
Austria disappears. You may even be a 
gainer by it. as Germany can never be sup- 
pressed." 

On this we parted. It was in the after- 
noon, and in the evening I heard from Fili- 
peseo that Czernin had that very day said 
precisely the same things to him. 

This last talk with Count Czernin is per- 
haps the strangest I ever had with any diplo- 



COUNT CZERNIN 101 

mat. For the representative of Austria-Hun- 
gary to say that if he were a Roumanian he 
would make war on Austria because it was the 
interest and duty of Houmania so to do would 
have been extraordinary and utterly incredible 
if I had not myself heard it. 

It seems to me that after this talk it was 
not becoming in Count Czcrnin to bring him- 
self to treat the King of Houmania and our 
statesmen in the way he did. He had no right 
to ask us to be blinder than he was himself 
to the interest and duty of Roumania. 



Count Mensdorff 



COUNT MENSDORFF 

I abbived in London on the 12th of July, 
1914, in the evening. I was much worried, 
although on the 9th of July, only three days 
earlier, King Charles had positively assured 
me that peace would he preserved for at least 
three years Longer. It was quite impossible 
for me to forget the horrible way in which 
the Marquis Pallavicini had spoken to me in 
the spring of 1914, and from my own observa- 
tion during the whole of the Balkan crisis I 
knew that Austria really wanted war. 

So when the Serajevo outrage occurred it 
was easy for me to appraise the full gravity 
of the situation. And when I saw Austria — 
in oilier words, Count Tisza, who since the 
death of Francis Ferdinand was virtually dic- 
tator of the Empire — preserve an inscrutable 
altitude while preparing a so-called case, but 
giving no indication of her intentions, my 
anxiety deepened still further. 

105 



106 SOME PERSON M IMPRESSIONS 

It was in this state of mind th:it 1 arrived 

in London, 
There I found ■ verj strange situation. A 

on of the Press was in all good faith 
friendly to Austria. In England the old no- 
tion of a pacific Austria necessary to the bal- 
ance of power in Europe still obtained. I 
must admit that the Austrian Ambassador, 
Count Mensdorff, aiul his friends had done 
their work well. It is well known that the 
English Press is immune against any form of 
uption. but. on the other hand, personal 
relations and friendships play a great part in 
this journalistic world, where people are in- 
clined to be over-confiding because they are 
fundamentally honest. The soil, too, was fa- 
vorable. England had not yet forgotten the 
horror felt over the assassination of King 
Alexander and Queen Draga, 

Count Mensdorff was the embodiment o( 
the best type of Austrian diplomat. He was 
a true aristocrat and a tine-looking man. but 
he was not well educated and not at all in- 
telligent, though perhaps on this account all 
the more plausible and untrustworthy. 

During the preceding weeks he had been 
assiduously making up to journalists. As 
Prince 1 ichnowsky said to me at the time. 



COUNT MENSDORFF 107 

"ITe is concocting something or other." This 
"something" obviously was to launch English 
public opinion on the wrong scent in other 
words, to spread the suspicion thai Serbia was 
particularly responsible for the assassination 
of the Archduke, since she had been over- 
tolerant of revolutionary movements. Count 
Mensdorff's agents had had recourse to an old 
device of Austrian diplomacy, a forgery. 
Some rascal had given John Bull a document 

purporting to have emanated from the Ser- 
bian Legation in London which proved that 
the assassination of the Archduke was the 

work of the Government of Belgrade. When 

1 met the Serbian Minister, M. BoSCOVitch, al 
St. Ann's Hill, the house of my friend, Sir 
Albert Rollit, he asked me as to the propriety 
of bringing a libel action against John Hull. 
The document seemed to me such an obvious 
fabrication that I said it was unnecessary. 
War sell led the question of this new Austrian 
forgery. 

The English Press was on the wrong tack. 
It honestly believed that Austria was out for 

the punishment of the assassins, and never for 
a moment suspected the criminal designs of 
the Hapsburgs. 

I realized at once that this attitude of the 



108 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

English Press might well constitute a real 
danger to the peace of Europe. I was posi- 
tive that the Government of Vienna, which 
was totally incapable of believing in disinter- 
ested motives or in frank dealing, would read 
heaven knows what ultra-pacific tendencies 
into the English papers and that it would en- 
courage them to make most unreasonable de- 
mands on Serbia. And I feared this all the 
more, as I found out that Sir Edward Grey 
had completely failed in obtaining any light 
as to the intended demands of Austria. 

I made up my mind to do the best I could 
in my own modest capacity, and in the after- 
noon in my own room at the Ritz I saw Mr. 
Steed, then foreign editor of the Times, and 
author of the well-known book on the Haps- 
burg Monarchy; Mr. Gwynne, editor of the 
Morning Post, a friend of twenty-five years' 
standing; and Professor Gerothwohl, who 
wrote for the Standard. 

My friends knew Vienna too well to be 
taken in, but all around them were the many 
victims of Count Mensdorff's honeyed tongue. 

I explained to them that, knowing as I did 
the bellicose disposition of Austria, they were 
endangering the peace of Europe in encour- 
aging her. I begged them in the interests of 



COUNT MENSDORFF 109 

peace to warn Austria, and to do it in a pretty- 
stiff tone, the only tone understood in Vienna 
and Budapesth. I added that I took upon my- 
self full responsibility for this Press campaign, 
which I believed to be useful, not only in the 
interests of peace, but of the wretched Haps- 
burg Monarchy itself. 

On the following morning, both the Times 
and the Morning Post published vehement 
leaders denouncing the Austrian plot and giv- 
ing the Hapsburgs a warning which should 
have prevented them from taking the plunge 
if the Tisza-Forgasch-Berchtold trio had not 
been completely demented. At any rate Eng- 
lish public opinion was awakened. Most of 
the Press followed the example given by the 
Times and Morning Post. The alarm signal 
had been given. 

When, a few days later, on the morning of 
the 24th, Austria's monstrous ultimatum ap- 
peared, everything was made clear even to the 
most unbelieving. At any rate in England 
prejudice in favor of Austria was dead for- 
ever. 

We who had given the alarm signal were 
right. How happy we should have been to 
have been wrong! 



England's Antipathy to War 



XI 

ENGLAND'S ANTIPATHY TO WAR 

During my long official life I have made and 
received too many confidences not to know the 
obligations attaching to my position. It is 
only the insistence with which Germany dis- 
seminates the false legend that the war is the 
work of the British Empire that forces me to 
depart from my usual discretion, which I be- 
lieve up till now has been faultless. 

I am going to tell of two personal matters, 
the first of which dates from January, 1913. 

I was then in London, and through conver- 
sation with the British Foreign Minister and 
other authoritative representatives of English 
thought I had acquired a deep conviction that 
England passionately longed for peace. For 
this reason I believed her relations with Ger- 
many — who at the moment was usefully em- 
ployed in muzzling the warlike proclivities of 
her ally, Austria-Hungary — were becoming 
closer and more cordial. Thus on the 7th of 
January, 1913, I allowed myself to write to 

113 



114 SOME PERSONAL IMrRESSIONS 

the late King Charles telling him that given 
the unshakable determination of England and 
Germany to prevent European war, I was 
certain it would never break out. But that, 
as people will say, is ancient history. 

Well, on Tuesday, the 21st of July, 1914, 
two days before the Austrian ultimatum was 
presented to Serbia, I had the honor of being 
received in a long audience by Sir Edward 
Grey, 1 Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
British Empire. 

I wanted to get him to assist the State of 
Albania to get out of the impasse it was in. 
And I tried to convince him of the necessity 
of sending an international contingent to Al- 
bania and of putting a little more money at 
the disposal of the Prince of Wied. 

After explaining to him the European as- 
pect of Albanian difficulties, I pointed out that 
Albania was liable to reduce Austria to the 
state of nerves she had been in during the 
Balkan war. This is literally what I said: "I 
know that there are people who imagine that 
a war between Austria and Italy may be the 
result of tolerating the present mix-up in Al- 
bania and that it is a way of detaching Italy 

, Now Viscount Grey. 



ENGLAND'S ANTIPATHY TO WAR 115 

from the Triple Alliance, but this would be a 
short-sighted, dangerous policy." 

Sir Edward Grey, in a tone of real sin- 
cerity — that particular sincerity of English 
statesmen which imposes respect and confi- 
dence in the world — interrupted me with a 
display of emotion rare in such a collected 
person, saying, "But I do not want to detach 
Italy from the Triple Alliance and I have 
never tried to do so. I have always realized 
that if Italy left the Triple Alliance and 
joined France and Russia the combination 
against Germany and Austria would become 
so powerful that the peace of Europe, which 
rests on the balance of power, would be en- 
dangered. I want nothing but peace, I work 
for nothing but peace." And in order that we 
may fully realize the importance of this com- 
munication, I must add that a few minutes 
later Sir Edward Grey spoke to me of the ex- 
treme gravity of the political situation owing 
to the Austro-Serbian quarrel. He was fully 
aware of the possibilities inherent in the situa- 
tion, and was all the more acutely anxious, as 
it had been impossible for him to discover 
what Austria's terms to Serbia were. 

This happened forty-eight hours before the 
fatal ultimatum which was, and will remain, 



116 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

one of the most tragic blots on the escutcheon 
of European history. The ultimatum will 
also be remembered as the most formidable 
blow ever delivered at small nations whose ex- 
istence, compared with that of the large na- 
tions, is so difficult, so anxious, and so painful. 



The Responsibility for the War 



XII 

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

The true history of the responsibility for the 
war may be summed up as follows: 

Austria, who had never given up the idea 
of obtaining compensation in the Balkan Pen- 
insula for her losses in Italy, allowed the 
Turco-Balkan war of 1912 to take place, be- 
cause she, like Germany, was convinced that 
the Turks would win. Was there not in Tur- 
key a Military Mission, and was it possible 
to think that the pupils of the Germans could 
be beaten? Was it thinkable that wretched 
serfs could be of serious military value? 

The defeat of the Turks falsified all the cal- 
culations of Austria, and from that moment 
she lost her head and conceived the project 
of plunging Europe into blood and fire in or- 
der to regain for herself the prestige which 
she thought had passed away from her. 

I repeat the charge that during the whole 
period between the battle of Lule-Burgas un- 

119 



120 SOME TERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

til the Peace of London, Austria wished to 
provoke a European war. 

The Anglo-German entente for preserving 
the benefits of peace for Europe, an entente 
that at the time was genuine, proved an in- 
superable barrier to the prospects of Austria. 
Nevertheless she did not give up her inten- 
tions. With remarkable intuition as to hu- 
man weakness she scented the possibility of 
war amongst the victors, and she encouraged 
Bulgaria to commit the fatal act which 
brought it about. 

When she found herself once more mistaken 
in her calculations and Bulgaria beaten by 
the hated Serbs, Austria decided herself to 
fall upon Serbia — M. Giolitti has given us 
irrefutable proofs of this. And now we are 
going to allow ourselves to imitate M. Giolitti 
and produce another proof which hitherto has 
remained unknown. 

In May, 1913, Count Berchtold charged 
the Austro- Hungarian Minister in Bucharest 
to make a communication to the Roumanian 
Government (to whom both the Serbs and the 
Greeks had appealed in view of the possibility 
of attack by Bulgaria), and the communica- 
tion was this: "Austria will defend Bulgaria 
by force of arms," In other words, Roii- 



THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 121 

mania, although the ally of Austria, would be 
attacked by Austria if she opposed the crush- 
ing of Serbia! 

Count Andrassy can put his hands on this 
document in the Ballplatz, but our Minister of 
Foreign Affairs will find no copy of it in our 
archives, because Count Berchtold's note was 
only read to a single minister — myself. Though 
I was not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Prince Fiirstenberg read it aloud to me, and 
my reply was such that he refrained from 
delivering it to the person for whom it was 
really intended. 

Events gradually became as clear as the 
day. On two different occasions in 1913 Aus- 
tria-Hungary tried to make war on Serbia. 
She was prevented from doing so by Ger- 
many, Italy and Roumania, but she did not 
give up the idea. 

In April, 1914, at Bucharest she put for- 
ward the idea of a preventive war very seri- 
ously. When the crime of Serajevo took place 
she was on the alert, we know with what re- 
sult. 

It is now quite certain that the tragedy of 
Serajevo was a pretext and not a cause of the 
war. It is known that the person guilty of 
provoking this monstrous conflict was Count 



IS* SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Tisza who, because o? his great ability, was in 
charge o( Austrian policy during the mouths 
that led up to the war. 

It is no use to argue that, in the days im- 
mediately preceding the declaration of war, 
Count Tisza and Berchtold, realizing that 
their game was turning into a tragedy, took 
fright and wished to retreat, but were pre- 
vented from doing so by the impatience of the 
G erman Emperor. 

Count Tisza, who had been miraculously 
delivered from the Archduke Francis Ferdi- 
nand — whose anti-Magyarism was an open se- 
cret — saw in this very incident an unique op- 
portunity oi' consolidating the dominion of the 
Magyars in Hungary and the domination of 
Hungary in the Empire, Tie hurled himself 
into the adventure witli his overbearing en- 
ergy, that brutal energy which had so often 
been exercised in the Parliament at Buda- 
pesth. 

Tisza took the risk of Europe being 
drenched in blood in order that Magyarism 
might triumph. lie succeeded, but it is only 
just that among those things which have been 
struck down by the eternal Nemesis, the crime 
o( Magyarism should be the most heavily pun- 
ished. 



King Charles of Roumania 



XTII 

KING CHARLES OF ROUMANLA 

I do not propose here to draw a portrait or 
even a sketch of King Charles. One day it is 
my intention to outline in detail the features 
of this King I knew so well, who without be- 
ing a great man was undeniably a personality. 
I will do it with complete Impartialityi for I 
have never been and it is not in me to be — 
a courtier, but at the same time with the sym- 
pathy I naturally feel for a sovereign whose 
adviser I was during so many years. For the 
moment I only wish to say enough to render 
intelligible his attitude during the war. 

King Charles was one of those spirits, east 
in a narrow circumscribed mold, which are 
just as incapable of a folly as of action on a 
great scale. Tie had impeccable tact, a mar- 
velous capacity for seeing both sides of every 
question, tireless industry, a sound sense which 
could easily be mistaken for genuine intelli- 
gence, a deep sense of duty, cultivation un- 
usual in a monarch, perfect manners, a pa- 

125 



1*6 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

tience which sometimes seemed, quite wronglv. 
like indifference, and with all this a great and 
quite legitimate regard tor what history would 
say of him in the future. For normal times, 
therefore. King Charles was remarkably well 
equipped. But for moments of erisis the 
characteristics 1 have enumerated are inade- 
quate and almost tiresome. With all his pow- 
ers. King Carl, whose physical courage was as- 
suredly beyond question, was lacking m moral 
courage, and the very idea o'i initiative was 
foreign to him. It is this eombination of 
qualities and defects, emphasized by age. 
which explains the part played by the King 
during the world war. So far as it speeially 
relates to Roumanian policy 1 do not propose 
to describe his attitude. The whole situation 
will be dealt with fully in my coming Me- 
moirs on the origin of the war and the share 
taken in it by Koumania. 

To tell all 1 know about those who have 
played any part in these unprecedented cir- 
cumstances is a debt 1 owe to history, and per- 
haps, when everything that took plaee behind 
the scenes is known, some moments of deplor- 
able hesitation and moral weakness, otherwise 
inexplicable, will be understood. Inevitably I 
shall have to concern myself from the outset 



KING CHARLES OF R0UMAN1A 127 

with the position of King- Charles, not only 
for what he did himself, but above all for what 
others did in their eagerness to anticipate his 
thoughts and his wishes. I desire now only 
to relate his (minions on the world war and its 
consequences. 

King Charles, it is only fair to say, was no 
admirer of the Emperor William. The Kai- 
ser's stormy and ill-regulated activity was ut- 
terly distasteful to him; in addition he cher- 
ished a genuine love of peace. lie had too 
much sense to overlook the peril and misery 
involved in a general war or to face it with 
a light heart. Again, in justice to the King, 
let me add that within his limits he really 
worked for peace. I shall never forget that 
in February and March, 1913, King Charles 
was the one convinced champion of my policy, 
the ohject of which was to prevent a san- 
guinary conflict between Bulgaria and our- 
selves, a conflict which would at that time 
have inevitably resulted in universal war. It 
is true that at a certain moment he deserted 
me, but when I none the less maintained an 
absolute non possumus, the King frankly con- 
fessed to me that he would never have given 
way to the war party if he had not been cer- 
tain that I would stand my ground. Mon- 



128 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

archs sometimes make us unexpected confi- 
dences. Did not King Charles one day ex- 
plain to me for a full half-hour the reasons 
which made him fundamentally ungrateful? 

Until 1912 the King had lived in the con- 
viction that the general war would not break 
out during his lifetime. In the autumn of 
1912 he sent his nephew — now King Ferdi- 
nand of Roumania — to Berlin to learn the in- 
tentions of the Emperor William. The Crown 
Prince brought back the answer that the Em- 
peror believed a conflict between pan-German- 
ism and pan-Slavism to be inevitable, but that 
he hoped it would not take place while he lived. 
King Carl for his part was so convinced of the 
stability of peace that he ventured in the 
spring of 1914 to receive a visit from the 
Czar at Constanza, which he would never have 
done had he thought that a few months after- 
wards he might have to consider the possibil- 
ity of declaring war on him. Even on July 5, 
1914, when King Charles confided to me 
at Sinaia the Kaiser's great secret — namely, 
that he had decided to bring about the Euro- 
pean war — he added that this would not take 
place for three or four years. That the old 
King was quite honest in saying so I am ab- 
solutely convinced for a thousand reasons, the 



KING CHARLES OF ROUMANIA 129 

strongest of which, based on his own tempera- 
ment, is that had King Charles imagined that 
the world war on which the Kaiser had deter- 
mined would break out twenty-two days later, 
he would have begun at once to take steps to 
ensure that his personal policy should at least 
have every possible chance of success. In 
point of fact, he took no such step until the 
days just preceding the declaration of war. 
Now during the whole of his reign he had sub- 
ordinated everything to the single idea of 
making himself the autocrat of Roumania's 
foreign policy. lie would not have left him- 
self completely unarmed on the day of the 
crisis had he known beforehand the date on 
which that crisis would occur. 

Before the meeting of the Crown Council 
on August 3, 1914, King Charles had con- 
fined any action on his own part solely to con- 
versations with his Ministers. Of these conver- 
sations history will have more to say. The 
cardinal point, which is within my personal 
knowledge, is that the King always contended 
that England would remain neutral. Like 
nearly all Germans, King Charles was not 
merely ignorant of England, but totally in- 
capable of understanding her. The Anglo- 
Saxon world is always surprised that Ger- 



180 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

mans arc as blind as they arc where England 
is concerned: the truth is that, apart from very 
rare and partial exceptions, the German is 
organically unable to appreciate the English 

spirit. England was simply excluded from 
the old King's calculations, and with the tone 
oi' authority which monarehs are accustomed to 
use. especially on subjects which they know 

nothing about, he pronounced his opinion as 
if it were gospel. 

King Charles was equally ignorant oi' the 
workings o^ the Italian mind. lie could not 
believe that Italy would dare to detach her- 
self from Germany, and the attitude she ac- 
tually adopted disconcerted no less than it 
surprised him. So convinced was he that Italy 
would not venture to separate herself from 
her all-powerful allies, that when the Italian 
"Minister came to inform him confidentially of 
the intentions of his Government, in event of 
war resulting from the ultimatum to Serbia, 
and emphasized the fact that he was only au- 
thorized to communicate this to the King on 
the understanding that His Majesty pledged 
himself to repeat no word of it to anyone. 
King Charles naively asked him if he must 
keep it a secret even from Berlin. The Min- 
ister's answer was that this went without say- 



KING CHARLES OF ROUMANIA 131 

ing, since when the Italian Government wished 
to make a communication to the German Gov- 
ernment, it would take particular care to do 
so at Berlin and not at Sinaia. It should be 
added that there was no love lost between 
these two. The King disliked the Italian 
Minister and the latter reciprocated his senti- 
ments with interest. 

Given these views on England and Italy, 
together with his profound admiration for the 
German military organization and the opin- 
ions which were so widely entertained in half- 
informed circles on the military deficiencies of 
France, it is far from surprising that King 
Charles allowed himself to be convinced, not 
only that Germany would win, but that she 
would do so very rapidly. When one con- 
siders his conduct during the Summer and 
Autumn of 1914, which accorded so ill with 
the higher interests of the country he had 
made his own, one must take into account the 
extenuating circumstances that, with the best 
will in the world, a Roumanian by adoption 
could not be conscious of the problem of our 
national unity in the same sense as a Rou- 
manian by birth, and that the King was more 
than sincere in his belief that Germany could 
not be beaten. 



18fl SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

When at the Crown Council of August 8, 
1914, the King told us that by our refusal to 

allow him to enter the war at the side of the 
Central Empires we had destroyed the whole 
great work o( the Roumanian renaissance, that 
we had ruined our country forever, and that 
the immediate future would show us how right 
he was. he was perfectly sincere, lie was sure 
of a German victory, and Kins Charles was 
never one of those who can rise to the level o( 
understanding that it is better to be beaten 
in the defense of right than to follow the eall 
of triumphant wrong. 

So little did King Charles believe in the 
possibility of resisting Germany, that some 
days after the famous Crown Council he was 
at pains to inform me exactly how the war 
would develop. According to him. it was to 
last, at the most, until December, and in Jan- 
uary, if not sooner, the Peace Conference, 
which would change the organization of the 
world from top to bottom, would be called to- 
gether. Before the loth o( September the 
Emperor William was to be in Paris. Imme- 
diately afterwards a revolution would break 
out in France, and Germany would grant her 
defeated enemy a peaee. generous beyond all 
expectations, only depriving her o( her eol- 



KIN(J CHARLES OF KOUMANIA 133 

onies and a mere trifle of territory. Germany, 
added the King, would never repeat the error 
of maintaining the French Republic. On the 
contrary, she would help in the restoration of 
the monarchy, in the person of Prince Victor 
Napoleon. Once peace was signed in France, 
the Emperor would turn with all his force 
against Russia, and before December would 
achieve the task, which had been too much for 
Napoleon, of occupying Moscow and Petro- 
grad. This would be the end of the war, to 
be followed by the dismemberment of Russia 
on the lines of the famous scheme dating from 
Bismarck's time, which, however, it must be 
remembered, the great Chancellor insisted 
should only be carried out in concert with 
England. It is needless to dwell on what I 
said in reply to this fantastic dream, which 
from the lips of a man ordinarily so full of 
common-sense as King Charles, impressed me 
very strangely. Quite vainly I tried to make 
him understand that there would be no rev- 
olution in France, that there would be no res- 
titution of the monarchy, and that it was in- 
comprehensible that the Napoleons, children of 
victory, should ever owe the recovery of their 
throne to a defeat. The King seemed to have 
been hypnotized. The more he spoke to me 



184 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

the more conscious I became of that terribly 
intoxicating quality in the idea of German 

omnipotence, which could at so great a dis- 
tance enchain the mind of an old man whose 
deliberate judgment had always been his mas- 
ter quality. 

King Charles had reached such a point of 
conviction that Germany must win that he 
quite openly criticized his nephew. King Al- 
bert, of whom he was really fond, for what he 
called his fatal error in imposing the march 
of the German troops through Belgium. There 
was something very painful to me in the 
King's insistence on this subject, and one 
August day. when he happened to say that the 
war had not brought to the front a single 
great man. 1 replied to him that he was mis- 
taken, for there was already one name in- 
scribed on the page of immortality — that of 
his nephew. King Albert. of whom he had full 
cause to be proud. And since the King main- 
tained his point of view that another policy 
would have been more to Belgium's advan- 
tage, 1 repeated to him the answer I had given 
the evening before to the German Minister, 
when he, too. had said the same thing. I had 
asked the German Minister if he had never 
sacrificed his interest to his honor. When he 



KING CHARLES OF ROUMANIA 185 

assured mc tliat he would never do .anything 
else, I replied in my turn that nations had 
the right to consider their persona] honor as 
well as individuals. 

On the anniversary of Sedan, or the day 
before, the Emperor William telegraphed 
Prom Rheims to King Charles that lie could 
assure him, after having consulted his military 
chiefs, that at Length France was at his feet. 
The King had thai day the last genuine grati- 
fication of his life. Not that he hated France, 
Par Prom it, and nothing would have pleased 
him belter than an understanding between 
France and Germany; but he thought he saw 
his forecast justified. The Sovereign, who 
bad been touched to his innermost being by 
discovering bis inability to impose bis will on 
Roumania, as lie had hitherto done through- 
out his reign, cherished a last hope of at least 
being able to say to us one day: "You see, I 
was right." Further, it is by no means certain 
that he did not hope to revive bis policy and 
see Roumania, after all, at Germany's side 
when the German victory was established be- 
yond dispute. That this was his hope I my- 
self believe. 

Cruel awakening as the battle of the Marne 



136 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

was for King Charles, he tried to deceive him- 
self on the consequences of that critical event. 
I saw him a few days after this marvelous 
victory, which will remain one of the happiest 
and most significant dates in the annals of 
mankind. The King told me that what had 
happened was nothing but a strategic retreat; 
as always, he clung to the idea that the Ger- 
man army could not be beaten. I could not 
control myself and, forgetting the respect due 
to his position and his years, I explained to 
him, in unrestrained terms, the absurdity of 
the idea that an army, which had sacrificed 
everything for the sake of advancing at head- 
long speed, had determined to lose all the 
benefit of this forward movement without 
having been defeated. King Charles — the 
words dropping slowly from his lips in a fash- 
ion which told plainly how his spirit had been 
overwhelmed by a reality he had never dared 
to suspect — said to me very gently, "Perhaps, 
then, I am mistaken; perhaps you are right; 
perhaps they have been beaten." The more 
I think of this conversation the more I am 
conscious of King Charles' moral distress dur- 
ing this last period of his life. I often saw 
him then, although I never asked for an audi- 



KING CHARLES OF ROUMANIA 137 

ence. It was always the King who, deeply- 
pained as he was by the campaign I was con- 
ducting against Germany, sent for me. 

At one of these interviews our talk touched 
on the name of his sister, the Countess of 
Flanders, mother of King Albert. In a tone 
of deep despair the old King said to me: "God 
has been good to her, he has taken her before 
this terrible day. Up to now the Almighty 
has been good to me also, but he has deserted 
me at last. How much better it would have 
been for me to die before this war." I was 
deeply touched, and answered him that I per- 
fectly understood him, and that in truth it 
would have been better for him to have died 
before war broke out. It was with these 
melancholy reflections that my last serious in- 
terview with King Charles came to an end, 
and I am convinced that it was the spectacle 
of the collapse of his fondest beliefs that has- 
tened his end. 

He was one more victim of the belief which 
for every German had become a maxim of 
life, that Germany was so strong that she was 
invincible. Before the battle of the Marne he 
expressed it by saying, "For a century pan- 
Germanism will be supreme: then will come 



138 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

the era of the Slav." King Charles believed 
the day of the Latin world was done, and as 
for the Anglo-Saxon world, he never even 
began to understand it. 



Herr Riedl 



XIV 

HERR RIEDL 

During the Balkan crisis Roumania found 
herself in a most painful position. She had let 
the opportune moment pass for discussing 
with Bulgaria the pushing of her frontier be- 
yond the Danube. The best moment was be- 
fore Bulgaria mobilized, or at any rate the 
few days between the calling-up order and the 
beginning of the campaign. It was not till 
after the battle of Lule-Burgas, when a new 
Government, in which my party held half the 
portfolios, came into office that overtures with 
Bulgaria were begun. We know how difficult 
they were. 

Russia did not conceal her intention of help- 
ing Bulgaria if it so happened that we at- 
tacked her. 

The eventuality of Roumania asking for 
Austrian aid also came into the category of 
possibilities. 

It was at that moment that Austria thought 
fit to hand us the note prepared in anticipa- 

141 



148 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

tion of her eventual assistance. She sent a M. 
Riedl to Bucharest, a gentleman I prefer call- 
ing fferr Riedl, for rarely have I seen so rep- 
resentative a type of man replete with that 
particular form of bookish undigested infor- 
mation which is almost a monopoly of the 
German race. 

He filled some very high position in the 
Viennese bureaucracy, and was the confiden- 
tial agent of Francis Ferdinand, some said his 
future Finance Minister. His mind was most 
dogmatic. It is hardly worth while to add that 
he knew nothing about human psychology. 
Germans find it an inaccessible realm. 

Herr Riedl's first business was with our 
Minister of Finance and our Minister of Com- 
merce. I don't know whether our Finance 
Minister saw through him, but our Minister 
of Commerce did, and rang me up to tell me 
Riedl had asked him to conclude a customs 
union with Austri a -Hungary, neither more 
nor less. He added that Herr Riedl was com- 
ing on to see me. 

He came, and stayed with me for over an 
hour. The talk consisted, for the most part, 
of a monologue. His French was bad. but it 
did not prevent him from saying what he 
thought. He became quite lost among his 



HERR RIEDL 143 

own theories and statements. He arranged 
facts to suit himself, instead of basing his the- 
ories on existing facts. His dogmatism in no 
wise precluded his having recourse to cunning. 
Herr Riedl, in fact, would have made an ex- 
cellent diplomatist to deal with imbeciles. He 
would have impressed them by his scientific 
jargon and he would have taken them in by 
his appearance of candor. 

Herr Riedl began by laying down that 
Turkey in Europe must be divided amongst 
the Balkan nations. Therefore Austria, who 
stood to lose the Turkish market, had a claim 
to economic compensation, and in dealing with 
this question of compensation she was anxious 
to arrive first at an understanding with Rou- 
mania. If we made difficulties she would be- 
gin with Bulgaria. The blackmail was ob- 
vious. 

Herr Riedl, who was out to ask for a cus- 
toms union, was careful not to mention these 
words. He preferred a preferential tariff. 

He explained to me at some length that the 
system known as the favored nation treatment 
had had its day, and that in future the world 
would advance to the tune of the preferential 
tariff. Austria wished to inaugurate the sys- 
tem, and it consisted in this: Austria, in re- 



144 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

turn for a certain limited quantity of our food 
products- the quantity necessary for her own 
consumption would allow us preference, and 
we wore to do the same for certain industrial 
products from Austria, but we were not to be 
allowed to grant a similar preference to other 
nations. The system was to be carried into 
effect when our existing commercial treaties 
expired, but we were to conclude the agree- 
ment immediately. 

When 1 objected that we should thus run 
the risk o( having no other state to trade with 
us, he recognized that this was quite possible. 
Austria and Roumania would then have a 
tariff war with all the rest of the world. And 
when I said that all it meant was our entry 
into a customs union with Austria, he was 
obliged to admit that I was right. 

I pointed out to him that his system had 
not been tried anywhere, and he instanced 
the preferential tariffs of Canada and South 
Africa in favor of England. "But they are 
parts of the British Empire." 1 said, "and 
Roumania is a state independent of Austria." 
He pretended not to understand my objec- 
tion. At bottom he knew well enough that 
for us to enter a customs union with Austria 
would mean the loss of our independence. 



HERB RIEDL 145 

Probably he thought that we should be flat- 
tered by this prospect. 

J proved to him at length why we never 
could aeeept his system, and I explained to 
him that we meant to develop our industries. 
I told him we wished to control our own tariff 
system, and that as for our cereals, our wood 
and our petrol, we could export them every- 
where, especially to the west and to Germany, 
without any preference in the Austrian mar- 
ket. J added that we clung too tightly to our 
political and economic independence to be 
tempted by the dole of a little extra profit on 
our cereals. 

Then he let his imagination loose. lie told 
me that the world could no longer continue 
as it was, that Europe must organize herself 
against the tyranny of pirate powers and of 
America. 

He divided old Europe into three groups. 
The first, composed of England and France, 
were pirate states, which lived not by their 
own production but by exploiting colonies. 
He developed this nonsense with so much 
gravity and emphasis that I had greatly diffi- 
culty in preventing myself from laughing. 
The two pirate states ought to be hunted out 



146 SOME PERSONA] IMPRESSIONS 

of the European market and isolated and left 
to pine alone. 

The second group consisted of Russia, who 
luul no right to remain in Europe, She ought 

to be hunted into Asia, or at any rate banished 
beyond MOSCOW, Hussia ought to be cut off 
from the Baltic and from the Black Sea. and 
thus reduced, should be left to her proper eco- 
nomic fate. 

The rest o\' Europe was to be organized into 
a great tariff union, oi' which the Austro- 
Roumanian agreement was to be the corner- 
stone. lie said that Austria would take upon 
herself to get the consent o( Germany to his 
scheme. Once this was done. Switzerland, 
Italy, Belgium, and Holland, the states of the 
north ami the states cut away from Russia 
would be compelled to enter this union, and 
the world would be transformed. 

When I objected that Germany had much 
to lose in such an arrangement, as she risked 
forfeiting that oversea commerce which played 
so great a part in her national economy, he 
replied that it was precisely in order to tight 
the United States that the new organization 
o{ Europe had become necessary. Ami he let 
himself go about the American invasion, the 
American danger, and so on. 



HERB RIEDL 147 

He was immensely astonished when I told 
him that I jaw nothing to worry about in the 
development ot America, that it was perfectly 
natural, arid that the hegemony of the white 
races would pass to the other ride of the At- 
lantic. 

"Just think," J said. "The nations 
there are not hampered by our military slav- 
ery, our prejudices, our monarchies, our aris- 
tocracies. For this reason they are greatly 
luperior to us, and it is impossible that they 
should not get the tipper hand." 

At that moment I was not able to add the 
strongest argument of all the madness of a 
universal war, which has brought the transfer 
of this hegemony nearer by half a century. 

J think this was the climax for I [err RiedL 
Tie realized that there was nothing to he done 
with me, and though he still paid calls and 
pretended to take quite seriously the promi 
made to him of examining his system care- 
fully, he was under no illusions, and went hack 
to Vienna. 

I have never heard of him since. 



Count Szeczen 



XV 
COUNT BZECZEM 

Count Szeczes was the last Austro-Hun- 

garian ambassador in Paris, and wre must hope 
he will remain the last. Whatever siirvh 
of the Hapsburg monarchy, if by ill fortune 

anything does survive, v.il] never be able to 
afford the luxury of having an ambassador. 

There is nothing either good or had about 
Count S/eezen which makes him stand out. 
He is just one of those many Counts out of 
whieh the Dual Empire manufactured diplo- 
matists. If he took the trouble to look at 
my souvenirs he would find out that he was 
the first Hapsburg diplomat to appear to me 
under a new and purely Magyar form. Since 
then I have seen many more of them. But 
before I met Count S/eezen I had only met 
what are called "Kaiserlieks" even among the 
Magyars. My memory of Szeczen is distinct 
because of that. P^ven twenty years ago, 
though he represented the Dual Monarchy 
and received his instructions from Vienna, he 

151 



SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

was Magyar, very "Magyar ami nothing but 
Magyar. At the time of which 1 am speaking 
he was first secretary of the Legation o( 
Bucharest, under Count Goluchowsky, There 

was an agitation at the time in our country 
over the Roumanians in Hungary. The 
Magyars had made harsher the rule to which 
they subjected non-Magyar nationalities in 
their midst, and naturally we were not able 
to hide the sense of bitterness which Magyar 
injustice left in our souls. The press was 
violent and all sorts o( demonstrations took 
plaee. 

Similarly the Austro-Hungarian Govern* 
ment began to take umbrage, and the Rou- 
manian Government, o( which I was a mem- 
ber, did not know which way to turn. 

I was very intimate with Count S/.eczen. 
We saw each other constantly; and tacitly 
agreed never to touch on the question of the 
Roumanians in Hungary. This often was 
awkward, but we pretended not to be aware 
o( it. Our intimacy was only possible on 
these terms. 

One day Count S/eezen broke the silence. 
An incident had occurred which was o( no par- 
ticular gravity, but it was something Count 
S/.eczen could not swallow. I think a Hun- 



COUNT SZECZEN 153 

garian flag had been lorn up. He had just 
had Luncheon with me, and he made up his 
mind to speak to me as soon as we were alone 
together in my study. He began bitterly by 
imputing motives of tolerance or complicity 
to our Government, as wo had not taken 
action against the demonstrators, and, warm- 
ing up, Ik: said word Tor word almost as fol- 
lows: "You are now playing a dangerous 
game. You accept the axiom that we can 
never come to an understanding with Russia 
and you count on a future war between us 
and the Russians. Well, you are mistaken. 
If the time ever comes that we are convinced 
that we cannot count on you as the loyal ally 
of the Magyar Union, the only state which 
concerns US and one which we would defend 
with the last drop of our blood, we shall come 
to an understanding with Russia. After all, 
the Carpathians make a first- rate frontier, and 
Galicia, Roumania, Constantinople even, are 

as nothing when it is a question of preserving 
to Hungary its character as a Magyar Union. 
Relieve me, nothing is more possible than a 
definite and permanent understanding between 

Magyars and Russians. We shall be on one 
slope of the Carpathians, looking towards the 
Adriatic, they will be on the other slope, fac- 



154* SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

ing towards the Black Sea. And that will be 
the end for ever of the Roumanian question, 
not only in Hungary but everywhere." 

I let Count Szeczen unfold his scheme. He 
was furious, and paid no heed to the fact that 
it was very strange that an Austro-IIungarian 
diplomat should speak in this way to a Rou- 
manian Minister. 

When I replied that I had never had any 
doubt about the hostility of Magyar feeling 
towards us, but that all the same his threats 
had no effect on me, as I did not believe in the 
possibility of a Russo-Magyar alliance, he saw 
his mistake and stammered out an excuse that 
was no excuse. As we neither of us had any 
wish to quarrel we let the discussion drop. 

That day Szeczen had revealed to me the 
depths of his Magyar soul. This proud preda- 
tory people will never become resigned to live 
its own life as a national state like England, 
France, Spain or Italy. They mean to domi- 
nate other nationalities or perish. Any other 
solution is impossible. 

Count Karolyi's policy cannot be explained 
iu any other way. It is identical with that with 
which Count Szeczen in an angry moment 
threatened me more than twenty years ago. 
Often what appears to be new is really old. 



Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace 



XVI 

SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE 

Many, many years ago, during the last period 
of the reign of the great Queen Victoria, Sir 
Donald Mackenzie Wallace was my guest at 
Sinaia. Sir Donald was very well known in 
England. He began life in diplomacy, di- 
rected the foreign policy of the Times for a 
very long period, was Lord Dufferin's right- 
hand man in India, and was extremely intimate 
up till the day of his death with King Edward, 
then Prince of Wales. Sir Donald wrote a 
classic on Russia, a book which has been trans- 
lated into all languages. He was chosen by 
King Edward to accompany King George, 
then Prince of Wales, in his tour around the 
Empire, and he wrote an account of the trip. 
He attended the peace conferences of Ports- 
mouth and Algeciras; and at Petrograd he 
was the guest of Sir Arthur Nicholson when 
the Anglo-Russian alliance was concluded. 

I have had many interesting interviews with 
Sir Donald during my life. The one I am 

157 



158 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

about to relate is of extraordinary impor- 
tance. 

We were walking in a splendid forest, and 
our conversation naturally turned to world 
politics. Sir Donald said: 

"The present policy oi' the European Pow- 
ers is absurd. We are all victims of the prej- 
udices oi' the elder statesmen who perpetuate 
the truths oi' their youth which no longer cor- 
respond with actuality. For example, in 
England we are dominated by two so-called 
axioms, both equally out oi' date. We live in 
dread oi' the bogey of Russia wishing to chase 
us out oi' India., and wo believe ourselves the 
eternal rival oi' France. Now all that is un- 
true — utterly untrue. There is enough room 
on Asia for England as well as Russia, per- 
haps we already take up more room there than 
the Asiatics approve oi\ Anglo-French riv- 
alry is a prehistoric peep dating from the 
epoch when there were only two great powers 
in the world. France and England. To-day 
it means nothing whatever. England always 
has been and always must be an essentially 
pacific power, essentially conservative so 
far as international politics are concerned. 
France, for a thousand reasons, is now an 
equally pacific and conservative power. The 



SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE 159 

only revolutionary power in international poli- 
ties is Germany, it is Germany who keeps 
the world on the alert, it is Germany alone 
wlio threatens its peace. You may expect to 
see great changes when the elder statesmen 
have given way to another generation. You 
will see England become France's greatest 
friend, and the famous antagonism between 
England and Russia relegated to a museum of 
antiquities." 

When Sir Donald predicted this, speaking 
so succinctly and frankly, it was a new point of 
view. But since then it has all happened. 

That evening we spoke of Roumania, of her 

people, of her future-. Sir Donald had studied 

the question of the Roumanians in Hungary 
in de-tail. lie had even been to Brashov, 
Sihiu and Blaj, the districts chiefly concerned, 

and had talked to the representative Rouma- 
nians living there. 

Suddenly he asked me- the great question: 
"You have a treaty of alliance with Austria 
— you needn't deny it, I know it. But do you 
think that when the- moment comes for you to 
put it into effect you will be able to do it? 
Personally I cannot see how you ean." 

"I do not know whether we have a treaty of 
alliance with Austria or not," I replied, for I 



160 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

was bound to absolute secrecy, "If it exists 
I agree with you no one in the world would 
carry it into effect." 

Sir Donald must have made a mental note 
of my statement, which was as clear as his 
own. 

Circumstances have shown that I, in my 
turn, was a true prophet. 



Baron Banffy 



XVII 

BARON liAM'I'Y 

I saw Baron Banffy, the most overbearing of* 
all Hungarian ministers (and that is saying a 
good deal;, but once. It- was in the first days 
of January, 1890. Banffy was a hi# cheery 
fellow with pointed mustaches, who looked 
like a Magyarized edition of a typical French 
official. 

lie was a second rate man, but in spite of 
this his extreme energy imposed on people 
even when he was expressing himself in a 
language be spoke badly. Banffy came from 
Transylvania, and could speak Roumanian* 
As a prrf/'l (for he had begun by being a 
prSfet) ho had served a good apprenticeship 
in working the political oracle among the 
electorate, first as a district official and later 
on as Prime Minister of Hungary. 

Wnen I was in Vienna in January, ihimi, he 
intimated his wish to make my acquaintance 
through a Hungarian deputy of the Independ- 
ent Party. The reason that the Hungarian 
Premier wanted to see me was not far to seek. 

163 



164 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

It was merely curiosity. It was because I was 
the first Roumanian Minister to give subsidies, 
secret subsidies, not only to the Roumanian 
schools and churches of Transylvania, but also 
to newspapers and political committees. In 
order to subsidize the papers I commissioned 
journalists to write class books ostensibly for 
use in the Roumanian schools of Macedonia, 
and I paid for the work right royally. I need 
hardly explain that the class books were not 
always written. 

Banffy after a while had scented something 
of this political activity, of which, as a matter 
of fact, my colleagues in the Cabinet, with the 
exception of the Prime Minister, Lascar Ca- 
targi, were unaware, and I only told him after 
having done it for two and a half years. He 
did not blame me, but my political opponents 
in Roumania denounced my activities, and it 
was in this way that Banffy came to be cer- 
tain of what I was up to. As I had been 
turned out of office in October, 1895, Banffy 
was anxious to see the enemy of his people at 
close quarters. 

After leaving Vienna I stayed at Buda- 
pesth, and asked for an audience from the 
Hungarian Prime Minister. He received me 
in the wonderful Royal Palace of Bude, from 



15 A RON BANFFY 165 

which one gets such a glorious view over the 
Danube and over Pesth. Banffy quite natu- 
rally spoke to me on the subject of the Rou- 
manians in Hungary. 

He began rather brusquely by saying, "I 
hope you are not going to tell me that you 
don't want to annex Transylvania." "No," I 
replied, "I shall not tell you that; if I did you 
would not believe it, and would only think 
that you were dealing with a liar or with a 
man who docs not love his country. I want 
to annex Transylvania, but I can't do it." 

And then in my turn I said to him, "I hope 
you are not going to tell me that you don't 
wish to move the frontiers of the Magyar state 
to the Black Sea." With real good temper 
Banffy replied, "No, I won't tell you that. I 
do want to move Hungary's frontier to the 
Black Sea, but I can't do it." 

Then I said, "As the historical case between 
us cannot be settled either in your favor or in 
mine, and since we are neighbors, is it not 
possible for us to find a modus Vivendi? You 
have made the conditions for Roumanians in 
Hungary intolerable, why don't you change 
them?" 

Banffy began a series of explanations, one 
falser than the other, in order to prove that 



166 SOME PERSOXA1 IMPRESSIONS 

the ppi ession, And by n ai 

of something final he asked me why Rouma- 
nians in U 5 would not take part in elec« 
os and would not come to the Parliament 
. >th to put Forward their grievances, 
I must explain that at this period the Rou- 
manians of Hungary ha d adopted the policy 
passive resistance, which included absten- 
arce known in Hungary as 
elections, I looked Baron Banffy straight 
ween the eyes, knowing that 1 was deal 
th a vain man from whom one might 00- 
n anything by flattering his vanity. "Look 
On Banffy," 1 said, "we both know 
tions are in our respective countries. 
v • you tell me perfectly truthfully that if 
Roumanians were to offer themselves for elee- 
tion and yon did not wish them to be elected 
tlu- id be a single one who Could be re- 
turned against your will" Banffy answered, 
"Not a single one if 1 did not wish it." Thus 
I got him to discard his little joke about 
Roumanians participating in elections, a pro- 
ding devoid of all sense unless Roumanians 
and Mi were to come to a mutual un- 
derstanding. Then going back to the idea o( 
a I said, "l have no mandate 
the Roumanians of Humrary, I am not 



BARON BANFE v 

hpwikittit in t.h':ir wi.ui<:, but iro ild bn- 

poaiible fc 

in 'J 

churches, then 
(ion*?" 
BanfTy cred iriti] the moat bi 

frankix 

in Transylvania are b il 2 HJ in n 
and tb • ..-.' than too miles from 
Germani of '. 

nianj i r j J fur.; If rnil- 

lioni ftrong and apbicall 

oui to the Bo I ft ftw 

W': continued to i tiie I 

ed bun whether it would not at 1' 

possible to give Trail 

toral fran< . II ,r.; :j'J th': 

ballot. 
"V anx 

II'. rang and ordered the ':-' r p of 

the Kingdom of II ^ r .; ; jn. 

\/><>V. at this ma] die pin 

ftfagyai i of Hungai I 

deputies, that 

with A the Old 

Magyar domii 



168 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

the governments that have gone before and 
those which will follow after, only exists be- 
cause of the division amongst nationalities* 
With the secret ballot we should lose this 
advantage; in short, we could no longer 
govern**' 

After an hour o\' useless talk BanfFy asked 
me if there was a single point on which we 
agreed. 

"Yes," I said, "we arc agreed that we 
never can agree on any point." 

When 1 rose to bid him farewell we walked 
past the window with the view over the 
Danube and over Pesth. "What a magnificent 
eapital you have there." I remarked. "Well 
come ami take it." gaily answered Banffy, 

"Even if 1 Could, I never would take it: 
but its occupation is quite another matter," 
said 1. 

Most o( this conversation with Karon 
Banffy has already appeared in the pages o( 

Sir Mount Stuart Grant Duff*S diary. I had 
told him about it in London some years after 
it happened. 

"Never have 1 hail so elear and categorical 
an explanation from any Hungarian states- 
man of the irremediable antagonism o( our 
two points of view. 



Roumanian Policy 



XVIII 

ROUMANIAN POLIC1 

In 1^08 I was dining at the bouse of a great 
friend in Fan's. There were a number of 
people there, amongst them two former 
French Foreign Ministers. If they read this 
they will remember the conversation I am 
about to relate. 

One of them, whom we will call X, was a 
widely erudite man and a writer of great tal- 
ent, but the sort, of nature which does riot, re- 
tain its impressions. The other, V, was con- 
centrated by nature and spoke little and 
seldom. 

After dinner, when most of the guests had 
gone off to listen to music, we three found 

ourselves alone in trie study. 

We talked of Roumania, which had just 
made an act of unnecessary submission to 
Austria, and X suddenly exclaimed: 

"The more I think about it, the less I under- 
stand the policy of Roumania. You have no 
chance of becoming a great nation except at 

171 



172 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Hungary's expense. Yet you are the allies of 
Hungary; for make no mistake, Austria no 
longer exists. In reality you are in the first 
place allies of Hungary, and in the second 
place allies of Germany. It is impossible for 
me to understand your policy." 

"Do you understand the policy of Italy?" 
I asked. 

"Of course," X replied, "it is the policy of 
fear." 

"And why do you think that Italy is the 
only country that is afraid V* 

Y, who had said nothing, began to speak. 
He recognized that the policy of Roumania 
was to be explained by fear, and the conversa- 
tion turned on the profound difference be- 
tween the Triple Alliance and the Triple 
Entente. In the Triple Alliance, or rather 
the Austro-German alliance, there was com- 
plete unity of control, as Berlin alone w r as in 
command; in the Triple Entente the bonds 
were so intangible that it w r as difficult at the 
moment to rely on them. 

"What can we do," asked X, "in order to 
show you the great interest we take in your 
happenings and in your future?" 

Y then said, "All we can do for Roumania 
is to help her to become strong, so that when 



ROUMANIAN POLICY 173 

the day of the great catastrophe arrives and 
she has to make her choice, she may choose 
with perfect freedom." 

I thanked these two ex-ministers, and told 
them that in spite of the apparent political 
slavery of Roumania and in spite of the diplo- 
matic folly she had just perpetrated, a folly 
that consisted in informing Sofia that she 
would be obliged to intervene if Bulgaria took 
advantage of troubles in Constantinople to at- 
tack Turkey — in spite of these things I prom- 
ised that Roumania's choice would be made in 
perfect freedom. 

My friends must now see I was right, and 
they cannot regret the support given us by 
France in 1913. 



Tragedy 



XIX 

TRAGEDY 

The scene was London, on the 27th of July, 
1014. 

In spite of the pacific assurances which had 
in all good faith been given me that morning 
by Prince Lichnowsky, who had been studi- 
ously kept in ignorance of the warlike designs 
of the Emperor, I saw the world war ap- 
proaching and I was gripped by the horror of 
it. The last chance of salvation lay in adopt- 
ing the English proposal for a conference of 
the four Great Powers, but that had come to 
nothing, owing to Germany's refusal to take 
any part in it. 

Although I was convinced that no one 
would ever make the Roumanian army fight 
side by side with Hungarian troops, yet I was 
anxious, for I could not foresee how the war 
would open, or be certain that Germany and 
Austria would not, by some diabolic stroke of 
ingenuity, arrange things in such a way as to 
force Russia to declare war herself, 

177 



178 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Not having the text of our treaty oi' alliance 
under my eyes, 1 could not be sure thai we 
could escape its entanglements without ap- 
pearing to violate the letter of our engage- 
ment, In particular 1 could not recall exactly 
how the key phrase, "without provocation on 
her part." was worded. 

In the afternoon I asked my old friend, the 
Italian Ambassador in London, the M..rquis 
Imperial!, to come and see me. Having played 
an important part in affairs in his own coun- 
try, I felt sure he would know the text of the 
Italian treaty, the provisions of which were 
identical with those of the Roumanian treaty 
which 1 had read through in June, 1908. 

We talked together for a long while over 
the grave peril that threatened European 
civilization. We hoped against all hope. We 
even imagined we had discovered catchwords 
which would make the war impossible, so 
monstrous did it all seem to us. 

But we did more than this, for we also dis- 
cussed the war as a real possibility. It did not 
take us Long to find out. firstly, that we were 
completely agreed that if war did break out 
the blame would he entirely with Germany 
and the Magyars, and secondly, that the fate 



TRAGEDY 179 

of the world for generations to come must de- 
pend on the result of the war. 

We both wen: clearly of opinion that in the 
event of a German victory the future of 
Eloumania as well as Italy would be seriously 
compromised, if not destroyed. Supposing 
Germany and Austria to be the victors, all the 
risorgimetitOj all the battles and sacrifices of 
the Italian people would be in vain. For 
Eloumania a German rictory meant even more 
than this, if. meant sudden death, while Italy 
at the worst might accustom herself to slow 
strangulation. 

We believed in the wisdom of our respective 
Governments, and we also felt certain that if 
our rulers attempted to force our people to 
fight side hy side with the enemies of all 
libera] civilization, our people would resist. 
All the same we asked ourselves, in our 
wretchedness, whether \>y the litem.! interpre- 
tation of treaties we were obliged to acquiesce 
in race-suicide. 

The Marquis Imperial] had read the treaty 
- as a matter of fart he had done so hefore I 
did and we tried together to reconstitute the 
text, hut we could not do it. I shall never 
forget our despair, our misery, at not. being 
able to say with certainty what the exact word- 



180 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

ing o( the treaty really was. Yet on the fetter 
iif the treaty for, remember, we had not yet 
become acquainted with the "scrap oi' paper" 
doctrine depended our honor and our future. 

"What a tragedy!" we said to each other. 

We both felt tears trickling down our faces, 
and we were not ashamed o( them: but our 
talk came to an endj and with a prolonged 
hand-grip we said farewell. 

1 have never seen the Marquis Imperial] 
since that day, hut when he reads this he will 
forgive me for having preserved the memory 
of his tears. We wept together. 



Count Tisza 



XX 

C0UN1 TISZA 

I ').< ■:■■: ( .', inl 'J . / 

man tilC r '.'.'"-• J - H' 

. the prime mover iri ur.- 
flicfc Tisza provoked the si carnaj 

but. vrithout tl '' ould 

not have dared v. 'J'. 

minal must f,< ; \</>V.<:<\ for a. Berlin. H'. 
ran Hu - j ^fj an <:n< .- of a ; . 

ter ca we, and paid for hii crinu life- 

The punishment has beei ed out 

f ;) /: for the proie* ution ii f J'' 

I only met 'i / 

JJ< then chairman of the board of a 

Budapest]] bank v. >^ j <--} j did bo rtth an 

industrial company in Roumania oi I 

. chairman. V\'<: talked business and travel, 

not. a jrord of politic .. But tl con- 

rerfatioi] sufficed to give me an idea of 
personality, if': irai strong hi r 

the word. Cold as Hie blade of a knife; with 
a wiJJ of extreme brutality, and a demeanor 



is t SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

as serious as an English non-conformist min- 
ister's. 

Though he was a strong man he could never 
be a popular one. lie had no magnetism, no 

emotional quality, no outward sign o( the di- 
vine tire, none of the things that enable a public 
man to influence a crowd. 

I have often wondered how it was possible 
for so strong a man to blunder so badly, lie 
committed the unspeakable crime oi' provoking 
a Avar that would end Magyar domination, 

which, in Tisza*S eyes, was synonymous with 
Magyar patriotism. There evidently must 
have been several reasons why Tis/.a made 
such a mistake, but Magyar megalomania is 
not the least o( them. 

The recollection of my solitary Conversa- 
tion with Tis/.a helps me. however, to under- 
stand this psychological problem. 

The intellectual isolation in which Tisza 
lived may have had something to say to it, too, 
for it prevented him from realizing what was 
happening in other countries. In talking with 
him I asked him whether it was long since he 
had visited the west o( Europe. He answered 
me that it was seven years since he had left 
Austria-Hungary and that he felt no need 
ever to leave it again. 



COUNT TISZA 185 

"I should die if I went in for the same 
i*igime" I said. "I leave Roumania three 
times a year and pass four months in West- 
ern Europe) and look upon these journeys as 
a necessity — a sort of intellectual hygiene. 

"If we stay at home too long our horizon 
contracts. Little local questions assume an 
importance which they do not really possess. 
One must treat events in the political world as 
one does Mont Blanc; if one wishes to ap- 
preciate its size, one must go away from it. 
I have to cross the frontier in order to under- 
stand how small are the questions which at 
Bucharest seem to me of the first magnitude." 

Tisza listened to me, hut did not under- 
stand. He was satisfied with knowing the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and more espe- 
cially the Kingdom of Hungary, and from 
that standpoint to judge the course of human 
events. 

This political myopia must have Winded the 
strongest man the Central Empires possessed 
and led him to unloose a war in which were 
to founder the hegemony of his race, the inter- 
ests of his caste and his own historical reputa- 
tion. 

One must at any rate do this much justice 



186 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

to Tisza. He made his exit from the scene 
better than the two Emperors who had banded 
themselves together against the liberty of the 
world. 



Talaat Pasha 



X X J 
TALAA1 J'.'.-, ha 

IToung Turk Paj I ■ J ) 

formed, Djem*] more cultured, E 

more noise* but Tflla&t* pritbout doubt, I 

more rtrength of ohaj N . a 'I • 

but a Turk h i f><: a n 

}.',/.' .' : .::.:■ ting 0.- 

E iropean, He »ra# in 

jrthing, bad traveled i r 

knew now; of t.ho 

man bond among public men m V'.' 
countries Talaat nude lefi- 

' .' r* .' . by a prill of ii 

and by a quality irbick 

Turks, a quickne a Unun*-.;-, 

in execution »rl ■ ;■■ r ) ■ - tali bo ri 

tbenL 

Lik<: all Hie SToung '\ ■ Talaat iri 

Jingo. When I n for th*: v/:or.\ 

on my return from Atheni in Noremh 

1918, whw: J had a 



190 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

of peace between Turkey and Greece] Talaat 
explained to me how he had plotted and 
bought about the recapture of Axlrianople in 
191& It was • wonderful example of rash- 
ness and of resolution. In twenty-four hours 
he had forced his will upon the Cabinet, the 
Generals and the threat Powers, in order to 
procure the necessary money to carry out an 
expedition which the Bulgarians Could easily 
have turned into a disaster for the Turks hail 
they wished to do so. On the eve of this 
Talaat had found few people to approve o( it. 

on the morrow everyone was his accomplice. 
"As to the Great Towers." said he to me, "1 

knew that they would not mo\ e. and that the 
very audacity o\' the thing would foree it on 
them. I shall soon do the same thing when 1 
suppress the eapitulations. 'We do not mean 
to have those capitulations any more. I know- 
quite well that Europe will protest, but she 
will not act" lie showed the same determin- 
ation in discussing the Sultan. I had asked 
him if the Sultan or the heir-apparent might 
not wish to reeover the powers o\' former 
sovereigns. "We will never allow him to." 
replied Talaat. "We are the masters, and if 
a Sultan thinks he is going to run things as 
he pleases we shall simply depose him." 



TALAAT PASHA 10] 

These qualities of Talaat's were spoilt by a 
spirit of party prejudice, which we in the west 
find .offf: difficulty in realizing. For example, 
wrV n after my return from Athens I was 
discussing with Talaat a proposal for an 
understanding between Turkey and Greece 
about which Venizelos had charged me to 
sound the Turks, I felt that party interests 
more than anything else lay behind the argu- 
ments which Talaat used to me in countering 
my proposal. Talaat would hare liked to raise 
the popularity of the Young Turk Party \>y 
striking at a neighbor, and his Greek neigh- 
bor seemed to him the easiest to hit without 
incurring too big a risk. 

VV/k.tj I saw Talaat for the first time he 
impressed me by bis thoroughly un-Turkish 
characteristics. Early in November, iokj, J 
went from Sinaia to Athens under the pretext 
of a pleasure trip, but in reality to try to 
induce Turkey to make peace with Greece* 
Turkey was being encouraged in her attitude 
by Bulgaria, and thought ot nothing less than 
restarting the Balkan war. My friend 
Venizelos was of opinion that my going there 
might perhaps cause the Turks to pause in 
their insane project. 

J said nothing about my int.frjt.ioo-, to any- 



W SOMF n.KSONAl IMPRESSIONS 

. in Roumania except King Charles, with 
whom 1 arranged that it' I succeeded the credit 
it should go to Roumania, but that if I 
failed the blame should be mine tor having 
undertaken ;i mission which no one had 
charged me with. 

I asked an old friend, a Roumanian of 
Macedonia, formerly in the Young Turk Gov- 

unent, Batiaria by name, to moot me at 
Constantinople, where I only intended stop ■ 
ping a couple of hours. I wanted him to 
toll his friend Talaat, whom 1 did not at that 
time know, what a dangerous game the Turks 
and Bulgarians were playing, and how de- 
termined Roumania was not to tolerate a new 
conflagration in the Balkans. To my great 
surprise Talaat himself turned up. He made 
a good impression on mo. We talked for 
more than an hour. He complained that my 
going to Athens at such a moment looked like 
a demonstration against Turkey. I replied 
that I certainly intended to demonstrate in 
favor of poaoo and against Turkey it" she al- 
lowed herself to ho worked up by Bulgar 
intrigues, and added that Roumania was de- 
termined to striko at anybody, no matter 
whom, who disturbed the poaoo of Bucharest, 

and that she >vas quite in a position to do so. 



TALAAT PASHA 193 

Talaat was much moved, and jre at lei 
reached a point, at which he requested me to 
set m arbitrator between the Turki and the 
Greeki on aJJ the question! which divided 
them and they wett rei ' numerous 'j 1 -' 
tiom which had brought about a complete 
deadlock in the negotiation! at Athens* J 
cepted the mission, and, ai ii well known, I 

ceeded. But at this in * J laid to 

Talaat that be must prove to rrjf: that be rep- 
resented something different from the old Tur- 
key, and mutt Ho go by undertaking to push 
t.fi': affair through in three days* \\<. agreed 
to tbia stipulation, an almoit unheard-of pro- 
ceeding for a Turk, and ai a matter of I 
everything wai put through in Athem iri 
days, though not. without, diihcultiei and 
worriei which need rjot. be detailed now, 

Talaat promised to return the risit which I 
had paid to him on my iray back from Ath< 
and came to Bucharest in the Spring of 1914, 
when J was mo longer a member of the Gov- 
ernment. He made the lame impression f >n 
me, of being a determined man, energetic and 
brave, hut. completely ignorant of European 

m';n and affail 

The last time J law him wai at. Sinaia, and 



liH SOME PKRSONA1 IMPKKSSIONS 

I then rcaliied that his blindness must In the 
long van prove fatal to Turkey, 

It is well known that in spite of the peace 
which 1 had succeeded in negotiating at Athens 
the question of the islands remained to be 
settled between Turkey and Greece, This 

matter was net b\ its nature a question tor 

Roumanian arbitration, but for settlement by 
the Great Po* ers, 

In the early days o( the great European 

war. when I was still at my \ ilia in Sinaia. 1 
learned that Talaat. accompanied by Hakki. 
then president of the Turkish Chamber of 

Deputies, had arranged i meeting in Rou- 

mania with the Greek delegates, Messrs, 

mis and Politis, to discuss the question of 

the islands. 

On the way the Turkish delegates stopped 

two or three days at Sofia, which was a clear 

indication o\' their intentions; the so-ealled 

negotiations being but a trap laid by Austria 
and Germany, The discussions were carried 
on at Bucharest, but the Turkish delegates, 
under pretext of seeking country air, estab- 
lished themselves at Sinaia. The truth is that 
they wished to be in elose toueh with the Ger- 
man, Bulgarian and Austrian Ministers who 
were then at Sinaia. 



TALAA1 PASHA 196 

The negotiations did not prog 
irere not meant to. The orj J 7 thing the Turki 
fronted vtao to find ft ftzszis &#//i ; ■■;-. iinst Greet 
the sooner to bring about the conflagration in 
tjj<: iriiole Balkan Peninsula. 

Talaat naively believed that King Charles, 
who against hii frill had acquiesced in the 
neutrality oi Roumania, might still drag the 
country into a irar against Russia by allying 
himself irith Bulgaria and Turkey, I* 
ridiculous, but although Talaat bad plenty of 
determination h<: wm quite ignorant of r/j':rj 
and things, 

One incident in these precious negotiations 
i. worthy of being noted. It. is, moreover, the 
first and last occasion on prhich I bad a really 
mi talk with Talaat, 

One evening I ' e f asino at Sinaia, 

having a talk irith the Russian and Italian 
Ministers, [t wm about ten o'clock at night, 
vrben one of r/jy journalist friends came to 

rn me that the next day the Turkish dele- 
gates intended to present an ultimatum to the 
Greek delegates at Bucharest, and finish off 
the procedingi by a declaration of war. 

The rery idea that the Turks egged on by 
the Centra] Powers and by the Bulgarians, 

re about to let loose a fresh Balkan ■--. 



196 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

from Bucharest on the hospitable soil of Rou- 
mania was hateful to me. At once I cast 
about for means to prevent such a calamity 
happening. I knew that Talaat and his col- 
leagues were certain to come into the gambling 
room, as they were not due to go to Bucharest 
until the next morning at eight o'clock, and as 
a matter of fact they turned up soon after 
eleven o'clock. J. at once spoke to Talaat, 
and told him that I must have a word with 
him. He tried to put me off by making an 
appointment for the following evening, after 
his return from Bucharest, to which I replied 
that that would be too late, that I must speak 
to him immediately; that the business was one 
of extreme urgency, and that the least he 
could do was to accede to my request. 

Much against his will Talaat consented, and 
asked me whether Hakki could also take part 
in our conversation. Firmly I replied "No," 
but said that if he wished to communicate 
what I said to Hakki that was his own busi- 
ness, but that so far as I was concerned I 
meant to speak to him alone. 

Leading Talaat off into a corner, I made 
him sit down facing me, and the following 
strange conversation began. 

The general public which crowded round 



TALAAT PASHA 197 

the baccarat tables paid no attention to us, 
but the Russian and Italian Ministers, who 
knew what I was about, kept their eyes fixed 
on our little group. 

In a sharp voice I told Talaat that I knew 
of his plan for the morrow, and that I asked 
him, in the name of the respect which he 
owed to Roumanian hospitality, to give it up. 

Talaat tried to stammer out that I was mis- 
taken as to his intentions and so on. 

I replied that he was wrong to deny it, as 
I knew everything, whereupon Talaat ac- 
knowledged his scheme, and added that he 
was convinced that sooner or later Roumania 
would go to war against Russia side by side 
with Turkey and Bulgaria. 

Thoroughly angry, I asked him whether he 
had warned the King of his scheme to provoke 
war while a guest on Roumanian soil. He 
admitted that he had not done so, but stated 
that he knew that the King remained favor- 
able to the policy of war in alliance with the 
Austro-Germans. I then pressed Talaat as 
hard as I could. Carried away by my feelings, 
I gesticulated in a way I never do, and so 
completely forgot the consideration due to a 
guest that I told him that Roumania would 
never forget the insult which the Turkish 



198 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

delegates were about to offer her by thus 
abusing Roumanian hospitality, 

"You shall not do it in Koumania. I give 

you a fair warning, and believe me that in 
doing so 1 speak for all Koumania. If you do 
it you will repent of it." 

1 pressed Talaat so hard that he ended by 
giving me his word o\' honor that he would not 
present an ultimatum to Greece next day at 
Bucharest. 1 suggested to him to propose an 
adjournment of the question sine die 

"All right," said he, "provided the Greeks 
don't provoke me to-morrow." 

Once 1 got Talaat's promise to give up his 
plan 1 added, "1 have given you a warning and 

you have frankly heeded me. Now I wish to 
give you a piece o\' information and a piece o\' 
advice. The piece oi' information is this: 
owing to the ambiguous language o( certain 
personages you may perhaps have deluded 
yourself into thinking that circumstances 
might arise in which Koumania may find her- 
self at war against the Towers o\' the Entente. 
Well, believe me, that will never happen, and 
nobody in the world -understand me clearly, 
nobody in the world is strong enough to drag 
Koumania into a war against the Powers oi % 
the Entente. The exact opposite is not only 



TALAAT I'ASIIA 1!)!) 

possible l>ut is more than probable. I give you 
this piece of information so that you may not 
deceive yourself in weighing the probabilities 
which will decide the policy of your country." 
As Talaat still seemed to doubt whether I 

was speaking from facts, and as he still ques- 
tioned me ;is to the will of the King, I reiter- 
ated my point again, and said to him, 'Wo one, 
absolutely no one, is strong enough to prevent 
Roumania following the policy dictated by her 

national instinct." 

"And now for the piece of advice," I said 
to him. "Providence has not entrusted me 
with the task of looking after the fate of 
Turkey; it is quite enough for me to worry 
about that of my own country; but f will give 
you one piece of advice as a true friend. Re- 
main neutral. Never has Turkey had a bet- 
ter chance of living, if she has any vitality in 
her, than by remaining neutral in this war. 
In return for your neutrality demand of the 
Entente the guarantee of your independence, 
demand the abolition of the capitulations. 
You will get everything, but war can bring 
you nothing. If you are beaten, and yon wdl 
be beaten, you disappear. If you are vic- 
torious you will get nothing. A victorious 
Germany, even if such a thing is possible, will 



200 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

never commit the folly you dream of, of giving 
you the Caucasus or Egypt. She would take 
them for herself if she could: but once more 
this is merely advice, and the day will come 
when you will see whether it came from a 
friend or not." 

The next day at Bucharest Talaat kept his 
word. 

1 warned the Greeks by a letter sent to them 
that very night by special messenger, and the 
conference was adjourned for good. 

Since those days 1 have never seen Talaat. 
At the time o( the English expedition to 
Gallipoli 1 wrote to him and asked him to 
make peace with the Entente, telling him that 
it was the last chance o\' salvation for Turkey. 
Talaat sent me a verbal reply to this letter in 
the Spring oi' 1916 by the Roumanian Min- 
ister at Constantinople, saying that events had 
proved that he was right and that 1 was 
wrong. 

But how do things stand to-dav? 



Prince Von Billow 



XXJJ 

PRIM E VOX BULOW 

J bate known many of the mm irbo hi 
played an important part in German polk 
Only three of them gave in<; the impression 
that I bad to do irith really strong men. Two 
are dead, Kiderlen-Waechter and Baron Mar- 
ichalL The third iras Pi «i Biilo* 

So far from being a man of the part, like 
the Gokicho . and the Berchtolds, Prince 
von Btilow u at this moment a man of to-di 
Everything about him is therefore of interest 
iff: has a remarkable mind, one of those minds 
which bring a man to the front in aJ] countries 
and in aJJ ages. Of course be think-, J ike a 
German, like a reactionary, and like a coun- 
try gentleman; but in spite of these drawbacks 
his mind is of the most brilliant quality. J Jc 
posse . leg remarkable clearne don, ability 

1 if the German! bad been nfl*e they irould bar* made I 
von Btilow th'-ir rep <: at the P 

the only man I been Inti 

en Talleyrand . well 

Dd irbJdi M. 1 tallied is IS7L 

203 



SOI SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

to appreciate situations, adroitness and under- 
standing. It is impossible to be in his com- 
pany without feeling that he is a man whose 

family position has merely been an accessory 
to a distinguished career. 

To say that Prince von Billow is a great 
man would be an exaggeration, ami I believe 
that he has Sufficient sense not to claim any- 
thing of the kind. He is even below the level 
o( Kiderlen. merely to instance another Ger- 
man. but he is a strong man. thoroughly able 
to understand things ami to find the best solu- 
tion of a given problem. In the intellectual 
desert o( German public life that alone is a 
great quality. 

Prince vim Billow is. also, a man of great 
personal charm, which is always to the good, 
and his conversation is most entertaining. Al- 
though one must not expect l>ismarekian 
aphorisms to fall from his lips, yet his con- 
versation is not tainted by any touch of 
brutality, roughness or arrogance. 

At first sight one can almost believe oneself 
to be dealing with a Latin, so flexible, so in- 
sinuatingly frank and almost caressing is his 
manner oi' talking, and though it would be 
wrong to be taken in by appearance, the charm 
is undeniable. 



PRINCE VON BULOW 205 

'Hie first time I bad a serious political talk 

with Prince von IJiilow W&B towards the end 

of the year ihhh. In April he bad been ap- 
pointed Minister at Bucharest, and was to 
have remained there until December, 1808, 
He came from Petrograd, and was seemingly 
thoroughly conversant with Russian affairs, 
and he told me that lie bad spent the last i'cw 
weeks in the Russian capita] studying the 
Roumanian question in the archives of the 
German Embassy. His studies had given 
him, he said, great confidence in the virtue, 
and ability of the Roumanian people, for 
whom be foresaw a great future. 

No doubt this was a very good way of be- 
ginning a conversation with me on the prob- 
lems of European policy, in so far as they 

affected Roumania and the Roumanian peo- 
ple, for, unlike the late Kidcrlen, Prince von 
Bulow recognized the existence of the na- 
tionality question. 

In this long conversation, which touched on 
all subjects and consequently on OUT own pub- 
lic men, we came to talk about Cogalniccano, 
who was not only one of our most shining 
lights, but what is more important, a really 
great man. 

Biilow did not understand why Cogalniceano 



806 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

was inimical to the policy of an Austro-Ger- 
inan alliance, lie was too intelligent to at- 
tribute mean motives to Cogalniceano, for he 
knew his patriotism, his great soul, ami his 
high capacity, lie was astonished, however, 
that he seemed to take no account of the Rus- 
sian danger for Koumania or see that our 
salvation lay in an alliance with Germany, who 
could protect us. 1 answered Prince von 
Biilow by repeating to him as well as 1 could 
all the arguments which Cogalniceano had 
used so many times to me against the policy 
o( an alliance with Austria and Germany, and 
this in spite of the genuine admiration which 
he had at that time for Germany, 

After I had repeated these arguments to 
Prince vt>n Billow he made a statement which 
I now record. 

Amongst other things. Cogalniceano had 
said to me. "This Austro-German policy is 
perfectly absurd, because it is based on the 
idea of a war between Russia and Germany. 
Now. such a war will never take place, it 
would be too much against the traditions of 
the House of Prussia ami too much against 
the interests of Germany. " In 188S this rea- 
soning seemed faultless. "He is wrong," in- 
terrupted Prince von Biilow. "Under the last 



PRINCE VOX BULOW 207 

reign M. Cogalniceano would have been right, 

but I am anxious to make you realize that 
the new reign will show a complete change of 
front. It will be one of the cardinal points of 
the policy of the new reign [William 11 had 

been on the throne since June, 1888] to he on 
guard against Russia. Vou wril] soon see that 

ou j- poJiey will not leave room for doubt as to 
this question." 

Then the talk switched off to other sub- 
jects, as invariably happens in Uie case of con- 
versation without any definite objective. 

Later on, when I saw the new Emperor go 
in for a pro-Polish policy, I understood that 
Prince von Billow bar] not been mistaken. It 
did not last long-, but what could last long in 
the case of an absolute Monarch who is strong 
enough to wish to guide everything and not 
strong enough to be able to do so? Anyway 
the fact stands that this first talk of mine with 
Prince von Bulow (and I have had many 
others since then) remains deeply engraved in 
my memory. It explained to me many things 
which have happened during the last twenty- 
eight years. 

Dr. Dillon, the very distinguished writer, 
has lately published in an English review a 
most interesting account of Prince von 



208 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Billow's intrigues for the entanglement of 
Italy, contrary to the dictates of her honor 
and her national will, in the war. 

This article has been republished in the 
Roumanian papers, and has given its readers 
a welcome opportunity of getting a good idea 
of German methods in neutral countries. It 
is the first instance in modern history in which 
a foreign power has mixed itself up in the 
internal affairs of another country on so great 
a scale; has bought political honor like mer- 
chandise in the market place, and has framed 
real plots against a foreign state and its 
sovereign will. 

AY hen one reads it all one shivers at the idea 
of what the fate of Europe, the fate of hu- 
manity would have been if the Nero of Berlin 
had been the conqueror in this war. For- 
tunately it is now no more than a bad dream. 

One regrets that Prince von Biilow ever 
thought it his duty to be mixed up in so un- 
savory a business. Even patriotism cannot 
excuse everything. Civilization also has its 
rights, though modern Germany repudiates 
this idea; for her doctrine is that German in- 
terests are superior to right, honor, decency 
and humanity, and if we hold the same ideas 
on these questions as Germany, how can we 



PRINCE VON BULOW 209 

explain the sacred indignation which burns in 
every breast? 

Von ]$ulow deserved a better fate. lie had 
shown himself one of the most brilliant men of 
present-day Germany, and, in spite of his 
book, remained in comparison with his con- 
temporaries on a pedestal. 

Prince von liiilow had one great merit in 
the eyes of those who think, for he was the 
first German Minister who dared to put the 
Kaiser in his place. In an autocratic country 
where Parliament is nothing, where the First 
Minister of the Crown is chosen by the 
Sovereign, and is responsible only to the 
Sovereign and can be dismissed by the 
Sovereign without it being possible for the na- 
tion — as in the case of Venizelos — to compel 
his return; in a country whose political or- 
ganization was out of date by several centuries, 
the courage of this act was astonishing. Prince 
von Biilow's celebrated speech was received 
with a general paean of admiration. In the 
course of that ovation, with masterly skill he 
taunted his Sovereign with useless speechify- 
ing, and undertook in the presence of a phan- 
tom parliament that the Monarch should not 
repeat his mistake. It was a first step, a 
modest step, it is true, but the first step to- 



210 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

wards popular government in Germany. This 
criticism of the Emperor in the Reichstag was 
the dawn of a revolution, a revolution de- 
signed to save Germany and the world from 
the absurd regime which could only result in 
the horrors of the great war. 

And why was the attempt not followed up? 
Why did it fail? 

Perhaps Prince von Billow never formed a 
clear estimate of the enormity of his daring. 
Who knows whether he was not even alarmed 
by it himself? It is difficult for the soul of 
the free man to emerge from generations who 
have indulged in the fetish worship of mon- 
archy. 

What is certain is that the Kaiser watched 
von Billow like a cat on the pounce to take his 
revenge. The day the Chancellor committed 
the mistake of making up to our Nero in the 
hope that he would forget this salutary though 
distasteful reprimand, William realized that 
von Billow was no Cromwell, not even a Bis- 
marck, and he decided to make him undergo 
the fate oi' Seneca, though in a modern fash- 
ion. In the same Reichstag in which von 
Eiilow had allowed himself to speak on one 
occasion as if to an assembly of free men, the 
Emperor raised against him a reactionary 



PRINCE VON JHILOVV 211 

intrigue, and he fell. The rest of the story is 
well known. Prince von Biilow retired with 
a great deal of dignity and without sulking. 

I [e divided liis time between Norderney and 
Rome. From the Eternal City he watched 
with a fine sense of irony the performances of 
his former master, whose inevitable collapse 
he foresaw might take place any day. 

When the collapse came Nero recalled 
Seneca and demanded of him the supreme 
sacrifice, a harikari, not of his body, but of his 
reputation and of his name in history. 

Prince von Biilow must be congratulated 
that his patriotism got the better of a very 
proper feeling of resentment. He was bound 
to know that he was going to certain defeat, 
and he knew Italy too well to deceive himself 
either as to her intelligence or her sense of 
honor. For that he deserves the commisera- 
tion of all mankind. But he lost his head. He 
was not made of fine enough stuff for the 
sacrifice, and he ended by believing success to 
be possible, and then stooped to the task which 
Dr. Dillon has described, a task which has 
robbed our modern Seneca of all claim to a 
martyr's halo. 

What a pity for him, and what a triumph 
for Nero! 



Tatichefj 



XXIII 
'I ..'J [< HEFF 

Tatichefi 14 no Kongei a irell known name in 
t,}jr : vrorld of European politics, and yet to 
one of the mott genuinely intelligent people it 
bai ever been my lot to meet. I had a tails 
with him twice, both timet in London, 

The first tinn f . a dinner at the St 

James Club, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallac* 
then foreign editor of the Time:-., and Lord 
Reay, a fornn i rnor of* Bombay, a man 

v.f II known in the world of international jui 
prudence, w< ent. 

The lecond t. J r r i r ; 'i itichenTs boufe, 

and I talked for a few minutes to Stead, the 
well-known publicist, who was to low hi i life 
later on in the Titanic disaster* At the 
moment Tatichefl was the late Wil 
in England. Everyone will remember Wi1 
tjjr ; great Finance Minister of the B 
umpire, irho as an adjunct to his dictatorship 
had financial representatives in all the capitals 



£16 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

in Europe, which in reality l\>vnu\l a second 
diplomatic body, controlled by himself alone. 

Taticheff had a very singular history. He 
had begun life brilliantly in diplomacy, Ap- 
pointed to fche Embassy at Vienna, he began 
to work in an anti-German sense, or to say the 
least of it. not in a pro-German sense. At 
that time it was a most dangerous game to 
play, and Bismarck, who never overlooked 
anything and whose influence in governing 
circles in Petrograd is well known, determined 
to destroy him. An incident in the senti- 
mental side of TatichefTs life gave the Iron 
Chancellor the opportunity he sought. The 
Petrograd Cabinet broke Taticheff, who at 
once began to avenge himself after the fashion 
oi' a strong man. lie devoted himself to the 
study o( history, and produced books that 
gave him a great reputation. During the war 
o( 1ST 7 he served as a volunteer, ami behaved 
in such a way as to win the Cross of St. 
George, Then he went on with his literary 
career, until Witte took him back to the 
service o( the state, in the capacity o\' financial 
agent. Death overtook him before he had at- 
tained the summit of his powers. 

Like all intelligent Russians. Taticheff was 
a most attractive talker. He had subtlety, im- 



TATICHEFF 217 

agination, wit and charm, and beyond this a 
sort of courage which enabled him to touch on 
delicate mutters with perfect tact. 

Naturally we discussed Russo-Ronmanian 
relations. They irere in a very had way. 
Being afraid of Russia, we were plunged into 
a sea of Germanism, and TatichefJ was well 
informed on this point. He explained to me 

the plain truth of the matter, whieh was that 

tlic interests of Roumanian national unity 
were absolutely opposed to a Russophobe 

policy, and that consequently we were travel- 
ing on a wrong roao 1 , since any day might 
find the interests of self-preservation driv- 
ing us inevitably to reverse our existing pro- 
gramme. 

It is easy to imagine TatichefFs line of 
argument; there is no need for me to dwell on 
it. To-day the arguments used by the Rus- 
sian writer are established in the head and 
heart of every Roumanian, 

Taticheff came, of course, to the question of 
Bessarabia. He recognized that the Russian 

Government had been wrong to insist on our 

exchanging the three districts of Bessarabia 
for the Dobrudja. He was of opinion that 
Russia ought merely to have offered us this 



218 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

exchange and to have abstained from it if we 
refused to accept it. 

"But," he said, "you would have been very 
wrong to refuse it. I quite understand Rou- 
manian sentiment about Bessarabia, but this 
sentiment is not bound up only with the three 
southern districts, the least Roumanian of all, 
but with the entire province, the entire terri- 
tory between the Pruth and the Dniester lost 
in 1812. I understand this feeling of sad 
regret and also your keen aspirations in the 
matter. It is too human and natural for a 
friend of truth to be able to deny it. But 
what I do not understand is why the preserva- 
tion of these three districts, separated from 
Russian Bessarabia by the most conventional 
of frontiers, could satisfy the Roumanian in- 
stinct towards national unity or augment the 
chances of the future acquisition of the whole 
of Bessarabia. Danubian Bessarabia, except 
for the district of Cahul, is the least Rou- 
manian corner of the Roumanian state, and 
although the possession of Kilia has played a 
great part in Roumanian history we should 
recognize the fact that Moldavian rule has 
never been more intermittent in any other 
province of the former state of Moldavia. To 
envisage the marshes of southern Bessarabia 



TATICHEFF 219 

as a strategic point from which to advance on 
the Dniester is simply childish. The delta of 
the D ami he is of course very valuable. But 
a Roumania, mistress of the left bank of the 
Kilia branch, with Bulgaria on the opposite 
side of the stream, would have been far less 
mistress of the Danube delta than she would 
be in the situation created by her annexation 
of the Dobrudja. As for access to the sea, 
one cannot compare the two solutions. The 
Bessarabian coast even with the proposed 
bridge at Jibriani would never really have 
given Roumania proper access to the sea, 
whereas with Sulina, Constantza and Man- 
galia it is quite another matter. And it was 
up to you to add Varna, the best port on the 
Black Sea — Varna, which in 1878 might have 
been anything you liked to make it, except a 
Bulgarian town." 

And as I tried to interrupt him, Taticheff 
added, "I say once more that we were wrong 
to force your hand and you were still more 
wrong in refusing an exchange so favorable 
to yourself. If it had been a question of ob- 
taining possession of the whole of Bessarabia 
I should have understood your policy, but 
it was not a question of that or anything 
approaching it. In 1878 you had a rare 



220 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

opportunity of making capital out of your al- 
liance with Russia, especially after the glori- 
ous days of Plevna. You lost the opportunity, 
and what did you gain in exchange? Sooner 
or later the nemesis of history which has 
placed the greater number of your nationals 
in Austria-Hungary, that is to say among 
the Germans, will oblige you to draw near to 
us, will make you our ally in war, if you do 
not yourselves intend to seal the destruction 
of your race and of your independence. And 
then," said Taticheff, "in spite of these treaties 
of yours, treaties you pretend not to know the 
existence of, but which I know to be real 
enough, I am counting on you as allies when 
the great day of reckoning comes. I cannot 
admit that nations can ever commit suicide. 
They may delude themselves for a time, but 
they are obliged to come back to the truth in 
the end. I hope the great day will find you 
strong and ready. 

Taticheff was right. In the end truth pre- 
vailed. 



France and the Teuton 



XXIV 

FRANCE AND THE TEUTON 

Everyone in Roumania knew the late Cou- 
touly, formerly French Minister in Bucharest, 
and everyone appreciated his gentle character 
and his real friendliness towards our country. 

Gustave de Coutouly had served in the 
garde mobile in 1870 and also bad assisted in 
suppressing the Commune. It was quite 
natural that be should cherish an unfading 
memory of thai dreadful year, and that in his 
heart there should ever hum the passionate 
feelings of the vanquished. 

The last time I saw him in Paris was at the 
time of* the Tangier difficulty: it will be re- 
membered that the incident which accelerated 
the first Morocco crisis and almost set Europe 
ablaze was the famous landing of the Emperor 
at Tangier. It was like a thunderclap in 
Paris. People had become accustomed to the 
idea of peace, and if. was believed that France 
was safe from any new sort of aggression on 
the part of Germany. This thunderclap out 

22 I 



SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

of a blue sky was in truth the beginning of I 
now era in the psychology of the people of 
France, 

Some precautions against the possibility of 
:i sudden and absolutely unjustified attack 
had boon taken, The eastern garrisons had 
boon strengthened and frontier regiments were 
kepi always on the alert. 

Monsieur de Coutouly*s only son was serv- 
ing in one of these regiments. He was killed 
in the war. forhtinff irallantly, two days after 
his marriage, 

1 was discussing the gravity o( the time with 
my friend de Coutouly, when he began to 
read me a lot tor which his son had sent from 
the frontier. The young soldier expressed 
himself in this letter with the magnificent 
courage, the gayety, the humor, which is char- 
acteristic of tho Frenchman, He told his 
father he had nothing to fear, that the new 
generation, in spite o( its apparent softness 
and indifference, would do its duty as French- 
men, would prove worthy of their ancestors, 
and that it' war broke out the heroes who were 
the glory of French history would have reason 
to be proud of the exploits o( the French of 
to-day. "But," he added, "it is impossible 
for us to hate. You who were beaten in is?o 



D THE TEUTO 

<).<•.}> a i 

■■■:■ \ ...;■. ■ 

A I/.-,", and I. 

■//J J '.!.• Mood 

bflCk* btlt I r 

'i ',;•- flier m ] 

deptbi of the Lai 

r» .'.' ;'. . . ' r;Ti t/j 

DA 

" f J fj<; n<;V/ ; 

tf]': I 

in H 

Ar>'\ '<y. I 
pu:, 

in (',*:nntiri 

. not r 'j f ;'i aftei WO. ] 

tor tlk momenl irben tney couM on':': ovj 



11*6 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 
hurl themselves upon her, this time to destroy 

her forever. 

When WM broke out, a great friend o( mine. 
Titulesco, was in Stockholm. In order to get 
home he had to go through Berlin, and he 

stopped there ten days or more. From Berlin 

he wrote me a letter, which 1 have kept, as it 

does great honor to Titulesco*S spirit of ob- 
servation and the depth o( his judgment. He 
showed himself dumbfounded by what he saw. 
but the number o\' guns and the wonderful 
organization of material was not what inter- 
ested him. the important factor to him was the 
German soul. That soul astonished and ap- 
palled him at the same time, lie witnessed 
its manifestations. lie saw the happy ex- 
pression with which parents and friends read 
the names o\' their clearest in the lists o( killed, 
and he wrote: "It is perfectly dear to me that 
these people have been waiting for forty years 
with intense impatience for this day. To this 
people the war has brought positive happiness: 
this people desired war with all its strength, 
they looked upon it as Christians look upon 
the advent of the "Messiah, and in the joy o( 
striking France even natural feelings disap- 
pear." 

I pondered over the two mentalities, the 



PRAM E AND THE TEUTON 

ions of the conquered Latins who are unable 
to bate their conquerors, and the sons of the 
(/' rman conquerors who could not forego their 
hatred of their \'<>rin<:r victims. 

u 

STesterday evening in my little country 
library I took down ISAwtUe Terrible from 
the poet's shelf. J bad not read it. for a long 
while. The great poet, the greatest lyric poet 
of modern tunes, speaks of the choice between 
the two nations. 

Jf^ begins with Germany, to whom be de- 
votes three pages, opening with this verse. 

"Aucune nation n'eft pJ n--. grandc q 

and which end 

"L'/\\]f.Ti):i'y!n<: ftst puiH«ant': ct '-.';f,<:r ; . 

and for France be adds only three words: 

"O rn-'i I I 

It. was in September, J 870, that Victor 
Jfu^o wrote like this, the September in which 
Germany, having finished her war with the 
Austrian Empire, began her war against 
France. 



228 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

How can Germans ever understand the 
French soul? 

How can they fail to be mistaken as to the 
power and decision of France? 



A Cousin of Tisza 



XXV 

A COUSIN OF TJSZA 

I was talking in Vienna on the evening of the 
80th of July, L914, to a friend an intimate 
of Count Berchtold's. This friend happened 
to be an Englishman who did not believe that 
England would fight. 
"They are keenly anxious for war here," he 

Said, "and to tin's end they drafted the ulti- 
matum to Serbia in such a way that it could 
not possibly be accepted. They were greatly 
disappointed when the report — which, hy the 
way, turned out to he false — got about that 
the Serbs had accepted it without modification, 
for they are so weJJ prepared as to be confi- 
dent of victory. The present Roumanian 
Government does not count for much here, as 
it does not appear fully to realize the situa- 
tion. They tell me if only you were in power 
a good deal could he done with Roumania. 
Not only could the whole of Bessarabia 
lost in 18J 2 be regained, but Odessa also, 
and ..." 

231 



^s* somk rr.uso\ ai. mrurssiONS 

1 listened to my friend's words: he was quite 
an intelligent person, and I said to myself, 
"People in Vienna are up to the neck in 
ignorance and folly." 

11 

On the morning o( the 8rd o( August, 1914, 

1 called B party meeting at my house at 
Sinaia. It was attendee! by MM, Dissesco, 
[strati, Cantacuiene-Pashcano, Badarau and 
Cinco, 

To them 1 explained the situation and the 
matters to be discussed and settled at the 
Privy Council that afternoon. 

1 asked each person for his opinion before 
giving my own. Then I put forward my own 
views, and added that 1 was happy to think 
nearly all were o( the same opinion as I was 
as to the effect on our country o\' a German 
victory. It would be the death of Koumania. 
and it was morally impossible that we should 
assist at our own funeral. 

I said that if they had not been o( my 
opinion I should have retired from the leader* 
ship of the Conservative Democratic Party. 
And even then I should not have lost faith in 
my country's destiny, but should have worked 



A COUSIN 01 'J J.-.ZA £30 



on a* a private individual in complete tree- 
dona and with redoubled energy. 



in 



J was stiJJ at my little vjJJa at SinaJa in 
September, JOJ !•, just before the faJi of Lem- 
berg, when a Hungarian friend, a cousin of 
Count Tisza, came to see me. He was a 

charming man, and as a rule did not mix 
himself up in polil 

He spoke of my own attitude in the great 
European crisis, an attitude which, he said, 
might prove fatal to me. Jf o gave me to 

understand what J already knew '.'eJJ, that 
Tisza was the real pilot of the Dual Empire, 
and that after the Peace he intended to he- 
come Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post he 
could keep for life if it pleased him to do so. 
With the utmost civility he pointed out to me 
the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of my 
ever coming hack to power in Room am a, a a 1 
could never have any decent relations with 
Count Tisza's Government because of the 
attitude I was taking. lb: insinuated that 
there was still time for me to retreat, and that 
the Central Powers v^-s(: confident of victory. 
J told him that every man was bound to 
obey the call of duty without heeding risk or 



£34 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

danger, and that I was unite well aware that 
in the event of the Germans being victorious 

it would t>e my patriotic duty not to em- 
barrass the policy o( my country by remain- 
ing in public life, ami that when countless 
human lives were being sacrificed on countless 
battlefields it was ridiculous to stop at the 
sacrifice o( a man's political career, no matter 
who the man was. 

My visitor took the hint, and by way of 
excusing himself, assured me that his advice 
had been inspired only by his feelings of friend- 
ship. It is. however, the same adviee which, 
since then, has been ottered me on several oc- 
casions, and by quite different people* 



New Italy 



XXVI 

NEW ITALY 

A fortnight before the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese war I was discussing the 

chances of peace with King Charles, who was 
not only a statesman but a great soldier. 
Both of us thought w'ar certain, in spite of 
the peaceful assurances of the Embassies. I 
told him of my profound conviction that the 
Japanese would be victorious all along the 
line. lie answered me with the usual objec- 
tions, saying that there would be ninety Rus- 
sian divisions against thirteen Japanese di- 
visions, and so on. 

When we had finished arguing he asked me 
on what I based my conviction. "I believe," 
I said, "in the moral factor. History teaches 
that it is this moral factor rather than the 
mere number of battalions which gives vic- 
tory. For the Russians this war is an absurd 
colonial affair, which they do not understand; 
hut for the Japanese victory is a vital neces- 
sity. They know quite well that until they 

237 



238 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

have beaten a white race they will continue to 
be despised. 

"Now for the Japanese honor is the su- 
preme good, and it is necesary for them to 
win in order to make themselves our equal." 

My questioner persisted in his view. "Look 
here," I said, "you have often told me that the 
Austrian army was first rate, that its infantry 
was better than the German infantry, and that 
the higher command, since they had admitted 
to it people who were not noble by birth, had 
made astonishing progress ; well, I am perfect- 
ly certain that, given equal numbers or there- 
abouts, the Austrian army could be beaten by 
any other army in the world. It has not, and 
never can have, the moral factor." He ap- 
peared to find me rather ridiculous, and so I 
added, "I know that you have a pretty moder- 
ate opinion of the Italian army, but I am 
quite certain that, given equal numbers, the 
Italian army could beat the Austrian army 
into a cocked hat." 

After a few other remarks I added, "You 
do not know new Italy; our misfortune is that 
we preserve the opinions of our first youth 
and we do not adapt ourselves quickly enough 
to the new facts around us. Italy, for example, 
is passing through a moral revolution of which 



NEW ITALY 239 

people in general have no idea. The new gen- 
eration which has grown up in a free Italy is 
filled with patriotism, I might say pride, 
which the extreme politeness of Italians does 
not make apparent. Italy will no longer stand 
taking the part of Cinderella among the 
Great Powers. A working democracy like 
Italy will never trouble the peace of the 
world, but if it is forced to go to war it will 
astonish everyone by the decision of its action 
and by its heroism." 

I realized that I had not convinced King 
Charles as to the certainty of a Japanese vic- 
tory, nor as to the superiority of the Italian 
army over the Austrian army. Perhaps he 
realized later that I had observed and under- 
stood correctly. 

Now that the Italians have astonished the 
world by the valor of their troops, I call to 
mind this conversation which took place in 
1904, and I feel very pleased with myself at 
having foreseen that which all the world now 
realizes. 

In the month of August, 1901, I climbed 
Mount Tabor, which is celebrated for the fine 
panorama one sees from the summit. The 
ascent is easy, but as it is a question of climb- 
ing 10,000 feet it is a lengthy and fatiguing 



840 SOME PERSONAL [MPRESSIONS 

business. I chatted with my guide, a good 
chamois hunter, and pointing out to him a 

Steep precipice, which appeared to me quite 
unclimbable, 1 asked him if it were possible lo 

get up it. lie answered it was very difficult, 

and he advised me not Lo try, and then added: 
"A month ago some Italian Alpini were here. 
The commandant of the battalion was a little 
fat man, who was not much to look at. lie 
asked me to help him get up the precipice 
which you arc now pointing out to inc. I told 
him that only chamois could pass that way. 
He answered, "Fake: me all the same; where 
the chamois ean go man can go, and where 
men can go my battalion can go.' I obeyed 
him, and the battalion went that way just as 
the commandant had said." 

The Italian Alpini have since won for them- 
selves immortal fame. 



My tour Last Germans 



XXVJJ 

:.iv POUB \.::~:\ GEB I 

J J j. j ok*: of Ger- 

□ oo into of them among 

friends* Irj A ig ist, 1914, my relation! with 

ud Germ and 

COol'.r. and St tin f: '/.'':' 

i 'J to exist I. eh ram- 

stan' ' I ted in four 

Germans, and I am going to record the un- 
made 00 :;. r :. 

J 

One ii of a B 

B ■ che, the German Mini \ J ... 

Hen roo B - / .-. f . be] liplo- 

He i . a man of 
but absolutely v. it.}. . jj . dar- 

liiig ambition andtheonel eahze 

- u to be taken tor a grand $dgneur 4 J 
only bad one conversation with bun, and J 

gnized bin] at una H- 

ron Buscbe u Uke a piece of cheafS furniture 



244 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

— on the surface a thin veneer of oak or wal- 
nut, but the substance common deal. 

Herr von Busche was sent to Ronmania just 
after the beginning of the war, when Berlin 
had made the discovery that its Minister at 
Bucharest, quite an excellent man and one of 
prodigious wealth, was altogether inadequate. 
He had hardly arrived at Sinaia when, before 
being presented either to the Premier or the 
Foreign Minister, he had a secret interview 
with King Charles. Thanks to a private po- 
lice of my own, which has always done me good 
service, probably because I have never paid 
for it, I knew of this visit the same day. After 
his visit to the King, Herr von Busche pro- 
ceeded to Bucharest to introduce himself offi- 
cially to the Government. Returning to 
Sinaia, he sent his Councilor of Legation to 
ask for an appointment with me, which I 
fixed for the same dajr (this, as I say, was at 
the beginning of the war), and I waited for 
him in my drawing-room, where there hap- 
pened to be a portrait of Kiderlen-Waechter 
with a very cordial inscription. At exactly 
six o'clock Herr von Busche came in, but- 
toned tightly up in a frock coat which was 
plainly intended to suggest London, but as 
evidently hailed from Berlin — one of those al- 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS M5 

most invisible distinctions which make a world 
of difference. 

Herr Busche, who had been apprised how 
completely I was convinced of Germany's 
criminal culpability, affected to know nothing 
of this, and began by informing me that he 
could claim a double introduction to me: one 
was from Prince Biilow, who had begged him 
to give me his most friendly remembrances; 
the other was the memory of the late Kiderlen- 
Waechter, whose pupil he had been in diplo- 
macy. I replied that Prince Biilow had often 
shown me his friendly feelings, and that to 
know the terms on which I had been with 
Kiderlen he had only to look at his photograph 
— "the photograph," I added, "of a man who 
would never have allowed himself to be as- 
sociated with Germany's recent actions." 

Having come expressly to plead Germany's 
innocence, Herr Busche endeavored to con- 
vince me that Kiderlen's successors had been 
as much in favor of peace as himself, and that 
Germany was righting a defensive war. I 
opposed this view energetically, and in the 
course of our conversation I made Herr von 
Busche understand that I was well acquainted 
with what had happened at Berlin, since I 
knew the circumstances under which Kiderlen- 



246 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Waechter had become Foreign Minister, and in 
particular I referred to the famous memo- 
randum on the world situation which he had 
presented to Bethmann-Hollweg, after read- 
ing which the Chancellor had told the Em- 
peror that he would not consent to stay in 
office unless Kiderlen had charge of foreign 
affairs. Herr von Busche showed considerable 
astonishment at my knowledge of so intimate 
an incident of German diplomacy, and he took 
the trouble to let me know that he had made 
the copy of Kiderlen-Waechter's memoran- 
dum with his own hand. 

"Well," I said, "you see I know more than 
you expected of your country's policy;" and I 
related to him how Kiderlen had failed to ob- 
tain the Emperor's consent to the limitation 
of naval armaments, which would have se- 
cured peace, because von Tirpitz had opposed 
it. I added that Kiderlen had made no secret 
of his absolute conviction that France would 
never provoke war. "Any attempt," I added, 
"on your part to argue that France is morally 
the author of this catastrophe is, so far as I 
am concerned, pure waste of energy." 

Von Busche accordingly shifted the ground 
from France and fell back upon England, 
repeating like a gramophone all the German 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS 247 

absurdities about England's bellicose intentions 
and intrigues. I cut short this piece of mala- 
droit special pleading by a simple statement 
which completely upset my visitor. "You are 
giving yourself perfectly useless trouble," I 
told him. "I know England too well for that. 
It is Hungary and Germany who have started 
universal war." And I argued this so vigor- 
ously that von Busche persisted no further 
and changed the subject. But before doing so 
he was at pains to repeat once again that Ger- 
many was waging a defensive war, and that 
the German people were convinced of it. 

"There you are right," I replied. "What 
astonishes me most in your country is neither 
its military power, formidable as it is, nor its 
remarkable organization, but your success in 
having so disciplined your people that you can 
control their convictions, as if by police regula- 
tion, however contrary they are to the facts. 
This is indeed a unique and unprecedented 
achievement." 

From this stage the conversation began to 
languish. The German Minister was obviously 
looking for an opportunity to escape, but the 
Councilor of Legation, for whom he was wait- 
ing, had not yet arrived. When at length he 
came in Herr von Busche — again the base 



218 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

metal revealing itself — felt it necessary to ex- 
cuse himself for leaving so soon. "But," he 
said, "I have an audience with the King at a 
quarter past seven." 

"I congratulate you," I said, "on seeing His 
Majesty twice in three days. It is a good 
augury for your mission." Von Busche turned 
pale and said that he did not understand me, 
as in a few minutes he was going to see the 
King for the first time. He added that it 
would have been impossible for him to see the 
King before he had been officially presented 
to his Ministers. 

"Oh," said I, "in that case it is, of course, 
my mistake." And these were the last words 
exchanged between Germany's last Minister to 
Roumania and myself. 

This attempt, doomed in advance to failure, 
to prove that the author of the world war was 
England, and the lie with regard to his hav- 
ing met the King, may be fairly regarded as 
an epitome of the whole German diplomatic 
method. 

ii 

A few days after the battle of the Marne I 
was on my way from my villa at Sinaia to the 
Palace Hotel when a motor car stopped in 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS 249 

front of me. A man smothered in dust got 
out of it to speak to me. As he said he had 
come from Berlin on behalf of Ilerr Zimmer- 
mann solely in order to speak to me, I arranged 
to see him at once. In my house a few minutes 
later he withdrew this, and explained that 
Zimmermann had not really sent him. 

My visitor from Berlin was, in faet, a Ger- 
man engineer who had lived many years in 
Roumania, married a Roumanian lady, been 
appointed a teacher in one of our higher-grade 
schools, and, in fact, had become so completely 
one of ourselves that I firmly believed he had 
been naturalized as a Roumanian. At the out- 
break of war Mr. S. happened to be in Berlin, 
and before Roumania had definitely declined 
to enter the war at the side of Germany, he 
had made it his business to assist in bringing 
this about. With this object he used to 
send us from Berlin immense telegrams, some- 
times two or three a day, containing remark- 
ably biassed information on the progress of 
the war, evidently designed to work upon our 
fears. This reckless outlay made it clear to 
me that Mr. S. was doing his work at 
Germany's expense, which on the part of a 
naturalized Roumanian made me very angry. 
Immediately on meeting him I had reproached 



250 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

him vehemently for thus allowing himself to 
forget that he had hecome a Roumanian citi- 
zen, and my indignation fairly carried me 
away. Its object excused himself to me on 
the ground that he had not, in fact, ever been 
naturalized, but the violence with which I had 
spoken to him had made its impression, and 
when he came to my house all his earlier 
audacity had disappeared. 

Mr. S.'s proposal was really paralyzing. He 
began by admitting that my attitude towards 
Germany was quite naturally explained by 
my affection for France; "but," he added, 
"we Germans are also very fond of France 
and have no complaint to make of her. On 
the contrary, the idea of being at war with 
France is exceedingly painful to us. Such 
being Germany's feelings for France, I have 
come to you, since I have long considered you 
as one of the clearest-sighted men in Europe 
— an opinion which is also shared by the 
political world of Berlin — to give you the 
opportunity of rendering to Roumania, 
France, and humanity alike a service which 
will ensure your name being forever enshrined 
in history. 

"Go to Paris, where everyone — very rightly 
— trusts you. Propose to France a separate 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS 251 

peace. We will offer her terms of peace, 
magnificent terms, beyond her utmost hopes: 
and, after that, we will punish, as they de- 
serve, the Russians, and above all the English, 
the real criminals who have provoked the war 
and are responsible for this catastrophe. You 
have more chance than anyone else in the 
world of being listened to." 

I answered my German as any other man 
in my place must have answered: I told him 
that he had no shred of reason to believe it 
possible that I could listen to such a sugges- 
tion. What he was proposing to me was an 
infamy of which he should have known I was 
incapable. If France ever wished to be guilty 
of such abominable treachery she would not 
require any intervention on my part, and to 
suppose anything else was not only to lose all 
sense of proportion but to be quite abnormally 
stupid. I then dismissed S. as he deserved, 
but not without first telling him how little 
I thought of Germany for her ignorance of 
the spirit of France and of her other adver- 
saries. 

That Berlin should have thought me so 

foolish as to suppose myself able to play such 

a part, and base enough to wish to play it, is 

nothing: it is merely an erroneous estimate 



252 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

of an individual. But that Berlin could im- 
agine that France would betray England, who 
had come to her help without any obligation, 
made it perfectly clear to me that people at 
Berlin had completely lost, not only all sense 
of right, but what is sometimes more danger- 
ous, all intelligence as well. 
I have not accn Mr. S. again. 

Ill 

In November, 11)14, at Bucharest, I re- 
ceived tlie last visit of a German friend with 
whom my relations had been very close. 

Mr. X. is a man of business; he is also a 
man of brains, one of those singularly clear 
intellects which impress one from the first and 
in the presence of which one feels that here is 
a man who would have been a success at any 
period, in any country and in any career. 
Mr. X. is also one of the most international 
of Germans; his mother was a Russian, his 
wife is English, he has one sister married in 
Russia and another in the United States. lie 
has passed a great part of his life in Russia, 
in England and in Roumania. With all this 
he is highly educated, astute and witty. I 
say all this, because in November, 1914, X. 
gave me an unexpected opportunity of seeing 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS 258 

how the German war could pervert even so 
cultivated an intelligence as bis. When I 
record what X. said to me my astonishment 
will he intelligible. It will be understood also 
why, when after three hours' conversation he 
left me, I said to some friends who were wait- 
ing for me to dine with them, "I have just 
been spending three hours in a lunatic 
asylum." 

X. had always entertained for me a genuine 
friendship, and had come in reality to see 
whether he could do nothing to make me less 
Germanophobe. Too well brought up to re- 
veal his plans openly, he began by offering me 
Ilerr von Busche's excuses for no longer 
visiting me. "If it was only Germany you at- 
tacked," he said, "it would always be a pleas- 
ure to Ilerr Busche to call upon you, but you 
attacked the Kaiser, and that he cannot ig- 
nore." 

I replied that Ilerr von Busche was per- 
fectly right not to call on me, because in no 
case should I return his visit. I added that if 
ever Ilerr von Busche met me I begged that 
he would not bow to me, since I had quite 
made up my mind not to return it. 

In terms most nicely calculated not to of- 
fend me, X. then said how profoundly he re- 



854 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

gretted, not only on my account but on that of 
Roumania, to sec me afloat in a vessel which 
was bound to founder; and very delicately he 

alluded to certain strokes of the oar which, 
taken at the right moment, might effect a 
complete change of course. As I did not wish 
to handy words with him, I pretended not to 
understand, and replied that 1 had not, in- 
deed, any boat beneath me, but that I was a 
lone swimmer in an ocean full of danger, obey- 
ing simply the imperative behests of my con- 
science, and without ever asking myself 
whether or not I had any prospect of reach- 
ing land. And as X. insisted on Roumania's 
misfortune in losing the only politician who, 
according to hirn, was of real worth, I cut him 
short with the words, which I have so often 
repeated, "How can one concern oneself 
with the situation of an individual when the 
fate of the world is at stake?" Accordingly 
X., abandoning all hope of convincing me, 
left the personal question and began a mono- 
logue, like a man thinking aloud. For more 
than two hours he explained to me why Ger- 
many must be victorious, why it was impos- 
sible that she should be otherwise, and why all 
those who placed themselves across the Ger- 
man path would be crushed to the earth with- 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS 865 

out any advantage to themselves or to the 
cause which they wished to serve. According 
to him, Germany was at least half a century 

in advance of the rest of the world, because 
she understood what organization meant, while 
all other countries were still relying on the 
futilities of individual initiative. "For that 
reason more than any other," he said, "Ger- 
many's victory, which is just as much beyond 
dispute as the sun in the sky, will he an ad- 
vantage to the whole human race, since even 
the nations she conquers will feel the benefit 
of her supremacy. 

"Of all our enemies France is the only on* 
with whom we need reckon. Her soldiers, her 
officers, her General Staff, are just as good as 
ours, hut thirty-eight millions of men can do 
nothing against seventy millions. France will 
he ground to powder, and we Germans will he 
sorry for it. 

"Russia gives us no anxiety. Numbers arc- 
not the main factor in war. Russia, believe 
me, will go from collapse to collapse. Each 
lime you fancy that Russia is on the point 
of an achievement you will have a repetition 
of the Mazurian lakes. Thanks to Russia's 
disorder, Russia's indifference, her absolute 
lack of organization and her fundamental in- 



856 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

ability to create it, the famous steam-roller Is 
a perilous illusion. Believe me, the Russians 
will be beaten at just that moment when their 
allies will have special need of them, and they 
will he first to quit the held. 

"There remains England. Obviously she 
might have been formidable. 11' England had 

begun to arm herself ten years ago Ave should 
never have dared to venture on war. But 
England wishes to do in a few months what 
has taken Russia a hundred years. That is 
asking too much of human capacity, and it 
will never come to pass. You will see what 
will be the course of events. The war will 
last a few months more, at the very most a 
year. Then the Kaiser, at the head of his 
troops, will enter Paris, Moscow and Lon- 
don." I smiled at this, and X. replied: "Yes, 
London. It is there, at Westminster, that 
the Emperor will dictate the world's peace and 
the reorganization of the human race." 

Nothing was further from X.'s mind than 
bluff. Tie was profoundly convinced of his 
own prophecy, which, indeed, in his view, 
amounted to evidence. Yet I repeat that X. 
is a man of education and brains, who has 
traveled, who is at home all the world over, 



MY POUR LAST GERMANS 257 

and having lived all his life among foreigners 
might well have a more open mind. 

He gave me the solution himself when he 
said that since the war no one could feel him- 
gelf more of the German Michael 1 than he did. 

In the Spring of 1915 a friend came to tell 
me that a German diplomatist with whom 1 
had been very friendly, hut to whom 1 had not 
bowed for some months, was begging to meet 
me at any cost. It was suggested to me that 
we should come across each other, as if by 
chance, at my friend's house. After much 
persuasian J agreed, on the expre8S condition 
that no word of politics should he mentioned. 
I knew perfectly well that the German diplo- 
matist would not respect this undertaking, 
but the agreement to exclude politics was in- 
dispensable if I were to be able, without rude- 
ness, to bring our conversation to an end at 
the moment of my choice. 

Next afternoon, at half-past five, I was duly 
calling on my friend when the German diplo- 
matist earne in. lie told me that he realized 
that Roumania would soon be at war with Ger- 
many, that consequently he would have to 
leave Bucharest, and that he had come to beg 
me, when the occasion arose, to take charge 

'Michael: the German equivalent of "John Bull." 



258 SOME TERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

of the keys of his flat, feeling sure that he 
could count upon me to see that his property 
was respected. It is quite needless to say 
that he had no intention of doing anything of 
the kind, and that when Roumania declared 
war on Germany in August, 1916, he never 
even thought of it. It is, however, a pleasure 
to me to recall that a German diplomat reck- 
oned on me for the preservation of his house 
and furniture, when I rememher that in De- 
cember, 1916, when the German armies occu- 
pied Bucharest, Field Marshal von Macken- 
sen not only gave orders for my house to be 
sacked, with the most complete and what I 
may be forgiven for calling the most Hunnish 
particularity, but came in person a few days 
afterwards, accompanied by his staff, to ad- 
mire the way in which his instructions had 
been carried out. There are things that the 
Germans do differently from other people. 

My German diplomatist asked me with 
irresistible frankness on what my conviction 
that Germany would be defeated was based. 
I answered him without any reserve. I ex- 
plained to him my reasons, which were those 
of ordinary common sense, and we passed, step 
by step, from one point to another, until at 
length he reached that of making the follow- 



MY FOUR LAST GERMANS 259 

ing remarkable admission: "All you say is per- 
fectly true. The militarism of Prussia, the 
martinet spirit of Prussia, is the most abomi- 
nable thing on the face of the earth. But it 
happens to be invincible. And there is noth- 
ing for us — for any of us — to do but bow be- 
fore it as to fate." 

My only reply was to tell my German dip- 
lomatist, who happened to be a Saxon by 
birth, that I would see him again at the end 
of the war. 



Eleutherios Venizelos 



XXVIII 

ELEUTIIERIOS VENIZELOS 



All greatness is rare, and human greatness is 
the rarest of all. By human greatness I mean 
a harmonious personality made up of high 
intelligence, moral beauty and inflexibility of 
will. Great minds are not so scarce as men 
think, moral beauty is fortunately fairly com- 
mon, especially amongst humble folk. Tenac- 
ity of will is often combined with moral per- 
versity. But the combination of these quali- 
ties in a whole which, according to my own 
idea, alone constitutes true human greatness, 
is so rare that one may go through life with- 
out meeting it. 

Venizelos 1 is a true example of human 
greatness, and of a greatness such that one 
may unreservedly admire it. It should not be 
forgotten that in sincere profound admiration 
we may find one of those rare springs of joy 

1 This appreciation was written in 1915, before M. Veni- 
zelos' recall to power. 

263 



864 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

which from lime lo time create ."in illusion as 
to the value of life, 

Shakespeare, the greatest poet humanity 
has ever produced, presents this remarkable 
and almost unique characteristic— -that we 
know nothing of his life. Venizelos is rather 

like him. Until recent years his life was so 
devoid of incident that it leaves a vast field 
lo he occupied by Legend. The only thing 

known about his early career is the time he 
spent in the mountains with other Cretans 
fighting for his country's independence. This 
was a moral education. People do not know, 
however, that this Cretan carried hooks about 
with him in the hush, in order to perfect him- 
self in the study of French. 

ii 

Before the time of Venizelos, Greece had 
fallen low, as we know only too well. If she 
had not since then risen again so marvelously, 
I, who owe an eternal debt to the Hellenic 
people, should not dare to speak of their past. 
During the war of independence Greece had 
accomplished marvels of heroism and moral 
beauty which in the end drew to it the pro- 
tection of the three Great Powers, France, 
England and Russia — the three Powers that 



ELEUTHERIOS VENIZEL08 265 

are dated in history with noble 

action, trhether they act independently or to- 
gether. J>ut t } j i s same Greece had started down 
a real incline almost immediately after her 
emancipation. She made an unhappy choice 
in her first king. How could any rigid .Ba- 
varian understand the Greek soul? Her sec- 
ond king made a rule of leaving the Gre< 
entirely free, he did not so much as guide them 
through difficult moments, and there resulted 
a period of unchecked quarreling between po- 
litical parties, the system of dividing the spoil 
pushed to its utmost limits, and in spite of the 
efforts of another great man, TricoupiS, the 
Greek people, one of the most gifted on the 
earth, knew all the misery of defeat and bank- 
rupt 

As ever, the nation was saved on the i 
of the abyss by the only means of salvation 
that history knows revolution, and by the 
most dangerous form of revolution, that 
known as the military covj) d'etat. King 
George, who had done.- nothing to i it, 

drank the full cup of humiliation to the dregs. 
With his own hand he signed the order cashier- 
ing his own sons from the army, including 
the Crown Prince, whose name was for the 
Greeks forever associated with their defeat 



866 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

at Domokos in ih<)7. Whatever liis faults 
may have been, ,-i martyrdom like his should 
have expiated bhem. A Tier having destroyed, 
ii was necessary i<» rebuild, Hut military rev- 
olution, unless it throws up a Napoleon, 
though very effective In clearing the ground, 
rinds reconstruction beyond its powers. 

Greece was in a state of veritable chaos* 
The new Chamber not only wanted to set 
about revising the fundamental laws of the 
state, but it also wanted to proclaim its own 
supremacy, though the exercise of such su- 
premacy was something quite beyond its pow- 
ers as they had then developed. 

It was at this moment that the Cretan ar- 
rived. 

I Fe came alone; without elansincn, or family, 

or fortune; withoul past or parly or support- 
ers. He stood, as I say, alone. 

He was received like a god crowds arc 
occasionally endowed wilh divine intuition of 
ihis kind. Received as a god, he acted from 

the (irsl inomenl as a man. 

There are lew finer pages in history than 
I he account of how the Cretan faced the peo- 
ple of Alliens. They were shouting with all 
their might, "Long live Venizelos! Long live 
the Constitutional Assembly!" and he forced 



ELEUTHERI08 VENIZELOS 907 

upon them the alternative ay, I .' 
ion of the Con rtitution ! ' 

This man was v.; 

wrong. Like all i . be began by 

ing everything. J J'- crushed the parties, or 

ber die old elk] d brought 

Greece to destruction Jf<; made another na- 
tion. Amongst an excitable peopfc red 
to insist on the permanei . of 

.ant, his selection by ' na- 

tion, and nil promotion on the recommenda- 
tion of bif coUeag 

He ble o ri bettei even than 

the Herculej of legend* An a 
rope co ild indulge itself in the le of* a 

great man come to light 

n 

After having remade Greece himself, be 
turned to the Hellenism in the world 

at large. 
During the whole Balkan crisii and One 

, quite truthfully ( 1 

t, thanks to the genius of Veni/.clo-.. irith 
of ail at her di.po-.a]. con- 
trolled f 
With the insight of a man* Vemzeloa 

lized the true rahie o: - . ed 



2G8 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Serbia to Greece, and at all times and in all 
circumstances dominated M. Pasitch by the 
power of his personal attraetion. When it was 
found impossible to arrive at an understand- 
ing with Turkey on the subjeet of Crete, 
owing to the hopeless incapacity of the Turks, 
Venizelos accomplished the miracle of con- 
cluding an alliance with the Bulgarians, a 
race that the Greek people traditionally re- 
garded in the light of an hereditary and un- 
compromising enemy. In concluding this al- 
liance he saw clearly how necessary it was to 
keep out of the treaty all reference to the 
division of territories that might be conquered 
in the future. King George and the Crown 
Prince (afterwards King Constantine) op- 
posed Venizelos bitterly, but the Cretan once 
more gained his point, and the treaty was 
silent as to the division of the spoils. Be- 
cause of his prevision, Greece escaped the im- 
putations and difficulties in which Serbia is 
still involved. 

In London Venizelos imposed his person- 
ality on all political and diplomatic circles, 
and this in spite of his reserve and modesty, 
which was such a contrast to the foolish ar- 
rogance of Danef. 

It was just at that time that I had the hap- 



ELEUTHERIOS VEXIZELOS 269 

piness of getting to know him, and of forming 
one of those friendships, based on confidence 
and sympathy, which death alone can break. 

I only saw Venizelos twice at that time, but 
it sufficed for me to know that I had before 
me not only a great man but a gentleman, a 
man in whom one might repose unlimited con- 
fidence without running the risk of being de- 
ceived. I knew he was in profound disagree- 
ment with the Bulgarians at the Balkan Con- 
ference which was then sitting, but he had too 
much delicacy to say a word to me about diffi- 
culties between him and his allies. 

The first time I saw him I asked him the 
secret of his extraordinary success. lie replied 
that he had arrived at the right moment, and 
that he had adopted two rules of conduct: to 
tell his people the whole truth in all circum- 
stances, and to be ready to leave office at any 
moment without regret. 

I had a very animated conversation with 
him at Bucharest. He became very angry 
when I told him it was a mistake to insist 
upon getting Kavalla. 

From his anger I could see — what later on 
I found to be true — that he was not the only 
director of bis country's policy. At the time 
I was dreaming of completing the Treaty of 



270 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

Bucharest by a treaty of alliance between the 
four kingdoms of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, 
and Roumania. 

When all the secrets of the Balkan crisis 
are revealed, when men know all that Veni- 
zelos did, our admiration for him as a great 
man will be enhanced. Here, at least, we have 
an individual who need not fear that all his 
actions and even his secret thoughts should be 
revealed. 

After the Treaty of Bucharest, Venizelos 
found he had to fight Austrian intrigues at 
Constantinople. I do not want to tell the 
history of the Treaty of Athens now, nor to 
insist on the fact that on several occasions a 
new war between Turkey and Greece was on 
the point of breaking out and that Venizelos 
was prepared for all eventualities. All I want 
to do at the moment is to render public hom- 
age to the moral beauty of Venizelos, who, 
far from wishing to ignore the services I was 
able at that time to do Greece and the cause 
of peace, insisted on giving them the widest 
publicity. 

At the end of October, 1913, he wrote me 
a letter of generous appreciation, in which he 
said: "Our recent friendship has been rich in 
practical results for my country, and I rejoice 



ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS 271 

that Roumania lias again so well played the 
part of arbiter in the conclusion of peace in 
the Balkans. It is a new bond between our 
two nations; we who are already bound by 
the same interests are destined to advance to- 
gether on the path of civilization." Magna- 
nimity is always the mark of greatness. 

Venizelos had the question of Epirus on his 
hands at the time. He knew quite well that 
it was impossible for Greece to oppose the 
unanimous wish of the Great Powers, and that 
it would be unworthy of him to be the cause 
of a general war. He sacrificed himself to his 
duty, knowing well that the day would come 
when he would be able to obtain Epirus with- 
out provoking Europe. But in making good 
this policy he spent himself, just as he spent 
himself at Bucharest when he failed in ob- 
taining for the Greeks the sun, the moon and 
the constellations. His actions were closely 
watched at Athens. Every concession this 
great man made for the peace of Europe and 
the security of his country was made the oc- 
casion of attacking him as a coward soul who, 
having no faith in the force of Hellenism, did 
not dare show himself implacable. 

Nothing is easier than to obtain vulgar pop- 
ularity by siding with those who shout loudest 



878 SOME PERSONAL [MPRESSIONS 

at a time when, at the risk <>f unpopularity, 
another man takes upon himself to defend 
his country. 

1 1 is io this incident that Venizelos owes the 
enmity of IM. Zographos, just as later on, as a 
reward for his efforts over the [islands, he had 
to submit to all the epithets coined by the 
envious and the disappointed. 

in 

Everyone who lms studied history suffi- 
ciently to know that great men are sometimes 
rather a burden on their country, will under- 
stand that Venizelos could not remain long 
in power. 

A Tier the Treaty of Bucharest had been 
signed IM. Pasitch invited us all to luncheon 
at the Palace Hotel. Speaking to my right- 
hand neighbor, I told him of a wish I had 
cherished Tor many years <>l' visiting Japan in 

the summer of 1914. Veni/elos heard me, 

and asked me if I would take him as a travel- 
ing companion. Then he went on to ask with 
a smile whether I was sure I should be free 
in the first half of the year 1914. lie was 
alluding to the opinion generally held that the 

men who had accomplished the work of 1918 
would be retained in office by their peoples. 



ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS 873 

J told him, and the other gu 
gurprised at it, that J " of thi 

dom, not only for myself, but also for him. 
A . far a . Venizeloa i i oni a ■■'■A, I i 
ong by But for the I gland q 

tion and the surprise of the Europeai 
Ik; nrould have been out of office at the 
period I predicted. Hi-, greatnesi offended 
people in ould hardly imagine. 

The man irhc d modern Greece had at. 

all - from the scene in order 

thai might emerge {'r<>iii 

their obscurity. J felt it first in July, 1913, 

and J became firmly convinced of it in the 

months that followed. 

When European v.ar hrok': out J had 
no doul ' ' .1 knew 

that be iranted a . and lasting alliance 

amongst the little nations, and I could not 
believe lize 

the liberty, th 

hound up. 

indeed irere the independence and . 
of Roumai] : . the defeat of Austria and 

Germany, J}., bethought 

i . I did, and as a con .o^.uorj^o- that he realized 
from the beginning that our highest moral 
duty, not ! o. hut aJso in . 



874 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

sped, of our interests as nations, was to do all 
in our power to bring about the victory of the 
Triple Entente. 

Willi the fixed idea in my head of bring' 
ing over all the Balkan nations to the side of 
the Triple Entente, and in spite of Austro- 
German affirmations concerning their hold on 
Bulgaria, I allowed myself to telegraph and 
write to Venizelos, begging him to help us to 
show, in this European crisis, that we were 
broad-minded Europeans. 1 said it would he 
the worse for us if we showed ourselves petty 
and provincial. A victorious Germany would 
spell moral and material death. A Triple 
Entente victorious without our help would 
spell our moral undoing. 

I told him that just as I was advising my 
country to make territorial concessions to the 
Bulgarians, and advising the Serbs to do the 
same thing on a substantial scale, as the war 
would give them a magnificent territory ex- 
tending up to the frontiers of Italy, so Greece, 
in a lesser degree, should also set an example, 
more especially as splendid compensation 
awaited her in Asia Minor. It was in Au- 
gust and Septemher, 1914, that I ventured to 
write in this strain to my friend at Athens. I 
will come hack to it later. For the sake of 



ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS 275 

truth I ought to say that Venizelos replied 
to me in the autumn that Greece could not 
make any territorial concessions, and I felt 
rather hitter about it. Bitter because, al- 
though I did not think that I could influence 
the decisions of a Venizelos, I saw that Veni- 
zelos was even more than I had guessed the 
victim of difficulties originating in people 
without foresight, and who, therefore, cannot 
understand those who have this divine gift. 
The revelations Venizelos has recently made- 
have completely cleared this matter up. 

Never did he appear to me greater than 
after I had read the two memoranda he ad- 
dressed to King Constantino. 

I am one of those who have read and re- 
read Bismarck's Memoirs. There is nothing in 
them which approaches the greatness of soul 
revealed in the two documents penned by 
Venizelos. How could a man like myself fail 
to resent the ironic fate of these two papers, 
addressed as they were to people incapable of 
using them. 

The publication of the documents not only 
exalts Venizelos higher than ever, hut is an 
inestirnahle service to Greece. 

To prove to the Bulgarians that a Greek 
existed, the greatest Greek of all, who eon- 



876 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

ceived the possibility of sacrifice in order i<> 
secure peace witli his neighbors, that is a Oner 
work than striking medals with the effigy of 
King Constantine <>n them, entitled the 
"Slayer 6f Bulgars." 

And now we eome to Venizelos' last act. 
A i fifty he retired from political life, an- 
nouncing that if ever his country found her- 
self faced with a great foreign crisis he would 
return to the fray, ms would be his right and his 
duty. And after having affirmed with all his 
strength his right as a free man to fight no 
matter whom, he retires as a free man, an- 
aouncing to his people thai it is the last serv- 
ice he can render the Crown. 

This resignation of Venizelos, however dis- 
tracting \'nv all the friends of Greece, presents 

one with the spectacle of almost superhuman 
greatness. This man would only have to 
march straight ahead and everything would go 
down before him. But afraid of wounding 

Greece, he performed an act of sacrifice that 

was harder than dying itself, and exiled him- 
self from the company of the living. 

Compare the fall of Venizelos with that of 
Bismarck, and the superiority of our GrSBCO- 



ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS 277 

Latin race over the Germans will stand out in 
all its sublimity. Dismissed by a young Em- 
peror, Bismarck knows neither how to fight 
as a man or be silent as a man. He scolds 
like a discharged cook. Why this difference? 
Was Bismarck of inferior metal to Venizelos? 
It was not this, but that Bismarck belonged 
to a nation which for centuries has held the 
notion that the statesman is not the servant 
of his country but the servant of his king, and 
that the king himself is not the highest ex- 
pression of the national will, but another will 
superimposed on that of the nation. 

Bismarck was heavily weighted by medieval 
institutions and a life of obedience, and, when 
dismissed like a servant, like a servant he cried 
aloud. The Greek, true son of the French 
revolution, knows that he is the servant of the 
people, and when he surrenders everything it 
is to the people that he makes his sacrifice. 
He withdraws as a free man without recrimi- 
nation. 



And now for a final recollection! 

The last time Venizelos came to Roumania, 
I had a talk with him in the embrasure of one 
of the windows of the Palace. We spoke of 



8T8 BOMB PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

that political philosophy bo which men con* 
cerned with the busincn <>f Government al* 

wji.vs Imik Iciek. Amongst oilier things, we 

spoke of the relations between the statesman 
;»imI his Sovereign in countries where mon* 
ttrchy is still an institution And the Cretan 
said i<> me: "It is our duty i<> devote our 
heart, our brain, our life to strengthening and 
supporting our sovereigns! We know well 
enough that» in their turn, they will only dis- 
miss us if they cannol destroy us ( All the 
same, we must do <mr duty, because ii is our 

duly." 

Venizelos has done his. 



7 - t Kat jet 



XXIX 

THE KAISER 

I have only seen the Kaiser once. To speak 
of him after this single interview would be 
rash, if the Kaiser were not one of those fig- 
ures which are always posed for the camera 
and whose characteristics can be almost in- 
stantaneously caught. Pope Leo XIII had 
also only seen him once, at the outset of his 
reign, when he said of him, "This man will 
end in a catastrophe. ,, 

It was in January, 1907, at Berlin, that I 
was received in audience by the Kaiser. There 
was luncheon afterwards, to which, apart from 
the Court, no one else was asked except Herr 
Tchirsky, then Foreign Minister, and the 
Roumanian Minister to Germany, on whose 
unfortunate behaviour during our war it is be- 
yond me to express an opinion. I was waiting 
and chatting with the Empress in a little room 
opening into the dining-room, when the Kaiser 
came in. I was at once struck by his machine- 
made stride, and when he planted himself less 

281 



2H2 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 
than two puces in front of me, his steely eyes 

Looking Straight into mine, the impression of 

something mechanical became still stronger. 
The Kaiser's stare is like nothing I have ever 
seen before, quite abnormal in its intensity, 
and distinctly suggestive of madness. For 

perhaps ten minutes he talked to me in 
the anteroom. Question followed question 
breathlessly, giving me scarcely time to frame 
an answer to one before it was followed by 
another. 

It was clear that the Emperor meant to 
make himself pleasant. The evening before 
he had taken the trouble to inquire whether 
I would rather be talked to in French or 
English. I had said I would prefer French. 
Needless to say, I was surprised at so obvious 
an intention of ingratiating himself: a Rou- 
manian Minister of Finance was hardly so 
important that the Fmperor of all-powerful 
Germany should be at such pains to please 
him. I naturally concluded that the Kaiser 
was a master of the art of seduction, and 
later on my impression of this resemblance to 
Nero was confirmed. 

The Kaiser started by telling me that he 
knew me very well already from the reports 
of Kidcrlen-Waechter, his Minister in Rou- 



THE KAISER 98$ 

mania, who bad told him aB about me. "1 
don't know," be said, "if your brother* are 
fond of you, but my Minister'* apprei 

and affection for more than broth- 

erly." If': nrent on to talk to me of the diffi- 
culties of a Minister of 1 nance in our time; 
then leading the conversation— if an avalanche 

of interjections can be called a co nv ersation — 
to the question of petroleum in Roumania ; he 
said to me in a cutting tone that he did not 
propose to have any interference from Amer- 
ica in Europe an affairs, and that he looked 
upon the full exploitation of our petroleum 
one of the bulwarks against her eneroach- 
mer. 

Of this preliminary conversation this 
the one point clearly impressed on me. It 
. plain that the Kaiser, as the world has 
since had ample reason to know, detested 
America. 

During lunch — I was seated on the I. 
peroral left, his daughter being on mi right 
hand — and afterwards for more than an hour 
in the smoking-room, William II talked to 
me without ce PPHlg from one sub- 

ject to another with an inconsequence and a 
feverish impatience which I bad never pre- 
viously encountered. EL bent on .ho/.- 



884 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

in^» me that lie was little short of omniscient; 
he even talked to me of the Roumanian monu- 
ment in the Dobrudja the so-called Tropeum 
hy Adam Ceissi and h<- was evidently pleased 

and surprised when I told him that Molll c 

had spoken of it in his hook on his early 
travels. 

Among a thousand other things, the Kaiser 
asked me how King Charles had always man- 
aged to get his own way, in spite of our par- 
liamentary system. I told linn in reply that 
the King had always had the wisdom to let 
matters take their course, except in special 
questions which he thought of particular im- 
portance, and that in these his influence was 
consequently decisive! The Emperor then 
asked me why his brother-in-law, King George 
of Greece, was not similarly successful, and I 
gave him my explanation. During tin's part 
of the conversation I realized again how pro- 
found was the Kaiser's contempt for liberal 
ideas and the constitutional system. It was 
plain that he was sincere when he declared 
that Providence had chosen him as its instru- 
ment to insure the happiness of this poor- 
world, just as Nero was sincere when be be- 
lieved himself a great artist. 

After that we wi:rc talking of sport, espe- 



THE KAI8EB 280 

. : I I 

me if King < I 

• 'J. 'J bat fa . 
d Ac K 
re* r d tempt r ' 

I 
. . . 
Here I bad I duo, 

taJ i 

P 

I 

I 
[ . 

H 

I 
Junrrh, but 



180 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

by Monsieur Teliii :,l. y, AS "a. souvenir of my 

vi, ii to Berlin," 

I li.-iv( never seen the Kaiser since, but some 
years later, in conversation at Potsdam with fl 
Roumanian lady, a musician, married to ft 
German, the Emperor asked her if she was 
German by birth, and when she answered that 
she was a Roumanian the Kaiser said in reply: 
"Well, and how is our good Take Jonesou?" 
and my musical friend, who was tempera- 
mentally a courtier, told me of this [mperial 
apostrophe as if it were almost s divine honori 

Of my single interview with the German 
autocrat I retain a disquieting recollection, Et 
was plain to me that he was a man out ol* 
the ordinary mn, and yet there was soon 
thing abnormal, almost unhealthy, about him 
wliieli kept in*- perpetually asking myself what 
be would ultimately do. The contemplation 

Of Peal greatness provokes a serene sense of 

admiration. That was not the impression left. 
on me by the Kaiser. On the other hand, li< - 
did not strike me as a man of commonplace 
qualities, whom the accident of birth had 
placed in a situation out of all proportion 
to his natural capacity, Rather, there was 
something exceptional about him, but it was 
something incalculable and alarming, 



THE KAISEB 287 

From Kiden'en-V. ei I knew already 

Hie Ka. .'.: . ::.'. bods of E at 

and fuJi of danger. Every morn- 
ing he went to the Foreign Mi 

be had all the telegram* read to him and de- 
manded immediate replies. Then he drank a 
glass of port, ate two biscuits and departed. 
To prevent his monarch's impulsiveness re- 
sulting in complications. Kiderlen had re- 
course to a plan of his own. He only showed 
the Kaiser such telegram* as had been received 
up to one o'clock in the morning, those, that 
is, which he had himself had time to consider, 
so that he was in a ;. ary, to 

withstand the Emperor's impetuosity. 

The great question which remains, and will 
always remain,, to be answered is how the 
Kaiser, whom a German once described to 
me as a lath painted to look like steel, brought 
himself to the point of launching universal 
war. and when he actually chc . date of 

August, 1914. The oftener I recall the im- 
pr<: left on me by my interview with 

him. the more firmly I believe that the war 
had long been part of his deliberate pol 
but that the choice of the moment and the 
form of its declaration were due to hnpul 
It would otherwise be incomprehensible that 



288 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

the Kaiser, who certainly did not lack brains 
(like his son, whom Kiderlen-Waechter 
frankly treated as deficient), should have 

risked Jill the hopes of his country and his 

house at that particular moment, and for the 
sake of a question which exclusively concerned 
Austria-Hungary. For in the future of Aus- 
tria-Hungary William 11 had no confidence. 
So long ago as the autumn of* L012 Heir von 
JagOW, a favorite of the Kaiser, and then Ger- 
man Ambassador at Home, said to the Rou- 
manian Minister thai the great question of the 
hour was to discover how the inevitable dis- 
solution of Austria-Hungary could take place 
without the destruction of the European 
fabric. Again, in the early days of Novem- 
ber, 1918, on my way hack from Athens, 
where I had succeeded in making peace be- 
tween Turkey and Greece, I was dining with 

the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. 
During the evening the German Ambassador, 

von Wangenheim, now dead, who was also a 
favorite of the Kaiser, and whom I then met 
for the first time, carried me off into the bay 
of a window, and after first congratulating 
me on what I had done at Athens, said to me, 
in so many words, "You will see that the sick 
man of Europe, the Turk, will still be here 



THE KAISEB %H f .) 

when Austria-Hungary is no more Hum 
toiical recollection." So the Kaiser i 
hare been under no illu to the po ..- 

bflity of giving the Hapsburg Empire a new 
lease of life 

How then can ire explain his policy? Per- 
haps the key Cfln be found in a confidential 
statement be made at Potsdam in the early 
days of August. 191 * ; to the Crown Prince of 
Roumania. The E m peror told him that it 

i in the interest of Roumania • r : ber- 

at the side of Gerrnar ory 

beyond question, be Austria-Hun- 

gary could not last for more than twenty 

Irs, and Germany would tl e Transy!- 

vania to Roumania. The Kaiser's crime 
ag;, world is therefore all 

the more unpardonable, because in bis inm 
heart he could not believe that it would bring 
9 of great European upheavals to a 
close. Ife drew the sword, not to pi 
Austria, but b I to dispose of her ulti- 

mately in his own fashion and at his own time. 

It must not be supposed.. l I have 

only spoken to the Kaiser once, that this con- 
versation is my only material for the estinv 
I have framed of him. At. I Will ill tin. 

e explanation of his d er, and 



890 SOME PERSONAL [MPRESSIONS 

like all men who are not really courageous, 
when the Kaiser decided i<> make daring the 
keynote <>f his policy, he overdid ii. An inci- 
dent of the early years <>l" his reign with which 
I nin acquainted reveals him precisely. Bis- 
marck had no love Tor him, and lost no occa- 
sion to make the Kaiser understand that li<' 
was a figurehead, and that the real authority 
rested with his Chancellor. Me went so Car in 

this that one day, when Hie Kmperor asked 

him to promote a diplomatist <>r minor rank 

for whom he had a, liking, Bismarck enrlly 

refused. In spile of this the Emperor stuck 

to his point and returned to it several times. 

Bismarck remained immovable. Paced with 
this situation, the Emperor had neither the 
strength of mind to abandon his demand nor 

to give his instructions aS an order. The ten- 
sion became so great that someone in the 

Kaiser's immediate circle went to Ilolslein 
and asked him to use his well-known influence 
with Bismarck to bring an impossible situa- 
tion to an end. Bismarck would not hear a 
word of it. Ilolslein at length decided to 

make a fresh attempt the day before tne 

Kaiser was starting on a cruise in the North 
Sea. Just as he was embarking he was told 
that there were indications of Bismarck giv- 



THE KAISEB 291 

ing way. During the whole the Bm- 

per< restless* nervous, and irritable, and 

dared to say a word against 
ChanoeUor. At Hie first point at winch be 
touched in Norway be learned the news thai 
Bismarck had at last yielded Hi* delight 
was overwhelming. He atly 

pjf:. a child, Kiderlen-Waechter, •■ 

accompanied hirn. and had told Hoi stein how 
necessary it was that this small satisfaction 
should be given to the Emperor, was more 
than astonished at the spectacle of the master 
of all Germany literally jumping with joy at 
having been able to promote a eivil servant. 
This is the same man who. when the day came 
on whieh he decided to o '.he builder of 

modern Germ cted with recklesf audac- 

ity and an absolute want of proportion or 
delicacy-- once a the weak man over- 

doing it. It was probably in the same fashion 
that he brought about the world war. J'"or 
years be bad wished for it, but he shrank from 
making the election. As soon as he had made 
a step forward he recoiled from the decisive 
measure — the essentially timorous man again, 
willing to wound but yet afraid to strike. 

B it on the day when he had screwed his 
courage to the sticking point his impetuosity 



2<)2 SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 

became nearly insane, for it was insanity on 
the part of the Kaiser to declare war himself 
in place <>r provoking his adversaries and 
forcing them to declare it on him. 
The complex personality of the Emperor 

William and the dreadful penalty which hu- 
manity has paid because the last Hohenzollern, 

instead of being the traditional Prussian sov- 
ereign, not too intellectual but full of com- 
mon-sense, was half a madman and half a 
genius, must confirm US all in the profound 
conviction that the well-being of a country 
and of the world is a charge too serious to 
depend on the accidents of absolutism. 



